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INDIANA AT CIVIL WAR TIME,

A CONTRIBUTION TO CENTENNIAL PUBLICATIONS



BY
OLIN DEE MORRISON
Author of
Indiana, "Hoosier State," Three Volumes

Dedicated To Two Grandfathers in Union Armies
One of Whom did not Return

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

O. P. Morton

INDIANA'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNOR

PREFACE

This study consists of a research project started several years ago under the direction of the late Logan Esarey of the History Department, Indiana University, and to which five chapters have been added. Inspiration for publication was supplied by desire to preserve the study for the value it has for history, to add to Indiana's contribution to the commemoration of the Civil War. This author had hoped that such a time would somehow result in the production of a more balanced history of the war by a committee of historical scholars inspired by the desire for truth and seasoned temperament on which later writing and teaching could be based; certainly there is evidence of such a need when judged from viewpoints of product of college and universities, public schools and views of the public in general. Perhaps an objective study of President Abraham Lincoln himself would be as much of a contribution as anything; certainly his refusal of all attempts at solution by discussion and negotiation and his tricking of the South into firing on Fort Sumter, and the forces back of it, need further analysis. Why should the traditional settlement by sectional agreement have been scrapped so lightly and so positively even at the expense of deaths of so many hundreds of thousands and the upsetting of the lives of as many others in the total war of the time?

The South did not want the problem to be settled that way only, nor did the great majority of the North, and increasingly Mr. Lincoln was unhappy with the course of events. The voters never had a chance to express their wishes in the matter; nor had the Congress, even after the departure of southern members, until after the war had started. No one would argue that no good came from the conflict, but that good could have come anyway. Developments were pushed too far and too fast by a very small minority from only a section of the United States. The more the historian studies the situation the more he wonders that that small group was able to control and direct events until final unconditional surrender even with the leverage of the "firing on the flag" at Fort Sumter, so ignorant were the people and undeveloped were agencies for shaping and directing mass public opinion. The central figure in this study is Indiana's nationalist war governor, Oliver P. Morton, without whom, perhaps, the state could not have been held so firmly in support of the war, and without which other states in the West and possibly Ohio would not have supported the war so strongly, and without which the Northeast could not have continued the war, much less have won it so decidedly. His method was that of the dictator, machine politician, manipulator of everyone from private citizen to state and federal government and President Lincoln to win the point of complete surrender of the Confederacy through the war and keep it that way after he had complete conversion to radical reconstruction program as early as late 1865.

As for sources used for this study, this author has tried to remain free from modern comment and balance document against document

from the vantage point of one hundred years later. All documents in public possession and still in original form and concerning Governor Morton are believed to have been used. Then there are the documents in published form, some of which have secondary comment. The Terrell, Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Indiana, some 4,500 pages in eight volumes, is easily the most valuable official source of information, but it exudes war hatreds and the spirit of name-calling on persons who did not unquestioningly go along with dictatorship. And again it deals mostly with the armed forces, recruitment, supply, organization, engagements and muster, controlling opposition to the war. Much of its non-military material was republished by Indiana state agencies in 1960 and it was a definite contribution to making research materials available, since the original "Report" had long been out of print. But regretably it still left the traditional story, one-sided and biassed, and unsafe reading for unassisted and uninformed persons. Hatreds may be necessary for war time; certainly they should be understood as existing then, but why so deliberately perpetuate them so many years after the end of the great struggle? No state has shifted its position on the war in the last one hundred years. And as for states in general, perhaps, too much money is being frittered away with superficiality in Centennial publications on the war.

It will be evident at a glance that footnotes have disregarded some academic falderal, without, it is hoped, sacrificing clarity. And some documents have been reclassified since the major part of the research was finished; they, of course, could not be relocated. Librarians at State Historical Library and Indiana Archives have been most helpful. Much credit is due also to my wife, Elda Marie Morrison, for her part in the painstaking preparation of manuscript.

152 North Congress Street
Athens, Ohio

Olin Dee Morrison

INDIANA AT CIVIL WAR TIME

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INDIANA AT CIVIL WAR TIME

I. PROLOGUE: THE STATE ABOUT 1860

1. Social-Economic Situation

CIVIL WAR is conflict at its worst and in the light of modern teachings the most difficult to justify. It is a case of brother against brother, and hard-earned resource wasted in hurried desire to to prevail. It is one section of a country against another, the breakdown of organized government, the disruption of society and economic development, often times without clear understanding of causes or consequences that might follow. And leadership may be a definite but well-organized minority. Such was the case in Indiana in the period of the Great Conflict, 1861-1865. And so evenly were the forces balanced against each other that the student of today can hardly understand how forces of change came to predominate.

1. The People and their Social Situation

What was this Indiana that was confronted with prospect of war in the spring of 1861? It was definitely a rural state in which there were beginnings of commercial industrialism. Population had increased from 990,000 in 1850 to 1,350,000 in 1860. In the latter year more than half of its citizens were native-born and had lost ties with the lands of their origin in the East and in western Europe. But four counties had population in excess of 20,000 (Dearborn, Jefferson, Marion, Wayne). Settlement at the northwest was sparce. Earlier arrivals had come from the East directly, mostly from Pennsylvania and Ohio, or by a series of moves westward. Many had entered from the South (Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina) after generations of pushing ahead and were especially backward educationally and in general outlook. By 1860 they had penetrated as far north as Winamac by way of the Wabash river and the Michigan road and some were active politically; some had fled the South to get away from competition with plantation economy and negro monopolization of the best rural jobs. In 1860 Indiana had more persons of Southern ancestry than had any other northern state.

Foreign immigration accounted for about ten per cent of the people. These newcomers were principally from the British Isles and the Germanies, along with a few French. More than half were German; the Irish ranked next and were followed by English and French. Sons of Erin, especially, along with the British, took work jobs as canal, road and railroad builders, did some farming, and mingled easily with older residents; but the Irish did not easily forget the glories of Old Ireland. Germans lived in more compact communities and clung to their customs and language, especially in school and church. Counties with most foreign-born were Marion, Laporte, Vanderberg and Allen, where they were engaged in the brewing business, horticulture and other business pursuits. Many Hoosiers were poor and illy informed about the ways of the world, but were well able to live the rural life.


MICHIGAN
LAKE MICHIGAN
ILLINOIS
OHIO
KENTUCKY
Michigan City
Crown Point
WATERSHED
MORAINES
River
St. Joseph R.
South Bend
Elkhart
Elkhart R.
Angola
LAKE COUNTRY
WATERSHED
St. Joseph R.
Kankakee
Knox
River
Warsaw
Maumee
Ft. Wayne
St. Marys
SAND
Tippecanoe
Eel River
AREA
Little R.
OF LAKE
Kentland
LIMIT
Wabash
Logansport
Mississinewa
UPPER WABASH
Salamonie
River
MORAINES
Kokomo
R.
Lafayette
Covington
Sugar Creek
Lebanon
Winchester
1285 Ft.
Anderson
Newcastle
Richmond
Indianapolis
Greencastle
River
White River
MORAINES
White water R.
River
Terre Haute
Wabash
LOESS
276 Miles
OF
Bloomington
GLACIATION
177 Miles
Sullivan
KARST
SINKHOLES
Bedford
Laughery Creek
PLAINS
Rising Sun
East Fork
White
Muscatatuck Creek
OLD DRIFT
Madison
Vincennes
420
Patoka R.
Jasper
Princeton
English
River
Blue River
Ohio River
Jeffersonville
Little Pigeon Cr.
Anderson R.
Evansville
Tell City
Mt. Vernon
Ohio
Altitude in Feet:
To 500
500-1000
1000-1285

A further analysis will be of service. Church was valued more than formerly; there was still a strong tendency to individualism. Marriage and homelife was the standard of the day, and was largely self-subsistent on the farm and in the towns. The wife was queen around the house in non-controversial matters; the husband ruled beyond. Few persons moved about once they were established.Roads were passable in summer months at least; canals had moved goods and passengers; railroads came with a rush in the 1850's to compete successfully in transportation; feeder lines were by wagon. Business centered at Cincinnati, Chicago, Indianapolis, Louisville, Richmond and Fort Wayne. Indiana was prosperous in the 1850's, as property values soared, and was expressed in the production of livestock,cereals,potatoes, meatpacking, etc. Flax and hemp were giving way for sheep and wool, wild meat to butter, wild grasses to domesticated varieties. The new prosperity was reflected in dress for both men and women; children's clothing was that of their elders in mineatute. Society was democratic, especially in farming communities, but allowance was already being made for wealth and the professions, the law and politics especially. More than half of the people still lived in log houses. Many activities passed unnoticed in the law, but horse-stealing was still a serious crime; drunkenness was under heavy attack by advocates of the "Maine law" and some gains were made by local option under the law of 1853 and license system after 1859. Sabbath day was by no means uniformly observed.

Social gatherings and the regular course of life made for contacts with other persons. Barbacue was monopolized for political gatherings. Some 150 newspapers reflected their parts of the state. Circuses moved about in limited fashion. Fairs were of great interest and educational. Concerning formal education our rural Hoosier would recognize the merit of being able to read and do signatures and do simple mathematical computations, but being able to "speak proper" was not too complimentary. Vocational education was obtanned informally. Backwoods life had induced a rough boisterousness. But people were hospitable to neighbors and to strangers; they were superstitious and ignorant of the outside world and many went by signs and portents ents. They were rather distrustful of government, would keep it simple, and thought men were rather equally able to vote and fill public office and should not be pushed around. Professor Esarey has said that the year 1843 had marked the lowest decline of culture in the state; there was steady improvement after that. The matter of woman's rights was of small public interest; however, in 1846 women were given the right to make wills and have their property exempted from liability for debts of the husband.

In the light of the still common view that slavery itself was the basic occasion for the war, it will be of interest to review the position of the negro in the state.They had never made up more than one per cent of the total population and were mostly at the south. Long before 1860 negroes in general were unwelcome in the state. They were regarded as immoral and stupid, as a definite social liability. That view was especially strong among Southerners. The attitude was an active one. Laws had been enacted to keep the negro from entering the state or remaining in it. Negroes were denied the right to vote and to

POPULATION GROWTH, 1840-1870

4. 1840



5. 1850



6. 1860



7. 1870



Per Square Mile

serve in the militia. Intermarriage with whites carried heavy penalties. After 1831 negroes entering the state must post bond for good behavior and security against becoming a public charge. The constitution of 1851, too, approved by a large majority, prohibited by heavy fine free negroes from entering the state. A law of 1853 declared against negroes testifying in court in cases in which whites were concerned. As for slavery in the early 1850's at least, it was regarded as an out-of-state problem which should be continued as a system of control for negro population; certainly Indianans would do nothing about it in the states where it was. But forces were at work to upset that viewpoint and working out of New England, in part through church, education and newly arrived Gernans. Quakers, Methodists and Cogregationalists campaigned against slavery but they were in minority. "Underground Railway" and abolitionist booklets and the publicity given "rescue cases" sought constantly for public support against the slave system until slave owners in the Upper South charged the North with conspiring to rob them of their property in spite of federal law to the contrary. Colonization of negroes elsewhere was regarded favorably. Both parties played down the negro question in the election of 1860.

2. Politics in the 1850's to March 4, 1861

Some of the above-named matters were of minor political interest. Whigs were more favorable to reform than were the Democrats. People's party favored prohibition of manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Its members were Protestant, native-born and over twenty-one years of age. Know Nothings (American party) would restrict immigration, elect to public office only native-born citizens, oppose Catholicism and promote strictly American ideas and institutions. Many persons hoped that the Compromises of 1850 would allow political controversy to subside, and so it did until the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 disrupted party organization. . Oliver P. Morton of New England and New Jersey ancestry, from south of Centerville, and educated at Miami University in Ohio, broke with the Democrats and went Free Soiler. Other Democrats went into the Fusion party as a compromise position; it won the election of 1854. Some splinter groups as early as 1855 gravitated to Republicanism and opposition to the expansion of slavery. John D. Defrees, Whig, and M. C. Garber, ex-Democrat, were credited with formation of the local Republican group.

In the election of 1856, the struggle for Kansas attracted much attention; Peoples' Party would send aid to the anti-slavery group there. Know Nothings opposed expansion of slavery, favored prohibition in the liquor traffic and would make citizenship a prerequisite for voting; it named Willard Fillmore for president and Oliver P. Morton for the governorship. Morton would admit Kansas as a free state, oppose expansion of slavery into the territories and not interfere with slavery where it was. Democrats nominated Ashbel P. Willard of New Albany for governor and stood for the Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska law, 1854. Voters had little enthusiasm for either John C. Fremont, Republican, or James Buchanan, Democrat, party nominees for the presidency. Elections went Democratic in nation and state except for the Senate which got a Republican majority. Democrats were strongest south of the Old National Road. The division in the General Assem-



9. Navigable Rivers More or Less



10. GENERAL LIMIT OF SETTLEMENT
"Yankee" Southerner
Some Cities Trading with the South

bly resulted in a delay in the election of United States senators and which was resolved in 1857 by the election of Jesse D. Bright and Graham Fitch, Democrats and pro-slavery men. But revenue and appropriation bills were not enacted and state institutions were closed for six months. By this time Morton was prominent in the Republican party. In 1857 the Dred Scott decision seemed to open the state to slavery and the "anti's" began to run out to Republican ranks. Democrats divided further on the Kansas situation; Bright and Stephen A. Douglas were at loggerheads over the future of slavery there, but soon Douglas had the majority support. Republicans in 1858 opposed the Lecompton bill. In the fall elections, Democrats won the state ticket, less the General Assembly. Republicans won the Congressional delegation.

All this was preface to the election of 1860. Democrats had been strong in the state since 1843, but now their numbers were thinned too a bare majority; Douglas had their support for the most part in 1859. "Americans" were standoffish with the Republicans, some of the latter being too clearly anti-slavery to suit them. For the approaching election both major parties moved early to hold state conventions. Douglas-men controlled the state Democratic convention in January; Thomas A. Hendricks was named for the governorship and David Turpie for lieutenant governor, with the understanding that Hendricks, if elected, would be elected to the United States Senate and Turpie would move up to the governor's office. The convention accepted the Kansas-Nebraska act and the Dred Scott decision harmoniously.

Republicans were disrupted by need for a definite stand on slavery. They could agree that it should not expand but not as to the method for blocking it. No one seemed quite to realize that plantation economy could not possibly live in any of the territories, but the politicians were out for votes. Henry S. Lane, who probably had not an enemy in the world, was the most available candidate for governor and he got the nomination with the understanding that Oliver P. Morton, named for lieutenant governor would move up to the governorship and Lane would go to the federal Senate, if the ticket was successful in the election. Evidently the parties were putting their best face forward to catch the votes but both had strong tickets. Republicans won in the state elections in October.

In the national campaign, schism continued to prevail in the Democratic camp. Two candidates for the presidency were named: Stephen A. Douglas and John C. Breckinridge. For the Republican convention at Chicago, the Indiana delegation was instructed to vote for Abraham Lincoln, he too, reputedly moderate and able to attract the moderate vote. Evidently these tickets, too, were being named with a view to winning elections. Constitutional Unionists, mostly old Know Nothings named John Bell of Tennessee and Edward Everett of Massachusetts, but some voted Republican. Only Republicans and Douglas Democrats had both state and county tickets. The campaign was moderate; issues were kept out of the campaign. The vote in November was close. Republicans won on the national ticket. Lincoln received 139,000 state votes; Douglas, 115,500. In the national campaign, threats of secession, if Lincoln won the Presidency, got little serious attention. The tariff issue was not pressed in Indiana. Most Republicans gave no support to abolitionism. Democrats charged that victory for the Republicans would re-

12-15

AREAS OF MOST AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1859

12. Corn



13. Most Improved Land



14. Wheat



15. Tobacco



sult in civil war for the mastery of the national government or a peaceful division of the country. Republicans won the presidency by an electoral majority, but not a vote came from any seceded state, and only by stressing moderation. Their platform opposed all schemes for division of the country, opposed expansion of slavery and recognized the right of states to control their own institutions according to their judgment. Bu the national vote in November Lincoln won the votes of all northern states except three votes from New Jersey. Douglas carried Missouri only. Bell won three states: Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia. Breckinridge carried the South and Delaware. Lincoln's popular vote was 1,866,000; that of Breckinridge was 848,000; for Douglas, 1,375,000; for Bell, 591,-00; for a total of 3,480,000 votes. Essentially Lincoln had won a minority and sectional vote on a mildly sectional platform; Republicals were overjoyed. But would moderates continue to control the Republican party or were they only a front for the interventionists? Would the South try to put into effect their threats to secede with a view to negotiating a settlement form outside of the Union? There were shrewd manipulators of public opinion on both sides but Republicans would be in charge of the administration after March 4, 1861, for better or worse.

3. From the Presidential Election to the Governorship of Oliver P. Morton, January 16, 1861

The people had spoken in the November elections with regard to the issues presented to them in the campaign and had chosen moderation in the form of Henry S. Lane and Abraham Lincoln. Southerners in the Congress were not entirely outnumbered but they concluded that Lincoln and the industrial radicals composed the real test and basis for action; they thought they must resist the Republican threat to their way of life and had best do it before conditions became even more unfavorable. South Carolina seceded on December 20, 1860, and by February 1 was followed by six other states and soon the Confederacy was set up at Montgomery, Alabama, on the foundation of a new constitution based on that of the United States, but with changes in the direction of recognition of more local rights. Federal laws were not only not being enforced there, but most Union forts (not Sumter, Pickens, Jefferson, Taylor), arsenals and other property were surrendered without a contest to the states and to the Confederacy.

What should be done about secession and lack of enforcement of federal laws in the South? Through the winter of 1860-1861 they were not enforced; the Buchanan administration by doing nothing would seem to have accepted disunion at least for the time and under existing conditions. Public opinion in November and December at least did not object; no one then would argue for war to unconditional surrender. everyone hoped there would be no attempt at military coercion of the South. Some redicals in North welcomed the absence of southern members as an aid to Republicanism; and some would not attempt to appease the South. Compromise or "accommodation" proposals appeared everywhere in order to attract seceded states back into the Union, but the offerings were not mature or may not have been attractive enough. No one in the state yet would war to unconditional surrender as final solution. Democrats pressed solution by compromise and so would wreck the Republican party. Business south of the National Road already

AREAS OF MOST AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1859

17. Cattle



18. Manufacturing



SOME AREAS OF MOST CHURCH MEMBERSHIP, 1859

19. Friends



20. Methodists



SOME AREAS OF MOST CHURCH MEMBERSHIP, 1859

21. Christian



22. Lutheran



23. Catholic



24. Baptist



suffered from loss of trade with the South. And Hoosier conservatives were appalled at the prospect of being ruled by reformer Easterners in the Lincoln administration.

The loomed the question of what to do should compromise fail to appease the South. To this proposals ranged from allowing seceders to go in peace --peaceful sccession -- to regrouping the states so that all would be satisfied, to refusal to conciliate and turning the problem over to the interventionists for law enforcemant or coercion or war. Some radical eastern Republicans would resist all efforts at compromise; they gradually took the position that if it came to the worst, coercion or war would be worth while in that it would end slavery and advance industrial capitalism and save the Republican party. Immature president-elect Lincoln was allowing the storm to blow itself out against the South while more positive men labored at solution. The great mass of the people North and South had little information on which to base decision or evaluation. By the turn of the year some rugged souls were beginning to appear in the West who would make no compromise with "treason." In Indiana Oliver P. Morton was one of those persons. In recent years he had been a Democrat-American-Fusionist-Republican and lawyer with a comfortable income at Centerville just outside of the rising industrial community of Richmond, and always on the lookout for advancement. As early as November 22 he waslooking past failure of compromise efforts (which were never really attempted) and boldly proclaiming coercion (war) as the final arbiter. and as exponent of rising industrialism; the South could go free only if it would winit by force. Otherwise, as he saw it, the Northwest would be shut off from the world by the course of events. He would not recognize that the railroads had already broken economic and hence political ties with the South and tied together eastern and western parts of the North in new political and social alliance; he plowed straight ahead into war unless the seceded states would surrender all. He would inspire and support the federal government in every effort at enforcement of the laws, call it coercion or war, as far as he was concerned. He would not recognize secession; in it he saw only national ruin.

The Buchanan cabinet early in January was abandoned by members from the seceding states. President Buchanan in December has asked the Congress for additional authority for law enforcement; he thought states had no right to secede and that he had no authority to use military force to bring them back into the Union; he recommended a compromise line above which the North would be in control and below which the South would control. Early in January the Democratic party in Indiana proposed to have the state mediate between North and South; It opposed coercion of the seceded states. Thomas A. Hendricks, Democratic candidate for governor in the last election supported those views. "Union" meetings were being held over the state to discover effective compromise proposals. The General Assembly met in January 10; its attention, too, was confined mostly to formulating such plans to satisfy the seceded states and bring them back into the Union. As for legislative matters, Republicans offered a bill authorizing Govenor Morton to have repaired such arms as were in possession of the state. Democrats opposed the bill, but it passed the House. And Morton wanted

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enactment of a bill which would gerrymander the state in favor of Republicand at election time. Democrats "bolted" rather than see the measures passed. Some Republican members were opposed to compromise but general appropriation measures for operation of state government had not yet been acted on. The Democratic minority could block everything; they would return if the arms and reapportionment bills were dropped. To this administration men agreed and the bills were passed. Otherwise the principal measure enacted was one authorizing the governor to distribute among new military units such military equipment as was not already in possession of the militia.

Radical Republicans were warming up to charging the South with acts of treason, and demanding that the laws be executed and the Union be preserved by force if necessary. The calling of conventions for the drawing up of ordinances by delegates was a most talked up method of action. Amidst such a situation Republican Henry S. Lane succeeded Democratic Governor Hammond in the office of chief executive on January 14 and Morton was sworn in as lieutenant governor. Compromisers unquestionably were still in control. Then Lane was elected Unitdd States senator on January 15; Morton became acting governor the next day. He was now in a position to press "intervention" measures; he announced his determination to support every move on the part of the federal government to enforce the laws. Again, on the twenty-second, he was pleading that there be but one party, the party of the constitution and the Union. He could "know no man who will stop and prescribe conditions upon which he will maintain the flag, who will argue that a single star may be erased, or who will consent that it may be torn, that he may make choice of its tattered fragments. I will know that man only who vows fidelity to the Union and the constitution, under all circumstances and under all hazards; who declares he will stand by the constituted authorities of the land though they be not of his own choosing." Morton had not been elected on a war program; indeed he had not been elected governor at all. Was he implying that such a public official might go his own way and compel the electorate to follow him without question and regardless of the General Assembly and the courts? He definitely was in the minority on the use of war measures before the firing on Fort Sumter.

On the matter of compromise, again, Morton was entirely out of sympathy. With respect to the Virginia compromise proposals of January 19, 1861, Morton could not refuse to name state delegates to the convention but he would see to it that compromisers could not win; even at that his nominees agreed to proposals for constitutional amendments favorable to the South but which did not materialize and which could not have satisfied the South. It wanted a broader approach; it would prefer war to patching up the difficulty, but would try negotiation first, or, should negotiations fail, seceded states would still have their new government. Democrats had tried to keep the naming of delegates under their control and procrastinate until after Lincoln became president. President-elect Lincoln leaned to "law enforcement" but he hesitated to call it coercion of the states, or war. The General Assembly in majority hesitated or refused to take radical stand, preferring to allow the people to talk it out; early in March it adjourned without enacting "war measures." The federal Congress was not

in session and therefore could not assist in directing events. Lincoln on his way to Washington for the inauguration would go no farther tnan a program of law enforcement, not coercion or war. As late as the middle of March, Morton was irritated at Lincoln's hesitation to take a strong position. Lincoln was cautious and evasive, did "double talk."

In the meantime Morton and other radicals wuuld do more than try to influence public opinion. He inquired of the War Department the procedure for receiving arms for the militia. He inquired of county auditors concerning state arms that had been entrusted to them years before and found little of value. A few militia companies were being organized as early as January due to the inspiration of the radicals and were offering their services to the Governor. Morton recognized that local public opinion would not agree to a war program but thought it would be loyal should an emergency arise.

We need now to notice the sparring for advantage between "compromisers" and "interventionists" after the first of the year as the latter slowly gained ground. Abandonment of the Buchanan administration by cabinet members from the South encouraged the adoption of a little more forceful policy. Buchanan secretly sent the "Star of the West" a privately owned vessel with supplies and 200 troops to relieve Fort Sumter. It arrived off Charleston harbor on January 8, the anniversary of the Jackson victory at New Orleans in 1815. It was fired on by a Carolina battery and forced out to sea, but Sumter was not attacked even though some there favored it. Major Anderson did not return the fire, for which he was complimented by Secretary of War, Joseph Holt. Essentially the public was content to let it go at that, but of coure radicals raised a storm of protest because "the flag" had been fired on. No one was more vehement than O. P. Morton, soon to be one of the several new governors of northern states and out for blood. "Old Buck" let things rest at Charleston. So under Buchanan neither secession nor the firing on "The Star of the West" was the occasion for war.The radicals yet lacked leadership and organization to force the use of troops. Buchanan continued to play with the situation but in less dangerous waters. There had been a compromise by which the forts outside of Pensacola would not be attacked by the secessionists. Then Fort Pickens was strengthened by sending in provisions from a federal ship in the bay and the secessionists did nothing; naval vessels stood off shore. Buchanan's star of popularity rose with the radicals, then waned once more. Lincoln studied the situation from far-off Springfield, Illinois. And a brief truce was set up in negotiations between Major Anderson and Governor Pickens of South Carolina concerning the surrender of Fort Sumter, but Buchanan would not give it up; rather would he send reenforcements should Anderson request it, a matter not pressed by Anderson, since he did not want to be responsible for starting a war which would surely come in that case. Anderson favored peaceful adjustment of the difficulty. Buchanan hoped that somehow the whole problem could be solved by compromise, but he would send reenforcements in clear case of need. Late in February he moved to prevent recognition of the Confederacy by foreign capitals. The majority of his cabinet, to his regret, gradually approached the radical Republican view. Much opinion in North and South would await the acc-

STATES AND TERRITORIES, 1860
STATES IN SECESSION, 1860-1861



ession of the new administration rather than recommend action earlier. The Congress was not able to enact laws having a direct bearing on the crisis, even general appropriation measures, or advise on methods for collecting customs in southern ports. Business suffered; business interests just then promoted moves for compromise.

4. From Inauguration of Lincoln to the Firing on Fort Sumter

Abraham Lincoln became president of the United States on March 4. What was his position to that date? In general he had trailed the average in public opinion concerning the secession issue. Mostly he had listened and not talked, as he usually did when he had not reached a conclusion. But he had rejected settlement by compromise as early as December, 1860, and by so doing had scrapped the sectional balance previously in effect. He would support the Chicago platform as would most moderates. Should federal law, especially that pertaining to collection of revenues and holding its property, continue to be resisted, he would have to enforce it; but he still hesitated to call it coercion of a state; otherwise inaction in itself would allow cecession to prevail. He was still trying to draw a line between enforcement of the law and coercion. He realized that coercion might lead directly to a general war, which nationalist that he was, he must recognize as a possibility if the South committed sufficient act of aggression. In his inaugural address, he promised "to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect duties and imposts;" the South would not be assailed except to meet occasions that might arise from resistance to federal authority.

Acceptance of that program would only allow the Confederate position to disintegrate. Opinion on both sides was crystallizing either into preventing division of the Union or completing the division already started, should the North or South commit an occasion for it. The politicians were busy evaluating program in the light of what would be good or damaging to party. Observance of that program would only allow the Confederate program to go to pieces.

At the time of Lincoln's inauguration Major Anderson's position at Sumter had weakened, whether or not the Charleston market was still available for fresh foods; Anderson thought it would take at least 20,000 troops and supporting naval vessels to deliver reenforcements and realized that would start a war; hence he requested orders for speedy evaluation of his post, which would relieve him of responsibility. Lincoln must find an answer. Increasingly radicals demanded "Vigorous" policy." Lincoln gave little outward evidence of his future line of action if he had a complete one. By this time business interests were becoming interventionist, fearing financial disaster should the Union go to pieces. Congressmen were leaning increasingly to reenforcing Sumter and talking of war if need be. Then on April 4 nine Republican governors ganged up on Lincoln to induce action; Morton offered 6,000 troops, which he did not have, to support such a program. Local elections in Ohio, Connecticut and Rhode Island were going anti-Republican. Disunion at the South was gaining strength; Unionists there opposed use of force against the seceded states and would support the Confederacy if the South were attacked. Even collection of revenues and repossessing federal property became "coercion" in the view of the South. Southerners wanted recognition of independence and evacuation for Forts Sumter and Pickenn. At Washington Secretary Seward fav-

ored evacuation of Sumter and giving time for the excitement to die down and thus accomplish peaceful reunion or voluntary reconstruction; he played with southern commissioners concerning evacuation of Sumter until about April 1, when Lincoln's influence became more evident.

Political pressure on Lincoln for action mounted day by day and he was an expert in solution of problems by political manipulation. Something had to be done; the South must be put into a definite position of taking the blame for resistance to the flag or surrender. By this time the majority of the cabinet opposed evacuation of Sumter. Navy Secretary Welles pointed out the fact that Confederates would oppose any attempt at reenforcement, and thus justify use by force by the federal government. On March 31 things began to move; Lincoln ordered that an expedition be made ready to go to Charleston by sea as early as April 6 to carry "supplies" to Sumter. So far he was only duplicating the "Star of the West" episode. He gave orders to sail on the fourth and so notified Anderson. The naval vessel "Powhatan" was commonly supposed to be part of the expedition, then secretly was directed to Fort Pickens instead. When the ships were well out to sea without naval escort by that time, Governor Pickens was notified by messenger that an attempt would be made to send Sumter supplies for "brave and hungry men of the garrison;" that if the attempt were not resisted there would be no effort to throw in men, arms or ammunition without further notice. Seward had contended for relief of Fort Pickens; that then was being done too. Democrats chided Lincoln for striving to save the Republican party; certainly he was trying to pull himself out of the mess that prevailed around him and pass the blame for civil war on to others, and at the same time recoup his position. There could be no doubt as to the reception that a relief expedition would get at Charleston harbor. The radical lobbying governors of April 4 hurried home to speed war preparations. The general Sumter-crisis strategy used by Lincoln had been common talk in March. To Lincoln the expedition was quite incidental in that its major purpose was to put the Confederates in the wrong in public opinion. The South knew that Anderson would not evacuate; he could have held out until May as far as supplies were concerned. Before the expedition reached Charleston the Confederates on April 12 bombarded Fort Sumter. In North and South public opinion consolidated to support the positions of their respective governments; the deadlock was broken.

Preparations for further use of force were made. It was not a foregone conclusion that there had to be a war, but a long one was possible. Lincoln had pulled himself out of an impossible situation by seeming to go extremist and had sacrificed personnel in the administration, right and left, to do so. Secretive Lincoln confided privately to Senator Orville Browning (Browning, Diary, p. 476), "The plan succeeded. The attacked Fort Sumter -- it fell, and thus did more service than it otherwise could," but that was the short view. President Lincoln wrote Anderson on May 1, 1861: "You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if it should fail, and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified bu the result." (Journal of Southern History 3:285) In both quotations Lincoln was taking undue advantage of the other party.

His whole line of action was much as that of an attorney out to win a case much as though there was little that mattered after that. It should be added here that southern states regarded the area of the forts, arsenals, etc. as being state property in temporary occupation by the federal government and subject to change in contract at the demand of the "sovereign" state; the viewpoint was not extreme for the time. The flag must come down to satisfy the southern view. Lincoln had acted without consultation with the Congress or the courts and was not elected on a war platform. The Congress was not to meet until July after the war was well on its way. The Confederacy at least had some justification for assuming public support through secession acts and the newly created Confederate government. It was a squirmy situation "squirmingly" handled.

All of this means that while Lincoln really did less than had Buchanan in his "Star of the West" episode, he had done it differently in that if the Confederates were going to bombard anything it would be Sunter, on the assumption that a relatively strong expedition was on the way to Charleston harbor, when in matter of fact the "Powhatan" had been pulled away to go to the relief of Fort Pickens which was not in danger. Lincoln's contribution was in the assembly of factors in the relief expedition and in selection of the time for it. No one can deny that the sharpest strategy was employed on both sides to win a point; nor can he avoid the feeling that the war was rushed without adequate hearings on both sides. The election of 1860 was not a vote on war or no war, and certainly the people had an interest in the matter. And it should be said that neither the office of president nor that of governor under the constitution was very important in government before 1861. Secession was not especially rushed. The federal government in 1861 was not that of modern times. There were really no attempts at solution of the secession crisis by the federal government short of complete surrender or be crushed by military force. Of course, with the Confederacy in operation, delay on the part of Lincoln only weakened the Union side. There was much of "state sovereignty" in the North on the part of states, especially Indiana, as we shall see, but it was expressed on the side of the Union. Why must disagreement be ended suddenly or go into war until unconditional surrender result? Controversy had been eased on a sectional basis in 1820, 1850, 1854 short of war and the Union had not suffered; why did radicals want to scrap that policy in 1861?

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Sources consulted for the 1850's generally were Logan Esarey, History of Indiana (1918);Olin D. Morrison, Indiana, Hoosier State (1958); Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came, 1860-1861 (1950);.Avery Craven, The Coming of the Civil War (1952); Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Crisis, 1860-1861; E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (1950); Henry H. Simms, A Decade of Sectional Controversy (1942); James G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction (1937; Samuel W. Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War (1887); William D. Foulke, Oliver P. Morton (1899). Some of those works were of value on the secession crisis, especially that of Professor Stampp, which followed the development very closely. His articles in Journal of

Southern History, volumes III, IX, XI departed from the traditional northern approach to more nearly allow the sources to tell their own story. His Indiana Politcs during the Civil War more nearly followed the course of radical enthusiasm there. Of other accounts there are Otto Eisenschiml, Why the War Came; John S. Tilley, Lincoln takes Command; David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis, etc. Other references of value in Mississippi Valley Historical Review were 3: 275 ff.; 5: 377 ff.; 7: 93 ff.; 12: 51 ff.; 18: 500 ff.; 29: 55 ff.; 31: 41 ff.. In Indiana Magazine of History there were articles in 13: 211 ff.; 14: 183 ff.; 25: 1 ff.; 33: 277 ff.; 38: 1 ff.; 39: 1 ff.; 43: 379 ff.

II. THE RAISING OF TROOPS

1. Matters in General

THE FIRING ON FORT SUMTER broke the deadlock in public opinion with respect to adopting a policy of military force concerning seceded states and the secessionists. Telegraph was basis for rumors that such had happened but it was not until Sunday morning, April 14 1861, that confirmation was received at Indianapolis. Usual activities were disrupted; mass meetings were held; orators called for pledges of support for the federal program. No one, North or South, was prepared for war. Indiana had neither money, nor arms and munitions, nor organized militia. But, of course Governor Morton was not at all surprised at the course of events; indeed, he was the principal center from which the organized war spirit sprang. In 1861 there was practically no federal law concerning governors of states. Of Indiana law concerning that office, the Constitution decreed that the governor was commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the state and its chief executive;[1] of several statutes concerning his office, much dated from May, 1861, such as, reporting expenditures to the General Assembly,[2] ordering the payment of money for war expenses, borrowing money and buying arms, ordering the fabrication of arms at the northern and southern state prisons, approving Quartermaster's and Commissary General's bonds, calling into active service six regiments of volunteers for the defense of the state, etc. But there was no broad legislation concerning governor's war powers. Hence these laws are discussed whenever their subject matter is connected with the Governor's acts. Quite often that officer operated outside of the law, or with the consent of Washington, or in spite of the law.

The principal general classes of extra-legal acts concerned: (1) the raising of troops; (2) supplying those troops with war equipment; (3) overcoming active opposition to bringing the contest to a speedy conclusion favorable to the North; (4) various semi-official benevolent activities, such as caring for the wants of the soldiers, of their families, and of the State Institutions; and (5) management of state finances, especially from 1863 to 1865.

In April 1861, Governor Morton's problem of enabling the state to take an active part in the war was a difficult one. There were but a few thousands of dollars in the State Treasury.[3] The state had no arms

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1. Charles Kettleborough, Constitution Making in Indiana (Indianapolis, 1916), vol. I, pp. 323, 327.
2. Indiana Statutes, 1861, Special Session, Chaps. II; IV; VI, Sections 1 and 2; XLIII: LIII.
3. William Henry Harrison Terrell, Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of Indiana, Indiana in the War of the Rebellion, and Statistics and Documents (Indianapolis, 1869), vol. I, p. 3. This work will be cited hereafter as Terrell, Report.

or munitions, and no adequate organized militia or militia system.[4] Governor Morton himself had only entered upon the duties of his office, and hence was surrounded with many responsibilities and duties, ordinary and extraordinary, and new to him.

2. Details of Procedure and Results

However, public discussion of national questions had done much to prepare the North for the events that followed the firing on Fort Sumter. It enabled Governor Morton, on April 15, the morning after official confirmation of the bombardment reached Indianapolis, to telegraph President Lincoln, "In the behalf of the State of Indiana, I tender to you, in the defense of the Nation, and to uphold the authority of the Government, ten thousand men."[5] Later on the same day President Lincoln issued the call for 75,000 men for three months' service, Indiana's quota being set at 4,683. By April 19, 2,400 men were in Camp Morton. The quota was organized on April 27 as First Brigade, Brigadier General Morris commanding, the numbering beginning with Sixth Regiment, allowance being made for the five regiments of the Mexican War. It was sent to western Virginia to protect railway communications and repress secessionist activity; soon it was joined by regiments 13,14, 15 and 17 for a short period in June and July. Soon three times the number called for were in Indianapolis. Hoosiers were Unionist at least. The response to the call was so immediate, and the Governor's desire to place an overwhelming force in field so great, that on April 20, he offered six additional regiments "without conditions as to the term of service with the assurance that they would be organized, if accepted, in six days." The offer was repeated by special messenger three days later, but it was not accepted. Nevertheless, they were organized in accordance with an act of the General Assembly, and held until the call of May 16 for four regiments was received. It was filled by forming regiments of volunteers from this force.[6]

From the outbreak of the war, there was no ceasing in Morton's efforts to push it to a speedy and successful conclusion. Camps of rendezvous were at principal cities over the state, but principally at Indianapolis. Our summary of Indiana troops (infantry, cavalry, light

[4] Indiana had always had some form of militia and militia organization, but interest had come and gone with emergencies. The acts of 1852 and 1855 resulted raising of a few companies, but in 1860 there were only 500 men in the organization. Governor Lane in his message to the General Assembly in 1861 had referred to its inadequacy. The Senate defeated a bill to improve it. Ibid., pp. 1-2. See also Catherine Merrill, The Soldier of Indiana in the War for the Union (Indianapolis, 1866), vol. I, pp. 11-14.

[5] Terrell, Report, vol. I., p. 4.

[6] Ibid., pp. 4-14. Indiana Statutes, 1861, Special Session, Chap. LIII. The War of the Rebellion; a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1881-1902), Series III, vol. I, P. 80. This work will be cited hereafter as Official Records. Terrell, I. This session also defined treason against the state and named penalties; besides making appropriations for 1861-1862, it regulated expenditures, provided for auditing claims and paying for it.

artillery) an adaptation from Terrell's, Reports, gives regimental number, period of service, various locations while in service and place of muster out, in Chapter IV, which regimental history and battle record. His subservient military secretary has characterized his efforts as that he "could not and did not wait the slow and cumbrous movements of the authorities at Washington to make armies so strong as to be at once successful, overwhelming. He . . . suggested, urged, pleaded with the Government for the adoption of a more vigorous war policy, and (was) always in favor of enlarging and strengthening, by every possible means, the forces in the field. And often, when it seemed that the Government, by hesitation, inaction and delay, was on the point of sacrificing, or allowing to be sacrificed, the objects of the war by permitting great advantages to be seized by the rebels (in Kentucky especially), the Governor took grave and weighty responsibilities on himself, determining that no fault of his, nor of his State, should add to the chances of disaster or defeat."[7]

His program for enlistment, as far as numbers were concerned, was that they should be overwhelming. Upon receiving a call from the President, his plan for filling it was to issue a proclamation stating the terms of the call, and asking for volunteers to fill it. Influential men were started to work and public opinion was aroused.[8]

Recruiting officers were continually urged, encouraged, threatened, and dismissed to secure larger results. Morton induced the War Department to pay army chaplains;[9] he urged the "three months' men" in person and by letter to reenlist;[10] he visited other regiments in in the field to urge them to continue in the service;[11] he urged Sec-

[7] Ibid., vol. I, p. 19.

[8] Ibid., pp. 14-16. "For facilitating organization, camps of rendezvous were established in each Congressional District, and commandants, quartermasters, adjutants, and examining surgeons, were appointed to superintend and press forward rapid organization. These indispensible officers were selected from the men of the district, of influential character, who were especially qualified by energy and capacity for organization, as well as being conspicuous for their local popularity. Commissions were then issued to one man for each company to be raised, with pay for the service; permanent commissions in the organization being conditional upon success in enlisting recruits. Local committees were formed in each township; and, after the first year of the war, local bounties were very generally offered by the counties and townships." Ibid., p. 16.

[9] Official Records, Series III, vol. II, pp. 365 and 368.

[10] William Dudley Foulke, Life of Oliver P. Morton, including his important speeches (Indianapolis, 1899), vol, I, p. 127.

[11] New Albany Daily Ledger, June 28, 1861; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, June 28, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 28, 1861.

retary Stanton to permit him to hire first-class speakers, to canvas the state for recruits, and pay them a special premium according to their success in getting them; [12] and he used plans of his own without permission from the War Department. He assumed the responsibility of filling old regiments that were reenlisting and continued to do so until the War Department caused him to stop; [13] he appealed to the men of Indiana who on account of age or other causes were unable to volunteer, to become private-citizen recruiting officers and prepared a roll of honor upon which to record their names;[14] he secured the permission of the War Department to call in from the field one non-commissioned officer or private from each company to recruit for the company;[15] he obtained a federal paymaster at Indianapolis;[16] he kept persons opposed to the administration from raising troops and commanding them;[17] he issued a proclamation urging that resistance to the enforcement of the conscription act cease,[18] and secured the appointment of his nominees by Stanton to aid in recruiting.[19] He organized the Indiana Legion which was a very valuable means for raising federal troops, several regiments being composed almost entirely of its members.[20] He inaugurated a system of public receptions for organizations returning home, to show the gratitude of the state for their services and to induce them to reenlist.[21]

To facilitate recruiting further he modified federal regulations concerning clothing the troops, by ordering General Asahel Stone to furnish uniforms to recruits as soon as they had passed the medical examinations and enlisted. He thought the federal plan of not doing so until a company was full, too slow; because his experience had shown that a few men enlisted and uniformed, and allowed to return home for a time, make excellent recruiting officers. By this means Morton was enabled to fill regiments in less time than would otherwise have been required.[22]

The delay of federal officials in sending him the draft regulations of July, 1862, and Morton's disapproval of turning such matters over to regularly elected county and township officials, who might not meet Morton's standards, caused him to draw up his own plans which he issued on August 1, and put in force before obtaining the consent of the Secretary of War to do so. This plan contemplated the appointment

12. Official Records, Series III, vol. III, pp. 830, 834 and 835.
13. Ibid., pp. 18, 24, 56, 58.
14. Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 24, and December 7, 1863.
15. Ibid., October 26, 1863, and January 30, 1864.
16. General Dispatches, vol. III, pp. 210-211.
17. Official Records, Series III, vol. I, p. 350; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, July 8, 1863; ibid., August 19, 1863.
18. Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, p. 341.
19. General Dispatches, vol. VII, pp. 146, 147, 156 and 159.
20. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, June 25, 1862, Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 15-16.
21. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 33-35.
22. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 204-205.

SOLDIER DRAFT BY COUNTIES (less those Excused)

Drafts of Oct. 1862; Sept. 1864; March 1865



of a commissioner in each county, who was to appoint a deputy in each township. These deputies were to make the enrollment. Two enrollment lists were to be made up in each township; one to get the names of those men already in United States service, and one for the names of all others between eighteen and forty-five years of age. The lists when completed were to be returned by a fixed date, to a county commissioner, who was to fix a time when he and his deputies would sit as a board and hear and determine exemptions. The general order of the War Department was to be followed in giving notices of the draft and granting exemptions. The county commissioner was to supervise the enrollment, the draft, and all matters connected with it, instead of the sheriff and other county officers mentioned later by the Secretary of War.

Morton assigned to his system the following advantages over the federal plan: (1) a speed of execution, since special man were looking after it; (2) the draft by townships prevented sections of counties from escaping the draft even though they had not furnished their proportion of the county's quota; (3) the county commissioner and his deputies were better able to sit as an exemption board than the enrolling commissioner alone contemplated by the federal plan; (4) the sheriffs in several of the counties being of different party affiliations were men upon whom Morton could not rely, which made him all the more certain that the whole business should be conducted by a county commissioner, named by himself, with special reference to energy, zeal, and party affiliations.[23] The Secretary of War could do nothing more than accept the plan.[24]

Morton also caused himself to be appointed federal arms distributing officer for Indiana, [25] and so hastened that work. Every draft brought out the best speakers that could be found--United States senators, generals home from the field, ex-governors, governors of other states [26] and on many occasions the results deserved Secretary Stanton ton's "Well done, Indiana".[27] He also dispatched special agents to the field to encourage the reenlistment of veterans; military agents, too, had this as one of their duties; field and line officers were instructed to encourage reenlistments.[28]

23. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, August 10, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. I, pp. 163-171; Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 15, 1862.
24. E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, August 13, 1862, Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 41; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 42.
25. P. H. Watson to O. P. Morton, August 11, 1862; General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 37.
26. Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 146, 156, 158, 159, 164, 165, 170, 174, 175 176, 192, 197, 231, 232 and 233 give correspondence on the August drafts.
27. E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, August 7, 1862, ibid., vol. XV, p. 29.
28. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 30.



39. POPULATION DENSITY, 1860



40. POPULATION OF LARGER CITIES, 1850,1870

He was decidedly in favor of the enactment of the conscription law. In July, 1862, he, the state Secretaries of State and Treasury, and the Attorney-General urged upon President Lincoln the passage of such a law, and expressed their opinion that if it was not enacted before Congress adjourned he would probably have to call an extra session for that purpose. They assured him that conditions in the Northwest demanded it.[29] But even though Morton was in favor of such a law it seems that he intended it to be more of a guarantee of volunteering than for actual use, as he was constantly warning the War Department that the draft would have to be used judiciously in Indiana. He did not hesitate to recommend its use, as in May, 1863, when he was urging the federal authorities to raise enough men to open the Mississippi river to northern commerce. But once a draft quota was filled, no one more resolutely called the attention of the War Department to that fact.[30] In the spring of 1865, Morton made a special trip to Washington to figure Indiana out of the draft.[31] In short, Morton wanted to look after all such business himself and resented anyone's interfering with his raising troops, unless additional and it was positively needed to cause men to decide to enlist. He wanted means for getting men into the army and would use the draft if necessary, but preferred voluntary enlistment. And rather characteristically, too, he wanted to be the judge as to when each would be used.

In the matter of furnishing advance pay and bounty to federal recruits before they left for the field, Morton did an important work. In the summer of 1862, during the invasion of Kentucky, the federal government had offered bounty and advance pay to encourage recruiting, but no money had arrived at Indianapolis when in August thousands of men were in camp ready to leave for the front.[32] They wanted to leave

29. Official Records, Series III, vol. II, pp. 212-213; General Dispatches, vol. IV, p. 73.
30. At the time of the draft in 1862 the state authorities insisted that Indiana had furnished an excess of 20,232 three-year's men beyond the draft call. During the winter of 1863-1864 and in February, 1865, there were other wordy controversies over quotas. Terrell, Report, vol.I, pp. 96-102. On March 30, 1864, Governor Morton protested to Colonel James B. Fry, Provost Marshal General, "Let me earnestly invite the Government to pause, before adopting a constuuction (interpretation of numbers furnished by Indiana) requiring a draft in a State that has filled her quota in the aggregate." Ibid., p. 103. The federal draft of August, 1862, was submitted to "as a large number of townships were behind in furnishing their proportion of men," and the draft was "the easiest way to put on an equal footing all the sub-districts in the State." Ibid., p. 96.
31. Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, pp. 51, 182-185, 251-261; ibid., Series III, vol. III, p. 196; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, April 6, 1865.
32. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, August 12, 1862, Department Dispatches, vol. XIII, p. 86; J. S. Simonson to L. Thomas, August 12, 1862, ibid., vol. XV, p. 84.

the advance pay with their families. Morton was unwilling to permit them to leave the state without making definite arrangement for payment. Colonel J. S. Simonson, then in charge of such matters at Indianapolis, could do nothing. Governor Morton protested to the War Department against such a state of affairs, adding that it was causing great dissatisfaction among the men.[33] Both Morton and Simonson tried to induce Secretary Stanton to give Morton full power to pay federal bounties.[34] But Stanton could hardly empower Morton to do that as a requisition on the Treasury placing such money in Morton's hands would certainly have been rejected.[35] As was to be expected Morton berated Stanton for not doing as he was asked, but Stanton soon argued Morton out of his ill-humor. [36]

When the Seventy-First Regiment left for Kentucky on August 18, it went with the Governor's promise that the money would be paid them at the earliest possible moment. Morton borrowed $100,000, not in the name of the state, but in his own name as Governor, and the regiment was paid just before the beginning of the battle of Richmond, Kentucky.[37] The money was furnished chiefly by banks in Indianapolis and Cincinnati; the bank at Muncie, Indiana furnished $25,000.[38]

After he had made full arrangements for getting the money, he told Secretary Stanton, "I hope, my dear sir, you will see that the bounty money, by which this may be replaced will be sent forward promptly that my credit may not suffer."[39] Stanton had been trying for a week to get the money to Indianapolis; he replied that he had ordered the money, and if it was delayed in its transmission, he "would dismiss the officer at fault and receive no excuse."[40] Before the emergency had passed $200,000 had been borrowed, and five regiments paid.[41] The money was transferred to Morton's credit when it came from Washington about ten days after the loan had been made, and in that way

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33. O. P. Morton, to E. M. Stanton, August 12, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 86.
34. Ibid., p. 48 and 84; Private Dispatches, No. 16, p. 20. They also asked that Governor Morton be empowered to appoint officers to muster troops into the federal service, but the request was not granted. General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 48.
35. Ibid., p. 49.
36. E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, August 13, 1862; ibid., pp. 96 and 98.
37. William Henry Smith, History of the State of Indiana from the
e earliest Explorations by the French to the Present Time (Indianapolis, 1903), vol, I, p. 362.
38. Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 21 and September 22, 1862; Official Records, Series III, vol. II, p. 410; General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 110; ibid., vol. VII, pp. 86, 87, 116, 212-213; Department Dispatches, vol. Xv, pp. 195-197.
39. Official Records, Series III, vol. II, p. 410.
40. E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, August 19, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 145.
41. Ibid., pp. 144 and 149; Official Records, Series III, vol. II, p. 410.

the state lost nothing by the transaction. The Cincinnati banks were paid by August 26.[42] Little blame can be attached to the federal officials because all the loyal states were making their demands for the same purpose.[43] Morton, although very impatient at times, could not stand by and see the men disappointed after the money had been promised them and when they needed it.

Other troops ordered raised later in the same month for three years' service were enlisted with the understanding that they too would receive the advance pay and bounty. Morton was of the opinion that it was to be paid, but Colonel Henry B. Carrington and Paymaster McClure declined to pay the money without a special order. The Governor took the matter up with Washington and the money was forwarded after $50,000 had been temporarily advanced from the State Treasury.[44] In January, 1863, Morton borrowed other large sums to give the troops advance pay and bounty, and had much difficulty in getting the money from the general government because of the many demands upon it.[45]

In February, 1863, in a special message to the General Assembly Morton asked that he be given permission to borrow from New York enough money to advance to soldiers in the field pay overdue them from Washington, and any arrears that might come in the future. The federal government was to reimburse the state. No action was taken on the matter however.[46]

Another extra-legal activity is seen in the exemption of conscientious objectors. The constitution of Indiana contains the provision that no person conscientiously opposed to bearing arms would be compelled to do military duty, but such person might be required to pay for exemption, the amount to be provided by law. The General Assembly had not fixed a money equivalent and the draft of July, 1862, brought the question up. Morton, not having power to fix the amount called Secretary Stanton's attention to the situation,[47] and the War Department acting under the federal law of July 17, 1862, fixed the amount at $200. The draft act of March, 1863, was protested against by Morton on account of the $300 substitute clause and because it placed the burden upon those not able to raise the money.[48] The commutation was repeated in July, 1864, except for conscientious objectors.[49]

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42. General Dispatches, vol. VII, p. 290.
43. Ibid., vol. Xv, p. 111.
44. Department Dispatches, vol. XVI, pp. 20, 21 and 28.
45. Official Records, Series III, vol. III, p. 16; Private Dispatches, vol. XVI, pp. 15 and 16.
46. William M. French, Life, Speeches, State Papers, and Public Services of O. P. Morton, (Cincinnati, 1864), pp. 318-321. This work is cited hereafter as French, O. P. Morton.
47. General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 284; Constitution of Indiana, Art. I, Sec. 37.
48. General Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 286, 287 and 291; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 200.
49. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 53.

On October 24, 1863, to stimulate recruiting, the federal government again authorized the payment of premiums to recruiting officers securing recruits. Fifteen dollars was to be paid for a raw recruit, and twenty-five dollars for a veteran. Governor Morton opposed the measure because the men obtained were put into old regiments subject to discharge with the regiment rather than to the regular time for enlistment, as was necessary should they go into newly organized regiments. He and Colonel Conrad Baker, state provost-marshal, finally agreed to pay a bounty of six dollars, making no discrimination as to the experience of the recruit obtained. On February 5, 1864, Colonel Baker received positive orders from Washington to pay the amounts previously specified, but for those men going into old organizations only. The Governor continued to pay the six dollars from state funds for each recruit entering new regiments,[50] on the ground that it was a proper claim on the federal government.

Morton tried hard to preserve intact original regiments greatly reduced in numbers and use them as recruiting agencies. He argued that combining regiments always created great dissatisfaction, and was regarded as a hardship by the men.[51] On September 26, 1862, he appealed to General D. C. Buell to order the small remnant of the Fiftieth Infantry that had not been captured at Munfordsville, home for reorganization and recruiting.[52] Two companies of the Sixtieth were greatly demoralized and requested to be ordered home for reorganization. The same request was made concerning the One Hundredth Indiana stationed at Carrollton on November 3, 1862.[53] He had secured this permission for a fragmentary regiment broken up in battle of Richmond, Kentucky,[54] and used that consession to obtain a similar one concerning the Sixty-Eighth, 200 of which were all that had escaped capture in September.[55]

His proposal did not meet with great favor with the generals in Kentucky. General Boyle may have favored the plan but he reported that General Gilbert, commanding the camp at Louisville, was opposed to sending the regiments back because they were drilling at Louisville, and were needed on the ground to repel sudden invasions.[56] General Wright answered that he had no authority to return fragments for the purpose of reorganization, and that he did not think it advisable to do so. He said that he would willingly consent if the proper authority could be obtained. In the meantime as a conciliatory measure he offered to send two officers from each company for the recruiting service.[57] In a manner characteristiceof Morton, he assured General Wright that he had requested the Secretary of War to grant him the desired au-

50. Ibid., pp. 56-59 and 72; General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 48; W. H. H. Terrell in Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 23-24.
51. Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 228.
52. Ibid., pp. 350 and 351.
53. Ibid., pp. 344 and 346.
54. Ibid., p. 252.
55. Ibid., pp. 280.
56. Ibid., pp. 229, 350-351.
57. Ibid., p. 231.

thority and expected to get it.[58] The matter was referred by Stanton to the General-in-Chief.

Both Grant and Sherman wanted to do this and Stanton saw the value of it but thought it easier to raise new regiments than to fill old ones; a new regiment involved a new colonel and other regimental officials; these would be local men of influence, and hence able to encourage enlistments.[59] Morton maintained that the old members would make the best recruiting officers.

Again, in September, 1863, Morton laid before Stanton a plan for filling up old Indiana regiments that had been so greatly reduced in numbers as to leave, for instance, not more than one hundred fifty effective men.[60] He wished to select, subject to the approval of the War Department, eleven regiments, one for each Congressional district, and to rendezvous them for reorganization in the district in which they were formerly recruited.[61] He argued that the army could be strengthened more speedily in this way, since the regiments thus selected would have the advantage of having all their officers and men as recruiting officers, that friends of the regiments would take an especial interest in the matter, and that they numbered so few men that their temporary loss would not be seriously felt.[62] The men who reenlisted were to be mustered out as if their first terms had expired receiving the $100 for past services and the $400 bounty awarded veteran volunteers for future service.[63] This suggestion was not accepted by the War Department, but it was finally agreed that Morton might make requisition upon each general commanding a Department in which Indiana troops were serving, for one man in each company, chosen by the commanding officer of the regiment, to recruit for the company. All were to report to Governor Morton for duty. They were assigned to recruit in neighborhoods in which their companies had been originally raised, with the result that several thousand recruits were obtained.[64] The federal authori-

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[58] Ibid., pp. 250 and 251.

[59] James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States since 1850 (New York, 1920-), vol. v, p. 240.

[60] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 28.

[61] Ibid., p. 29.

[62] W. R. Holloway to Secretary Stanton, September 19, 1863, in unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917).

[63] O. P. Morton to Secretary Stanton, October 7, 1863, in unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917).

[64] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 29-30. The federal act of February 28, 1795, was the legal authority for calling the three-months troops in 1861. It authorized the President to call out state militia for not more than three months, to execute federal law in case the regular authorities could not do so. It left the state to raise the troops, organize them according to general federal directions, furnish them with equipment and pay the expense of drill. State law in 1861 in its turn left the raising of regiments largely to individual initiative. In the transfer to federal service the oath of fidelity to the United States was administered. This loose system enabled anyone of the three agencies to expand its

ties recruited for the regular army from the volunteer forces of the state; Morton objected to the practice in October, 1862,[65] but it was not until February 11, 1863, that orders allowing it were rescinded.[66]

(According to the Constitution of Indiana, negroes could not enter the state.[67] During the early part of the conflict the restriction was enforced, but as the sentiment gradually changed the execution of the law became more lax and by the autumn of 1863, negroes were coming into the state freely. In August, 65 negro substitutes arrived at the Soldiers' Home credited to the first congressional district, [69] and many were coming to southern Indiana to enlist and receive the bounty offered,[70] but chiefly were credited finally to other states, especially to Massachusetts.[71] Indiana did not begin very noticeably to take advantage of this source for soldiers until December when companies were quite commonly raised, and substitute speculators brought them for the highest bidder.[72] Marion County commissioners voted $100 to each negro volunteer.[73]

In June and July, 1863, officers from Massachusetts recruiting negroes were throughout the state, and they in turn commissioned Indiana men to work for their cause. They openly explained their mission in public addresses.[74] Democrats were generally glad to get rid of negroes for any reason, but they scored Massachusetts for using such methods to fill her quotas and avoid the draft.[75] Hundreds of negroes were recruited in southern Indiana and sent to Boston in 1864.[76] This was contrary to the regulations for raising white recruits, and General Laz Noble arrested at least one negro recruiter from Massachusetts but he got off easily.[77] In November, 1863, Morton warned agents from other states recruiting negroes to leave the state under penalties.[80]

Recruiting of negro soldiers was practiced more and more during 1864 with such enlistments averaging 100 a week in the first part of the year. Negro refugees came to Indianapolis in considerable numbers,

usual scope of activities. Indiana Statutes, 1852, Chap. LXIX; 1861, Special Session, Chap. XXXVI; United States Statutes at Large, Session II (1795). Chap. XXXVI; Merrill, Soldier of Indiana, vol. I, pp. 72-73; Report of Adjutant General Lax Noble, January 8, 1863; The Six Three Months Regiments.

65. Terrell, Report, pp. 75-77. vol. I.
66. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, October 29, 1862, ibid., p. 75.
67. Indiana Constitution, Art. 13, Sec. 1.
69. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 26, 1863.
70. New Albany Daily Ledger, June 30, 1863.
71. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, December 4, 1863.
72. Ibid., December 23 and 28, 1863.
73. Ibid., December 14, 1863; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 80-81.
74. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, July 4, 1863.
75. Ibid., May 8 and 30, 1863.
76. Ibid., June 10, July 20 and September 9, 1864.
77. Ibid., August 31, 1864.
80. Terrell, Report, vol, I, pp. 80-81.

and once there if they did not have good possession of their tongues and know what they were about, they were picked up by some recruiting agent, substitute broker or other pseudo-patriot, and forced into the military service whether they wished to enter the army or not.[81] Governor Morton took no active part in checking this infringement of the constitutional provision declaring that negroes remain outside the state.)

Recruiting officials from other states operating in Indiana became so common that on November 5, 1863, Morton issued an order against it.[82] In June 1861, Chicago agents were recruiting for an Irish Brigade at La Porte, Indiana, and St. Louis men were trying to raise men in Terre Haute for Frank Blair's Missouri Brigade.[83] It was estimated that 200 men from New Albany alone were in Kentucky and Illinois regiments in 1861.[84] Finally all such enlistments were forbidden by the War Department pursuant to an act of Congress of July 4, 1864.[85] At the same time it was declared lawful for governors to send recruiting agents into states in rebellion and credit recruits so obtained to the states securing them; Morton opposed the plan on the ground that the men so obtained would be a detriment rather than an aid for winning the war.[86]

(Governor Morton was a most important factor in arranging the plan for the One Hundred Days' men.) On April 23, 1864, Laz Noble, Adjutant-General of Indiana, in accordance with Governor Morton's orders, issued a call for 20,000 men for one hundred days' service in the federal forces.[87] This call was the result of weeks of careful preparation on Morton's part, and was evidence of the general feeling that 1864 would be the critical year of the war. Generals were making extensive preparations for getting into the field early and by hard fighting to bring the war to a successful conclusion before winter.[88] It may have been this general attitude that brought out Morton's en-

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81. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 13, August 18, 19, 24,25, 27, 29 and 30, and November 24 and 28, 1864; ibid., January 8, 1865; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 80-81.
82. O. P. Morton, military order of November 5, 1863, in unclassified mss., Indiana State Library.
83. Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 13, 1861.
84. New Albany Daily Ledger, December 5, 1861; General Telegrams, vol. VII, pp. 97 and 125 give other instances of recruiting by outsiders in August, 1862.
85. Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, p. 633.
86. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 59, 80-81; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 27, 1864; Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, p. 633.
87. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 486-487; Democratic Pharos, April 27, 1864.
88. Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, part II, p. 355; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 289-290.

thusiasm for extra recruiting, or it may have been his own foresight; at any rate in the middle of March he was in frequent conference with the governors of Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin for getting more men into the field.[89] These governors met at Indianapolis and agreed on a rough plan which they carried to Washington and placed before President Lincoln on April 21.

The plan proposed the raising of 200,000 men for a short term of service. They were to be mustered in by regiments according to army regulations, and the pay, clothing, and equipment was to be as usual. They were to serve in fortifications, or wherever their services were required, within or without their respective states. The plan was not to interfere in any way with the draft then in progress, except that if any soldier or officer in this special service should be drafted he would be credited for the service rendered with the One Hundred Days' men.[90]

It was not without some difficulty that the governors persuaded the federal officials to accept the terms of their proposition, as it was so irregular and the term so short. In a long interview on April 21, they urged upon President Lincoln the necessity of calling the extra men to the defense of the states along the Ohio river, and claimed that they could raise that number by volunteering. One or two favored a longer term; Stanton seems to have favored four months. The compromise was for one hundred days. Morton favored the shorter time, and the Democratic charges that he was very anxious to get the men back in time for the autumn elections no doubt had a substantial basis in fact.[91] The stakes to be lost or won in those elections were too great to be lightly disregarded, especially since the state administration had been carrying on business so irregularly.

Lincoln refused to call for 200,000 men, but when urgently pressed agreed to make it for 85,000, and indeed it was not all easy to refuse the offer even though the opposition insisted that the form was too irregular, for, as Senator Lane said in the Senate, "I do not know that the Administration, strong as it is in patriotism and in the confidence of the people, is prepared to disregard the patriotic suggestions of five governors from noble loyal states."[92] Ohio was to furnish 30,000; Indiana, 20,000; Illinois, 20,000; Iowa, 10,000; and

89. Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 18, 1864; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 37.
90. Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, pp. 237-238 gives the plan itself. On April 16, 1864, W. H. H. Terrell wrote Governor Blair of Michigan that Morton had arranged with Governors Brough of Ohio, and Yates of Illinois to go to Washington soon and offer 20,000 men from Indiana, 30,000 from Ohio, 25,000 from Illinois for thirty days service; they were hoping the Governors of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa would join. Bureau of Finance, pp. 649-650.
91. Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 28, 1864.
92. Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session (1864), pp. 2023 and 2027.

Wisconsin, 5,000.[93] These governors from north of the Ohio remembered very distinctly the days of John Morgan, the attack upon Paducah, and the massacre of Fort Pillow, and demanded that there be no reenactment of those scenes in their states. They demanded it as a more adequate protection for their hundreds of miles of border while Union armies were withdrawn so far from their borders in the campaigns in Georgia.

Senator Lane summarized the situation further in his speech in the Senate while trying to get an appropriation for the regiments, "we have a blockade system involving a coast line of more than 1,000 miles. We have taken posts there and made them depots of provisions and arms and munitions. They have to be garrisoned and defended or you give up your whole blockade system. You have ordered your armies into the rebel states. We have to keep up their communications, to defend their munitions by garrisoning posts along that line of 1500 miles of rrontier." He argued further that even if the term was short there was much evidence that they would do effective work in garrisons and on lines of communications and so release men for Grant and Sherman upon the Rapidan and in northern Georgia.[94] Lincoln wrote his acceptance on April 23, but not until General Grant had been wired and his consent given.[96] The volunteers were to receive no federal bounty.[97]

Plans for raising the men were pushed rapidly forward.[98] Governor Morton issued his call for Indiana's quota on the same day that Lincoln accepted the offer;[99] recruits began to join the ranks at once. Within twelve days after the meeting in Washington, Stanton had formally authorized the military authorities of these various states to issue the call for their quotas.[100] Morton said that his reasons for urging enlistment would be suggested to all by the condition of the country, and the position of the military affairs of the North, and that he felt confident the call would be promptly and fully responded to.[101] In many speeches made over the state while recruiting

[93] Official Records, Series I, vol. IV, pp. 237-238.

[94] Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session, p. 2027; Official Records Series III, vol. v, p. 649; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 485.

[95] Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, p. 238; Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session, p. 2024.

[96] Official Records, Series III, Vol. IV, pp. 238-239; Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session, p. 2024.

[97] Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. II, pp. 289-290; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, April 20, 1864; and Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, p. 244.

[98] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, April 29, and May 6, 1864; Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session, p. 2027.

[99] Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 25, 1864; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, April 30, 1864; ibid., May 3 and 24, 1964.

[100] Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 3, 1964.

[101] Ibid., April 25, 1864, gives Morton's speech at Masonic Hall, Indianapolis.

was in progress, he emphasized these arguments and added that if the war was to be prolonged another year, confidence in the government at Washington would be destroyed, that the North should push the war with vigor to keep down the great body of discontented ones in the North from getting even larger and more serious. Colonel Carrington feared the rapid advance of a desperate Confederate army into the Northwest.

Senator Fessenden, of the Senate Finance Committee, brought into the Senate on May 2, the bill providing $25,000,000 for the One Hundred Days's men, and defended it through its earlier stages, when Senator Henry S. Lane of Indiana and the head of the Indiana lobby and legislative committee in Washington, took up the defense. Many objections were raised to the appropriation, but there was nothing to be done except consent to the bill since many of the men were already in the lines and it would not do to allow them to go without pay.[102]

The War Department intended that the governors to get their quotas from the active militia of the states, and Governor Brough in Ohio followed that plan much to the chagrin of Indianians since he got his quota sooner than they.[103] Morton was determined to get his 20,000 in addition to those that had already been enrolled in some form of state service. Many hoped that Indiana Legion would be preserved in case regiments or companies were filled to the minimum under the regulations governing the United States army.[104]

The campaign for volunteers started in the face of a very active opposition. Morton was at the head of the organization, and its center for the state was Indianapolis. Active managers, politicians, war-Democrats, public speakers, agents of the military bureau and Indiana Sanitary Commission, and recruiting officers carried the campaign to every part of the state. In Indianapolis every ward had supporters working continuously. Women formed ladies volunteer organizations to promote enlistments and serve in the positions left vacant by those going to the army.[105] Cities, counties, and townships supplied the bounty refused by the federal government, and voted amounts varying from twenty-five dollars for single men to fifty dollars for those married.[106] No bounties were offered or paid by the state primarily, but it aided in distributing special premiums of six dollars to recruiting officers for each man secured. These officers reported to W. H. H.

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[102]. Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session, pp. 2022-2024 and 2054.

[103]. Indiana Daily Sentinel, May 3, 1864.

[104]. Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 25 and May 30, 1864.

[105]. Ibid., April 26 and 30 and May 3, 4, 10 and 12, 1864; Democratic Pharos, May 4 and 11, 1864.

[106]. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 4, 1864. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 63-66, discusses the campaign by counties. The Logansport Journal for April 30, 1864, and the Democratic Pharos for May 4 and 11, 1864, give details on recruiting and the voting of bounty money.

Terrell the number of those enlisting under them; the Adjutant-General for Indiana made the payment through the Financial Bureau, and vouchers for the expenditures were forwarded to Washington for the United States to assume the final cost.[107] Money paid out by local appropriations was not reimbursed by the state, nor expected from Washington.[108]

These efforts produced results from the first. By April 27 Johnson and Montgomery counties each reported 600 men ready to leave for Indianapolis; and Winchester had raised three companies.[109] By May 5 Indianapolis had raised 320. On May 30 there were 4,000 in Camp Carrington. The One Hundred Thirty-Third Regiment was full on May 18.[110] Two days later eighty companies from the state at large had reported at Indianapolis.[111] On May 22 Morton was able to answer President Lincoln's anxious inquiry concerning the sucess of the recruiting as follows, "I started one Regiment of 100 days' men yesterday, another today. I shall send one tomorrow, another on Monday, another on Tuesday, another on Wednesday, and another on Thursday. I am organizing and sending them forward as rapidly as possible."[112] All had departed when the One Hundred Thirty-Nineth left Indianapolis on June 10.[113]

There was great need for such rapid recruiting, for during the early days of May Grant had crossed the Rapidan on his way to Richmond, and Sherman was moving out of Chattanooga, following Johnston into Georgia.[114] Grant's tremendous losses in the Wilderness during the first half of May only increased his desire to get all the men forward possible. Stanton notified the Governors of the Northwest on May 11, "The Government is sparing no pains to support him."[115] During the nineteen days following May 4, Sherman advanced one hundred miles toward Atlanta and was doing all he could to get men to keep his lines of communication open. He notified the governors of the Northwest, "Ineed not impresss on you that now is the time for superhuman energy . . . It is only by combined efforts on a large scale that we can expect to defeat our enemy, who is united and inspired

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107. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, Decemberl, 1864; Lincoln's call for troops of September 14, 1863; statement of W. H. H. Terrell, in unclassified mss., in Indiana State Library (1917).
108. Statement of W. H. H. Terrell, dated January 8, 1866, in unclassified mss., in Indiana State Library.
109. Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 27, 1864.
110. Ibid., May 5, 13, 17 and 18, 1864; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 14, 1864.
111. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 20, 1864.
112. Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, p. 400; ibid., Series I, vol. XXXVIII, part IV, p. 274.
113. Ibid., p. 282; Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 10, 1864; Congressional Globe, 38 Congress, 1 Session, p. 2024.
114. Official Records, Series I, vol. XXXVI, part II, p. 369; ibid., Series I, vol. XXXII, part III, p. 495.
115. Ibid., Series I, vol. XXXVI, part I, p. 427; ibid., Series I, vol. XXXVIII, part IV, p. 282.

with demonaic zeal . . . My army is in superb condition, and all I ask is that I shall not be forced to break it up into small fragments to guard railroads."[116] Stanton joined him in the call in his message: "Now is the time to put in your men . . . ."[117] Morton's plan for additional men was bearing fruit at an opportune time.

Secretary Stanton told Lincoln later that the state of Ohio organized within four weeks and placed in the field 35,646 officers and men, being 5,646 troops more than the stipulated quota; that other states, less able to meet the contingency contributed with alacrity all that could be raised.[118] He said, too, that the governors of the Northwest had raised 60,000 men in two weeks.[119] Before the movement stopped Nebraska and Kansas had caught the spirit. Late in June, General Curtis at Fort Leavenworth was authorized to assist Governor Carney of Kansas in raising a regiment of One Hundred Days' men on the same terms as the other states.[120] Nebraska's request to raise regiments of mounted troops to serve one hundred days was declined in July.[121]

By August 25 the regiments began to return, and by the end of the month the most of them were in Indianapolis ready to deliver up their arms and be mustered out.[122] In October, President Lincoln expressed his appreciation of their work as follows, "It was their good fortune to render efficient service in the brilliant operations of the Southwest, and to contribute to the victories of the national arms over the rebel forces in Georgia under the command of Johnston and Hood. On all occasions and in every service to which they were assigned, their duty as patriotic citizens was performed with alacrity and courage, for which they were entitled to and are hereby tendered the national thanks through the Governors of their respective States."[123]

By 1863, the drain of the war upon male population, and the existing economic conditions made it seem best to assist volunteering by other means. Hence, early in that year Morton began an agitation to induce Boards of County Commissioners to make appropriations for local bounties to aid in recruiting and keep Indiana out of the draft.[124]

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116. Ibid., pp. 294-295.
117. Ibid., Series I, vol. XXXVII, part I, p. 445.
118. Ibid., Series III, vol. IV, p. 534.
119. Ibid., Series I, vol. XXXVII, part II, p. 130.
120. Ibid., Series III, vol. IV, p. 560; ibid., Series I, vol. XXXVII, part I, p. 427.
121. Ibid., Series III, vol. IV, p. 464; ibid., Series I, vol. XXXIV, part IV, p. 604; ibid., vol. XLI, part II, p. 27.
122. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 23 and 31, 1864.
123. ~~Official~~ Records, Series III, vol. IV, pp. 755-756.
124. French, O. P. Morton, p. 231; New York Times, quoted by Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 16, 1863; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 64.

By July his work was bearing fruit; in that month Marion county offered ten dollars for each recruit to the number of 500 for filling the Seventieth Regiment.[125] Eighteen other counties followed her example during the same month with bounties varying from ten to fifty dollars.[126] These local appropriations did not cease as long as the war continued, and averaged about $100 per recruit, but went as high as $210.[127] These bounties amounted to nearly $3,500,000 in sixty-eight counties in the state by the end of 1864.[128]

During this year there was an increase to $300 in the federal inducement paid. Eighty-five counties made appropriations of this kind during 1864 for bounties varying from fifty to three hundred dollars.[129] Then too, many citizens and private corporations made donations of amounts as high as $5,000 to encourage enlistments. No distinction was made in respect to color of volunteers. Certainly these amounts were of the greatest help in securing enlistments and hence saving heads of families from the draft. During 1865 these local aids rose as high as $350.[130] The total amount furnished by townships and county appropriations for local bounties was the tremendous amount of $15,492,876.04.[131] On March 3, 1865, an act was approved which legalized the granting of these bounties, or appropriations to otherwise aid the government in the suppression of the rebellion, and provide for taxation for redeeming the bonds.[132] The courts did not test their

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[125] Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 16, 17 and 25, 1862.

[126] Ibid., July 28, 1862.

[127] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, September 29, November 12, 16, 17, 23, 26, and 28, and December 5, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18 and19, 1863. Since the amounts voted varied, volunteers drifted to the district paying the highest price to the detriment of the quotas of poorer districts. These bonds were either sold or given to volunteers. Bankers regarded their legality with suspicion, hence handled them only at a heavy discount. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 64-65.

[128] Annual Encyclopaedia, 1863, p. 529; ibid., 1864, p. 437. See Terrell, Report, I, for summary statemtnt furnished by local government units for bounties, soldiers' relief, etc; Terrell, Report (1960) gives such information too.

[129] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 20, May 4, 5, and 10, July 20 and December 26, 1864; Democratic Pharos, March 2, 1864; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 22-23; Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 14, and May 4, 1864. Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, pp. 75-88 gives a detailed statement of amounts expended by the various counties and townships in Indiana for
loc local bounties. In 1864 it was felt that every call would be the last, hence a lavish expenditure to furnish quotas creditably. Ibid., p. 67.

[130] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 23 and 30, 1865. W. H. H. Terrell gave the full history of these bounties to the general assembley in 1865. See also Official Records, Series III, vol. V, pp. 746-747.

[131] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 88.

[132] Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chap. LIV.

legality until after the war was over. The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the law in November 1865. [133]

In addition to the county appropriations, the federal government, since July, 1861, had offered a regular bounty of $100 per recruit.[134] But rising prices and the approaching winter of 1863 caused Morton to appeal to the Secretary of War for an increase in the amount offered. He was told that the amount offered had been carefully considered when the plan was adopted and that the officials did not think it best to change the plan.[135] By the end of the war the total compensation for one year's service in some counties amounted to $1242. [136] Recruits under the call of December 24, 1864, received nearly $1,000 each before going to camp.[137] The amount of money appropriated by counties, cities and townships for encouraging enlistment and giving aid to soldiers' families totaled $17,698,000. Twenty-two counties alone paid for local bounties and the relief of soldiers' families the sum of $5,065,539. [138] These appropriations were not legalized until 1865. [139] These local bounties were not refunded, or expected to be refunded by the federal government.[140] But for bounty payments program, the war program could have hardly been a success in the state. Grand total of state and local bounties was $20,259,000. Such payments for relief were $4,567,000, and for miscellaneous purposes $199,000. (Terrell, (1869) I, 75-78.)

In order to increase enlistments by heads of families, by enabling their families to live while they were in the field, Morton urged upon the Indiana legislature and Congress a plan for increasing the pay of soldiers. The prices of household commodities had increased from thirty-three to two hundred twenty per cent.[141] The soldiers' pay of $156 a year was entirely too meagre to support a family even in an agricultural community.) The General Assembly did not give its approval of the plan;[142] nor did it approve his proposal that Indiana pay every sixty days its citizens in federal service, and allow the federal government to reimburse the state as soon thereafter as possible.[143] Morton's petition to Congress for increased pay for soldiers was presented to the Senate by Senator Wright on December 8,

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[133] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 65.

[134] Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 7, 1862; ibid., August 26 and 30, 1862; ibid., September 3, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, pp. 109-110 gives a table of United States bounties.

[135] Official Records, Series III, vol. III, pp. 826, 831-832.

[136] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 28, 1865.

[137] Holloway, Indianapolis, p. 22.

[138] Indianapolis Daily Herald, November 11, 1865.

[139] Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chap. LIV.

[140] W. H. H. Terrell to Palmer, Quartermaster General of Michigan, March 8, 1869; and Terrell's statement of January 8, 1866. Both are in unclassified mss. in Indiana State Library.

[141] Indiana Historical Association Reports, vol. IV, p. 576.

[142] Ibid., p. 577.

[143] Logansport Journal, February 14, 1862.

1862. It was referred to the committee on military affairs, from which it was not reported.[144]

(In summary, the troops furnished by Indiana were organized into 129 regiments of infantry, thirteen regiments of cavalry, one regiment of heavy artillery, and twenty-six batteries of light artillery. The adjutant-general of the United States army gives the total number furnished by Indiana as 194,363. W. H. H. Terrell gives the results of recruiting in Indiana as 208,377, of which 175,776 were in the infantry, 21,605 in the cavalry, and 10,986 in the artillery organizations.[145] Enlistments in regular army and units in other states amounted to 5,000. Of the total number, 652 commissioned officers and 26,764 noncommissioned officers and men lost their lives through wounds or disease. The record gives names of 13 officers in desertion and 10,833 enlisted men, or a total of 10,846, or about five percent,[147] But there were units that suffered as much as ten to fifteen percent. Desertion from artillery units were very high. Desertion from the draft call of August, 4, 1862, was 373; from that of July 18, 1864, was 1158; from that of December 19, 1864, was 218.[148] There were 4,987 arrests for desertion.)

As for departmental organization, 1861-1865, Indiana was included in various districts and under various commanders during the War. In May, 1861, it was included in the new military district of Ohio and placed under the command of Major General George B. McClellan with headquarters at Cincinnati. The district was extended in June to include much of western Virginia and nearby parts of Maryland and Pennsylvania. In November the Department also included Michigan, Tennessee and Kentucky east of the Cumberland river, with General D. C. Buell in command, headquarters at Louisville. Wisconsin was included in August, 1862. General Ambrose E. Burnside commanded from Cincinnati. On November 16 the Ohio Department was defined as including only Kentucky north of the Tennessee and parts of Tennessee occupied by federal troops there. In the meantime the rest of the former district does not seem to have been assigned to any Department.

Then in February 1864, a Northern Department was created to include all states of the Old Northwest, except Wisconsin, with General Joseph Hooker in command from Cincinnati. Wisconsin was added in October, 1865, and headquarters was located at Detroit.[149]

144. Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 13, 1862; French, Life and Services of O. P. Morton, pp. 315-318 quotes Morton's petition; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 170.
145. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 106.
147. Ibid., (1960 Reprint), 563.
148. Ibid., 563. Terrell, I, 109, 114.
149. Terrell, Report (1960), 554-558.

III. EQUIPPING TROOPS WITH ARMS AND OTHER MATERIALS

1. Shortage of Arms and Equipment

THE MATTER OF EQUIPPING TROOPS with munitions of war was as important as recruiting. The first move toward bringing the war equipment of the state up to the necessities of the times was taken when the Governor inquired of the War Department on January 17, 1861, "what quantity and kind of arms Indiana is entitled to from the general government. Whether there are not arrearages for past years, upon what principle or ratio arms are distributed, whether upon Congressional representation, or enrollment of militia, or both; what form of application should be made, and how soon the arms can be forwarded."[1] He was told that arms were distributed upon the ratio of Congressional representation, that arrearages were due the state, and that Indiana's quota for 1861 was 592 muskets.[2] The answer of the War Department, and the general lack of war material in the state,[3] together with a view of the inefficiency of the militia laws were made the subject of a message to the General Assembly in February.[4] On March 5 the Governor was authorized by statute to collect, repair, and redistribute the arms of the state,[5] but that program yielded few arms fit for use. Governor Morton went to Washington about March 15 to secure the quota of arms due the state, but received little satisfaction. This dual situation was faced on April 12 by the firing on Fort Sumter, and three days later by President Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers. But one thing remained to be done: call a special session of the General Assembly, which was done on April 19, the legislature to meet five days later. Then began the continual drive for equipment which was to continue to the last day of the war.[6] He had already asked the War Department for twenty-four cannon to guard the southern border; now he demanded twice that number.[7] On April 25 he asked the General Assembly to appropriate $1,000,000 "for the purchase of arms and munitions of war, and the organization of the militia."[8]

Three days later he again called the attention of the War Department to the fact that Indiana needed arms: "It is now nine days since

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1. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 428.
2. Official Records, Series III, vol. I, p. 54.
3. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 110-112, shows the condition of the military equipment of the state. See also Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 2-3.
4. Ibid., p. 428.
5. Indiana Statutes, 1861, Chap. LXI, Sec. 10-11.
6. Official Records, Series III, vol. I, pp. 185, 161, 244, 410,426, 492, 501, 537, 543 and 551; General Dispatches, vol. III, pp.284, and 285; ibid., vol. IV, p. 32; ibid., vol. IX, pp. 36, 56, 79, 89, 133, 134 and 141; ibid., vol. XV, pp. 114, 162, 175, 176, 331, and 340-343.
7. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 430. Secretary Floyd had left the national armories in the North almost empty. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Brevier, Reports, 1861, Special Session, p. 15.

I have had the honor to hear from the Department, and from lack of information I am unable to take such steps for furnishing accoutrements, equipage, and supplies as I otherwise would . . . I beg leave again most earnestly to call your immediate attention to the subject of furnishing our State with arms . . . The country along the Ohio river, bordering Kentucky, is in a state of intense alarm . . . They are in daily fear that marauding parties from the other side of the river will plunder and burn their towns. The demands upon me for arms for their defense are constant, and I am compelled to reply that I have them not, and know not when or where I can get them. A bill will pass our Legislature, probably on Monday, appropriating a half million of dollars for the purchase of arms, but I am informed that engagements of Eastern manufacturers are such that they cannot be procured, perhaps for months. This State is one of the most exposed, by its geographical position, to the immediate evils of civil war, and it does seem to me should be preferred, in the distribution of arms, over those geographically distant from the scene of probable conflict. If, in your opinion, these considerations are entitled to weight, I trust that at least twenty thousand stands of arms will be promptly shipped to this state, with a large supply of artillery, which is indispensibly necessary to prevent our river towns from being bombarded and burnt by batteries erected on the other side of the river . . ."[9]

The first real step toward securing arms for Indiana's volunteers was made on May 1 when a law was passed and approved "to provide for the defense of the State of Indiana, to procure first class arms, artillery, cavalry and infantry equipments and munitions of war", an appropriation for $500,000 to pay for the same. An agent, or agents, was to be sent at once to procure the equipment.[10] An executive contingent fund of $100,000 was created on May 6. Governor Morton had anticipated the passage of the former bill by appointing Calvin Fletcher, agent of state, on April 27, to make a general survey of the army supply situation with a view of purchasing such equipment. But few arms were procured in this manner; his successor, Miles P. Fletcher, and other agents were equally unsuccessful. An appeal to General McClellan also failed to bring them.[11]

Robert Dale Owen succeeded to the office of Agent of State on May 1. He was "to visit the Eastern States and Europe in order to purchase arms . . . ." Before his commission expired on February 6, 1863, he purchased 30,000 Enfield rifles, 2,731 carbines, 751 revolvers, and 797 sabres. He expended for cavalry equipment, $3,905,44; for army blankets, $50,406.93; for infantry great coats, $84,829.13. The total amount expended by Mr. Owen was

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9. Governor Morton to Secretary of War, Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 430-431.
10. Indiana Statutes, 1861, Chap. VI; Morton, Correspondence File, Indiana State Archives, II.
11. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 432; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 125-126. The Indiana delegation at Washington also tried to secure arms and equipment.

$891,836,25, of which $752,694.14 was for arms.[12]

An act of Congress of July 27, 1861, permitted state agents to purchase military supplies in case proper vouchers were filed and passed upon by the federal Treasury Department, with a view to the general government assuming the debt.[13] Ultimately the federal government reimbursed the state for these purchases, to the amount of $611,240.18. The state furnished $141,454.27.[14] The only element of extra-legality in these purchases was that of Morton's advancing money to pay for United States army equipment which the government could not supply, or could not supply in time to meet state needs, or to pay for interest on loans to the state for that purpose.

As a result of the Kirby Smith campaign in September, 1862, Morton felt that the state should purchase 10,000 stands of arms for the use of the Indiana militia. He visited Washington and secured the consent of the Secretary of Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, and President Lincoln that the federal government would reimburse Indiana for the loan[15] necessary to make the purchase. He then turned to the Ocean City Bank of New York, borrowed $245,000 for 120 days and purchased the guns. The loan was strictly according to Indiana law.[16] The federal government made reimbursement for all except the interest on the loan, which the State had to pay. Other purchases were made following the same general plan.[17]

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[12] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 433-436. These purchases continued until the War Department ordered them to stop in 1863. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 179; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 530-531. On one occasion, when there was much doubt whether the federal government would assume the cost of arms purchased by Morton's agents; at one time it seemed that Morton would have the arms called in from the field, turned over to the United States ordnance officer at Indianapolis and reissued in order to insure reimbursement. W. H. H. Terrell to Kittridge Arms Company, March 1, 1864, Bureau of Finance, p. 606.

[13] United States Statutes at Large, 1861, Chap. XXI.

[14] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 434. An act of Congress of July 17, 1861, appropriated $10,000,000 to reimburse states for expenses incurred on account of volunteers called into the field. United States Statutes at Large, 1861, Chap. 7, Sec. 1. Other states purchased arms, ammunition, and clothing. Weeden, War Government, pp. 150-157 and 165.

[15] General Telegrams, vol. IX, p. 36; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p.435.

[16] General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 9, 13, 24, 36, 49, 56, 58, 73,79, 133 and 134; and ibid., IV, p. 32, 45, 52 and 53. There is some evidence that as early as June 20 Morton was planning to purchase these 10,000 guns with which to arm the Indiana Legion. He may even have blocked Chase's attempts to buy the same arms, to be sure of getting all of them. See also Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 435.

[17] During the Hines' Raid and Morgan's Raid especially. See ibid., p. 436. In November, 1862, Owen purchased 3,000 carbines. General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 203 and 209.

The summer of 1862 gives other evidence of Morton's attempts to secure arms from the federal government. He had received a small shipment occasionally in May and June,[18] but the military situation in July increased his anxiety, and consequently his demands. On July 16, he telegraphed, "please order Five Thousand arms to be sent here at once. It is absolutely necessary to put our State Militia on a War footing in view of the conditions of affairs in Kentucky and Tennessee . . . . . ."[19] Again, on July 21 he asked, "Can't you send me some cannon for our border towns? . . . . . Committees visit me almost hourly from the border asking for guns and small arms . . . ."[20] "Please answer my dispatch about cannon for our border towns. They are entirely defenseless." [21] "I dislike to trouble you but I have a large number of men already in camp and many more going in daily. I have no guns for them and hope you will furnish my proportion of Springfield Rifles immediately."[22] And again he declared, "I am ashamed to mention it again, but necessity is my apology . . . ."[23]

To these inquiries Assistant-Secretary Watson wired a lecture on his experience with putting arms in the hands of troops before they were organized, promised to send Springfield muskets as soon as the regiments were mustered in,[24] and inquired whether he really had militia or artillery companies organized and drilled who could use cannon.[25] Secretary Stanton mildly replied, "When General Halleck returns from the James River he will communicate with you respecting the cannon for the river towns. Your telegraph is referred." [26]

Then the storm broke, "I am painfully surprized by the spirit of your two dispatches received this morning. From the doubts and hesitation expressed in your inquiries, I should infer that requisitions made in behalf of the State are regarded in the light of favors to be strictly scrutinized and granted if at all with hesitation. I cannot organize artillery companies without being able to assure them they will get guns nor can they drill without guns."[27] As a matter of fact Morton was really trying to get more than his proper proportion of cannon at least, and by irregular channels.[28]

[18] General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 284 and 285.

[19] W. R. Holloway to P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, July 16, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 110.

[20] O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, July 21, 1862; ibid., p. 154.

[21] Same to same, July 25, 1862, ibid., p. 190.

[22] O. P. Morton to P. H. Watson, July 25, 1862, ibid., p. 188.

[23] Official Records, Series III, vol. I, p. 529.

[24] P. H. Watson to O. P. Morton, July 25, 1862, ibid., Series III, vol. IV, p. 189.

[25] Same to same, July 25, 1862, ibid., p. 191.

[26] E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, July 25, 1862, ibid., Series III, vol. I, p. 191.

[27] O. P. Morton to P. H. Watson, July 26, 1862, ibid., p. 191.

[28] P. H. Watson to O. P. Morton, July 25, 1862, ibid., p. 196.

But he continued his efforts to secure arms, if not through the War Department, then by means of state purchase, or state purchase with federal government reimbursement. By the middle of August, 1862, even the latter route was closing. The federal government insisted that it was trying to buy all the arms and accoutrements on the market, and that some of the manufacturers had lately refused to sell "in the hope that some of the Governors of the States would bid in competition with the government with no possible result but a raise of prices . . . . The Governors of the States have been notified that purchases of arms or ordnance stores made otherwise than through the Ordnance Department cannot be sanctioned, nor the money thus expended be reimbursed by the United States . . . ."[29] This tendency is what made necessary the special arrangement with Secretary Stanton and President Lincoln for the purchase of the 10,000 guns through the Ocean City Bank in October, 1862.

Another stumbling block to Morton's caring for Indiana's troops as he pleased was removed in August, 1862. The War Department had required that arms for distribution be placed in the hands of an officer of the United States government, who was to be responsible for them. Colonel John S. Simonson, the mustering officer in charge, was too slow to suit Morton. Hence he secured from the War Department an order to Simonson to turn the arms over to Morton for purpose of distribution.[30] But even that did not prove satisfactory and within a week Morton asked the Department for the removal of Colonel Simonson.[31] Colonel Henry B. Carrington, at Morton's nomination, succeeded Simonson on August 18, and cooperated with the Governor to the end of the war in carrying out his plans and instructions in mustering regiments in and distributing arms.[32a]

In the matter of furnishing clothing, blankets, and overcoats the state was very active in supplementing the efforts of the federal government.[32b]

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29. P. H. Watson to O. P. Morton, August 23 and September 5, 1862, Department Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 179 and 225 respectively.
30. P. H. Watson to O. P. Morton, August 11, 1862, ibid., p. 37; P. H. Watson to J. S. Simonson, August 11, 1862, Official Records, Series III, vol. II, p. 352.
31. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 186.
32a. Ibid., pp. 186-187; O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, August 21, 1862, Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 166; Henry B. Carrington to O. P. Morton, August 16, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. VII, p. 159; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 419 passim.
32b. On November 5, 1862, W. H. H. Terrell appealed to General Montgomery C. Meigs, United States Quartermaster, to furnish 600 rubber blankets to the Twenty-First Indiana then at New Orleans. Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 348. On October 22 of the same year Morton received permission from General Grant to supply with clothing the Twenty-Third and Fifty-Second Indiana Regiments. As Grant was needing troops and Morton was holding them in the state until after the election, Grant added sarcastically, "Would like to have more regiments to be clothed." Ibid., pp. 318,319.

The almost absolute lack of ammunition for Indiana troops at the outbreak of the war, and the great uncertainty whether it would be on hand or forthcoming in time of need made it seem best that an adequate supply be guaranteed by some means. Morton could never feel that the State's interests were adequately cared for until every emergency had been provided for. He discussed the matter with prominent men of the state, and it was decided to establish an arsenal at Indianapolis. The object at first was to manufacture only enough ammunition to supply the three-months' regiments, even though it was really the duty of the federal government to do this for forces leaving the state. It was this institution that made the greatest part of Governor Morton's extra-legal acts in supplying troops with munitions.[33] It will be noticed in some detail.

319. In August, 1862, Indiana regiments needed rubber blankets; and not being able to get them from the federal government, the Governor caused the state Quartermaster to advertize for 25,000. Ibid., pp. 176 and 177. On October 6 and 17 of the same year Morton appealed to Secretary Stanton to make a special purchase of 25,000 for Indiana regiments, but the request was not granted. Ibid., pp. 312, 313 and 316. Morton also saw that the regiments were furnished with overcoats and tents. Ibid., pp. 318, 319,331, 340, 341 and 342; General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 134, 158, 181.

33. The consensus of opinion on the Arsenal was shown by statements of that time. The Indiana Daily Journal said that the state furnished money for its support; it was founded by a state official, and its accounts were audited by the State Military Auditing Commission at the request of the Governor. Documentary Journal, 1864-65, part II, pp. 48 and 67. Morton himself admitted its extra-legality. Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 26, 1863. Joseph Ristine, Democratic Auditor of State, said that the Arsenal was built by Morton without legal authority. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 17, 1863; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 179-180. And that money paid by the United States to the Arsenal was paid into the State Treasury up to February 8, 1863, but after that it was kept in the Financial Bureau. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 17, 1864. The Sentinel said, "It is not a United States Arsenal and the State has not authorized it, yet the credit of the state has been, and is being used to its credit. It is very difficult to ascertain what relation the Arsenal bears to the State." Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 12, 1863. The conflict of the Legislature against Morton in 1863 resulted in no appropriations being made even for carrying on the state institutions. All money that was in the State Treasury or that was paid into it was held there by the Auditor and Treasurer. In order to have money to carry on his enterprises Morton put a safe in his office and employed a financial secretary to handle the funds not required by law to be placed in the Treasury. According to the Indianapolis Journal it was neither established, directed nor recognized by state law; the general government might with much justice claim that its proceeds are not state property, and the Governor's extra-legal act of establishing it and contracting its

3. Indiana Arsenal

(The Indiana Arsenal began operations on April 27, 1861, in rented rooms on Washington Street, south of the old State House.) Herman Sturm, who had made a careful study of munitions manufacture in Europe, was placed in charge.[34] (Labor furnished by men detailed from the Eleventh Regiment of Indiana Volunteers,[35] was used but a few days when civilians were hired.[36] Tools were scarce at the time, there being only a few bullet molds operated by hand, a small forge for casting shells, and a place in an adjoining room for loading cartridges.) State Quartermaster-General, Thomas H. Morris, furnished materials, such as powder, lead, and paper.

(When it was established, the Governor intended that the Arsenal be only temporary, but demands kept increasing and work at the Arsenal continued. Early in May the Indianapolis Daily Journal voiced an agitation for building or renting other rooms for it; since the Governor had already issued a call for arms that were scatterd over the State , and new arms were constantly coming to Indianapolis from the national government, a place to store these would be needed and it was suggested that the General Assembly provide for the building of a permanent arsenal.[37] It took no action on the matter. Nevertheless about June 1, Morton ordered the construction of three special buildings on Market Street, fronting the north entrance to the old State House.[38] The site was owned by the state and, of course, the change of location reduced the cost of manufacture.[39] Since they were planned especially for arsenal purposes, the buildings were more conducive to safety, economy and convenience than the former quarters.)

So urgent was the need for the new rooms that they were practical-

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products to the United States did not bind the state in any way. Its superintendent had been appointed and commissioned by Morton for arsenal duty. Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 4, 1863. From November 17, to December 28, 1862, he was a Lieutenant Colonel of the Fifty-Fourth Regiment, Indiana Volunteers, and was at the same time putting in nearly all his time at the Arsenal. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 418; O. P. Morton to R. D. Owen, December 31, 1861, General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 307; O. P. Morton to W. R. Holloway, December 4, 1861, ibis., vol. IX, p. 235.

34. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 321.
35. William Robeson Holloway, Indianapolis (Indianapolis, 1870), p. 119; Jacob Piatt Dunn, Greater Indianapolis (Indianapolis, 1910), vol. I, p. 223; Berry R. Sulgrove, Indianapolis and Marion County (Philadelphia, 1884), p. 316.
36. Terrell, Report, vol. I, P. 414.
37. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 8, 1861. This paper was the leading Republican newspaper during the war. It was so decidedly in favor of the policy of the administration and had its confidence to such an extent that it came to be called "Morton's organ".
38. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, June 14, 1861.
39. Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 652.

ly completed by June 15.[40] Sufficient guards were stationed there to protect them. Colonel Herman Sturm continued to act as superintendent,, with J. L. Smithmeyer acting as his assistant.[41] Sturm gave his especial attention to the making of cartridges, while Mr. Smithmeyer probably supervised shell manufacture and the hiring of labor.[42]

Work began in earnest as soon as the new buildings were finished. On June 13, twenty-four men were at work, By June 24, about eighty men and twenty women were employed; 300 persons were working at the Arsenal on September 23, [43] at which time it was doing all the work generally done by any establishment of its kind: Making cartridges for Minie, Enfield, and Mississippi rifles, for muskets, and ammunition for rifled and smoothbore cannon.[44] In the latter part of October, New Albany sent 750 kegs of powder and eight tons of lead to Indianapolis to be made up into cartridges for the use of Indiana troops in Kentucky. Four tons of lead and 1,000 pounds of powder were used daily at this time.[45]

About August 1, it became necessary to find other new storerooms. Arsenal officials saw that, if an armory should be erected, the state would save rent and at the same time be provided with a permanent place for storing arms. Consequently, they ordered one constructed.[46] Arms and the quartermaster's business generally were gradually transferred to the new buildings during the latter part of August, 1862.[47] A part

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[40] Dunn, Greater Indianapolis, vol. I, p. 223; Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 13 and 15, 1861; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 414; and Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 652, give a detailed description of the Arsenal.

[41] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 13, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 7, 1862. J. L. Smithmeyer was a graduate of the Austrian Polytechnical Institute and at one time an employee of a United States arsenal and well versed in the manufacture of firearms, and the various kinds of ammunition. During 1862, he lectured occasionally on artillery and ammunition. By December, 1862, he had been made Lieutenant-Colonel of the 54th Indiana Volunteers, and by special arrangement, with the War Department had been detailed as ordnance officer at Indianapolis.

[42] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, quoted in Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 14, 1861; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, June 14, 1861.

[43] Indianapolis Daily Sentinal, quoted in Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, June 14, 1861; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, June 14, 21 and July 15, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 23, 1861.

[44] Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, June 14, and 28, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 30, 1861.

[45] New Albany Daily Ledger, November 21, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 1, 1861; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, August 5, 1861.

[46] Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 6 and 16, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 22, 1861.

[47] Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 14 and 24, 1861.

of the building was set aside for use as an armorer's shop, in which United States as well as state arms were repaired. This action kept the arms in the service when they were needed badly, for had they been sent east, as was the custom, they would have been out of use for six months or more.[48]

Supplies for the Armory were now furnished from the Arsenal at Pittsburg by the War Department on requisition from Governor Morton. General Ripley, at Washington, usually granted them with reluctance.[49] Many arms were repaired at Indianapolis for use in Kentucky in August, 1862. Morton did not ask for consent to do this work; he simply told the War Department he was going to do it and insisted on receiving the spare parts and other materials until they were sent.[50]

Cold weather in December, 1861, interfered with the cartridge and shell making departments. It was not safe to introduce heating facilities into the frame buildings, hence other quarters had to be found.[51] This caused another building to be rented to which all business, except that of molding bullets and filling shells, was transferred. The number of employees was increased and signal lights were added to the output.[52] A summary of the amount of business done prior to January 1, 1862, shows that 92,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and 2,200,000 rounds for small arms had been made.[53]

Work continued in these Arsenal buildings for about a year, but the economical management of the institution, and guarantees of the

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[48] Congressional Globe, 37 Congress, 2 Session (1862), p. 3019; O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, August 17, 1862, Official Records, Series I, vol. XVI, part II, p. 360.

[49] General Dispatches, vol. XIV, pp. 114, 137, 156 and 162.

[50] O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, August 17, 1862, Official Records, Series I, vol. XVI, part II, p. 360. Other correspondence is given in General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 173 and 197; General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 74 and 125; ibid., vol. VII, p. 313; Department Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 175, 176 and 177. On August 12, 1862, Morton wrote Secretary Stanton ". . . . . We have from commencement of March, repaired all defective arms at our expense and can continue to do so to the advantage of the government if necessary spare parts are supplied. Federal Government orders that hereafter all such arms be shipped to Pittsburg.

"To say nothing of the heavy cost of transportation there is neither sense nor reason in this. We have facilities for repairing the arms without any delay and in our present straight for guns the delay in sending them off and getting them returned would seriously inconvenience us. I trust you will not allow General Ripley to annoy or embarrass us in this way." Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 72-73.

[51] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 416.

[52] Ibid., p. 416; J. P. Dunn, Greater Indianapolis, vol, I, p. 223; Documentary Journal, 1862, part II, p. 7.

[53] Ibid,, p. 7; Dunn, Greater Indianapolis, vol. I, p. 223.

security of life and property rendered it necessary to move it outside the city limits. Grounds were leased one and one-half miles east of the old State House,[54] where suitable temporary buildings were erected and operations were carried on during the rest of the time that the Arsenal was under the Governor's control.[55]

Political conditions in the state in July, 1862, seemed to demand an increase in the Arsenal guard. Consequently by August 2, nearly a full company had been recruited to guard it. Officials had placed few restrictions on admission of visitors in times past,[56] but on September 19, 1862, there was an explosion at the arsenal at Lawrenceville, Pennsylvania, which caused adverse orders to be issued by Captain Sturm.[57] From February to April, 1863, and during the height of the Northwestern Conspiracy in July and August, 1864, there was much danger of the Arsenal being seized by the Opposition. In March, 1863, three companies of infantry guarded it.[58]

(From 500 to 700 persons were employed from September, 1862, to practically the end of the war. The work often continued day and night, and from 200,000 to 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were turned out each twenty-four hours, as well as large quantities of rockets and artillery ammunition.[59]

Even then the demand was always in excess of the supply, and yet but few regiments left Indianapolis without full cartridge boxes and a good reserve supply of ammunition. Had Morton trusted to the Federal government to supply this ammunition, as some governors in the North did, the history of the Northwest might have been different. Very critical periods were bridged over by having this constantly renewed supply of first-class ammunition near at hand.) One instance of that kind was brought about by the Kirby Smith campaign, in September, 1862. Ohioans became greatly alarmed and telegraphed Columbus for a supply, but there was too much delay in filling the order. The Mayor and the committee of Defense then appealed to Governor Morton for it. This was a call for aid coming from outside the state, yet no questions were asked. There was no time for red tape. The wires flashed back the answer, ". . . . two carloads of ammunition ready. Will send another train in two hours." Morton sent them twenty pieces

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54. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 418; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, June 22, 1864; Sulgrove, Indianapolis and Marion County, p. 316.
55. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 418.
56. Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 29 and August 2, 1862.
57. Ibid., September 20, 1862.
58. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 214, 375, and 403; Vevay Reveille, April 17, 1863; New Albany Daily Ledger, April 14, 1862; W. R. Holloway to General Burnside, March 25, 1863, Private Dispatches, No. 16, p. 158; General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 177.
59. New Albany Daily Ledger, September 20, 1862; Sulgrove, Indianapolis and Marion County, p. 190; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, November 10, 1863.

of artillery, 3,000 stands of arms, 31,136 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 3,365,000 musket cartridges.[60] An order from General Wallace was filled with equal promptness.[61]

It would seem that Morton was taken to task by the United States Chief of Ordnance for this act, for he sent a very abrupt telegram to that official, saying that the "ammunition issued to Mayor Hitch of Cincinnati was issued upon my special order at his request, it being absolutely necessary for the protection of the city of Cincinnati, and there being no United States officer in command at the time I ordered Capt. Sturm, Chief of Ordnance of this State to send it to the mayor of the city . . . . ."[62]

Ammunition made at Indianapolis was also sent to Missouri, Kentucky, and western Virginia. It was distributed among the Home Guards of southern Indiana to anticipate an attack from south of the Ohio.[63] Conditions in Kentucky during the Zolli coffer and Polk invasion made Hoosiers uneasy aboutthe safety of their personal property. They demanded a supply of ammunition not only to protect the border but also to carry the war into Kentucky, and check the enemy on soil outside the state. Large amounts of military stores were sent to both sides of the Ohio during the raids into Indiana.[64] General Ripley ordered ammunition for small arms sent to Pittsburg Landing from the Indiana Arsenal in May, 1862.[65] Morton not only supplied munitions to the army during time of scarcity, but he insisted on its using Arsenal product during times of plenty.[66] He even tried to dispose of his surplus stock to General Wright at Cincinnati early in September, 1862, when the government had a sufficient quantity to supply regular needs.[67]

Conditions in Missouri demanded that aid be given Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon. The Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Regiments of Indiana Volunteers sent there were well supplied with cartridges from the Arsenal.[68] The army in the West received much of its ammunition

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60. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. II, p. 190; Sulgrove, History of Indianapolis and Marion County, pp. 190-1 gives about one-fourth of this amount.
61. General Telegrams, vol. VII, pp. 372-374.
62. O. P. Morton to General Ripley; unclassified mss. Indiana State Library. In a letter of August 17, 1862, to Secretary Stanton, Morton stated his views on the unnecessary and dangerous delays in sending the Austrian rifles to Pittsburg for repair. Official Records, Series I, vol. XVI, part II, p. 360.
63. Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 20, 1861; General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 122; General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 162.
64. General Telegrams, vol. IV, pp. 57, 62, 98, and 100; ibid., vol. IX, pp. 262 and 263.
65. W. R. Holloway to O. P. Morton, May 18, 1862; ibid., vol, III, p. 258.
66. Governor Morton to General Ripley, August 28, 1862, Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 192.
67. H. Sturm to General Wright, September 4, 1862, ibid., p. 222.
68. Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 17, 1861.

from Indianapolis, shipment being made almost daily as early as October, 1861. Much ammunition, to be used driving the secessionists out of western Virginia, was shipped in July of the same year.[69]

Three things remain to be noticed: First, the financial relations of the Arsenal with the state and the federal government; secondly, the investigations of the legislature of 1863; and thirdly, the transfer of the business to the federal government on April 18, 1864. The relation of the Arsenal to the State Treasury is discussed first. There was not a dollar appropriated by the General Assembly for establishing the Arsenal or continuing its operation, yet money was taken from the state treasury and used for carrying on Arsenal business. The money from the state came from the military contingent fund and state arms fund. Other money was loaned by private citizens or banks to Morton as Governor for Arsenal use. From June 22, 1861, to September 6, 1862, Captain Sturm borrowed $63,831,17 in his own name for paying its expenses. In most cases private citizens charged no interest on the amounts loaned, the amounts ranging from twenty to $3,000. Banks however, commonly charged interest on their loans varying from six to ten per cent.[70] Expenditures from the state treasury from November 1, 1862, to October 31, 1863, were $136,000. The total amount paid from the state treasury and financial bureau was $367,034.29.[71] All this was returned and every cent accounted for by receipt.[72]

It had been understood from the first that the general government would in the end assume all the war debts of the states,[73] but no agreement concerning ammunition furnished by the Arsenal had been made with the War Department prior to the middle of October, 1861. Supplies had been issued by the state Quartermaster-General for use in the Arsenal, and money had been drawn from the state treasury to pay for the same. This expense, together with others of a like extraordinary nature, had emptied the State Treasury. Public demands would not admit the discontinuance of the Arsenal. Its location at Indianapolis, in its close proximity to the armies operating in the West, made it a shipping point too favorable to be given up lightly. The only thing remaining was to bring the matter to the attention of the United States government and see what could be done toward having the federal treasury assume that part of the state debt which resulted from the making of ammunition.[74]

On October 15, 1861, Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, accompanied by Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General, came to Indianapolis to look after

[69] Ibid., October 30, 1861. See also Morton's message to the General Assembly in Documentary Journal, 1865, p. 797.

[70] Unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917).

[71] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 40; ibid., 1863, part II, pp. 38 and 109.

[72] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 13, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 38.

[73] Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 2, 1861; United States Statutes at Large, 1861, Chap. 21; ibid., 1862, joint resolution, No. 16.

[74] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 415.

the military affairs of the state.[75] Morton called their attention to the Arsenal especially. They visited the institution and reported that the ammunition made there was equal to that made anywhere else. He told them that his funds for running it were exhausted. The Secretary wanted the Arsenal to continue and told him that the federal government would pay for what had been furnished to the troops in the field.[76] This agreement was made with the understanding that some arrangement would be made for compensating the state for future issues,[77] and that the federal government would purchase ammunition manufactured beyond the wants of the state.[78]

General Thomas advised that an ordnance officer be sent to Indianapolis to inspect the Arsenal and find out what had been expended in making the ammunition with a view to paying the state for what had been issued to troops in federal service.[79] Captain Crispin, in charge of the arms depot at Bellaire, Ohio, was appointed by Secretary Cameron, for the purpose. In his report to the War Department, he said nothing, as far as the sources at hand show, concerning prices to be paid. He did report that the ammunition was equal to any made, and that he was opposed to the continuance of the institution because "the buildings were located in a populous part of town; secondly, its lack of improved tools increased the expense of manufacture; and thirdly, that the army in the West could be supplied with ammunition without recourse to State Arsenal".[80]

General James W. Ripley, Chief of United States Ordnance, was of the same opinion, as was Secretary Stanton coming to office in January, 1861.[81] On October 18, 1861, Ripley wrote Morton giving him the regulations for receiving payment for ammunition used by the federal government: "I have your letter of the 9th inst. . . . . According to regulations, money can only be expended by the duly apponnted disbursing agent of the Depart-

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75. O. P. Morton to Secretary Cameron, October 11, 1861, Private Telegrams, vol. I; Terrell, Report, vol, I, p. 415; Official Records, Series I, vol. III, pp. 548-549.
76. Ibid., pp. 547-8. General Lorenzo Thomas reported to the same material with minor additions to the War Department as published in Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 415; Documentary Journal, 1862-1863, part II, p. 7; Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 2, 1861.
77. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 415.
78. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part 2, p. 37.
79. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 415; Official Records, Series I, vol. III, pp. 547-8, gives Lorenzo Thomas's report to the War Department. Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 2, 1861, says that Morton requested the inspection of the Arsenal by a United States ordnance officer. It is prob able that both wanted him to visit the Arsenal.
80. Tereell, Report, vol. I, pp. 415-416; unclassified mss., Indiana State Library.
81. General Ripley to R. D. Owen, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library.

ment. If, however, you will take the trouble to direct the state officer who had charge of the manufacture of the small arms munitions at the Indiana State Arsenal, to make his accounts of expenditure and transmit them to this office with a certificate that he holds the ammunition for the use of the United States, they will be paid at the Treasury. Or a draft on the Assistant Treasurer will be remitted to him".[82] This answer by no means satisfied the Governor. Morton was in Washington for two weeks during the middle of December on business relating to the Arsenal; Senator Lane, Robert Dale Owen, and Herman Sturm were working at Washington during the latter part of December and the first days of January. Early in January, 1862, they succeeded in getting a contract with the federal government.[83]

It provided that the ammunition issued in the past should be paid for, and that ammunition issued in the future was to be receipted for by Captain Sturm, on behalf of the United States, and paid for after Sturm had made a requisition on the United States Treasury for the money. Captain Sturm was also authorized to alter or repair all guns and other United States arms that should be presented for such action. The Ordnance Department agreed to keep Sturm supplied with spare parts of guns, but refused to have anything to do with the arms belonging to the state and said that they would have to be cared for by the state Quartermaster. Accounts for repairs were to be sent quarterly to the Treasury at Washington. A bill for $68,700 was ordered paid; it included payment for ammunition already issued, $900 for nine months' rent of the Arsenal, and $3,584 for wages due the overseers.[84]

Republicans grasped eagerly at this opportunity to conclude that this contract with the United States converted the Arsenal into a United States institution, [85] but there is no reason for such opinions. The government was only discovering the value of Indianapolis as a distributing center, which encouraged the formulation of plans to establish an United States Arsenal there in the future.

The first quarterly bill was forwarded to Washington in April, 1862, but payment was delayed by General Ripley[86] on a technicality[87]

[82] General Ripley to O. P. Morton, October 18, 1861; unclassified mss., Indiana State Library; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 415,418.

[83] Ibid., pp. 415-416.

[84] R. D. Owen to O. P. Morton, January 9, 1862, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library; General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 96,97.

[85] Congressional Globe, 37 Congress, 2 Session, p. 3019; New Albany Daily Ledger, December 28, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 27, 1861.

[86] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 416-17. Ibid., p. 416, says that Ripley was an "old army man" and beheld the invasions of governors "upon ancient departmental usages and perrogatives in raising and fitting out troops, with astonishment and disgust".

[87] R. D. Owen to O. P. Morton, May 6, 1862, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library; Stanton had concurred in Ripley's hesitation to pay for these supplies. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 293.

Concerning this delay, Robert Dale Owen wrote from Washington: "Finding that General Ripley put off from day to day the auditing of our Arsenal accounts, I called upon him today and urged a final decision in the matter. Thus pressed, he said that although he had learned verbally that an arrangement had been made by the Secretary of War with you, by which . . . accounts of the Arsenal were to be paid, yet he had no written authority and could not act.

"I went to see the Secretary. He was absent . . . but I saw the Assistant Secretary, Watson; and, at his suggestion, made a written statement of the case . . . . It is only today (May 6, 1862) that General Ripley made any objection whatever on the score of authority." The second quarterly payment was due, when in June the whole matter was put before an ordnance commission,[88] which advised that the ammunition should be paid for, and at a rate that covered all cost and expense of manufacture.[89]

From April to August, 1862, Governor Morton and his assistants (D. G. Rose, Herman Sturm, W. R. Holloway, W. H. H. Terrell) worked in and out of Washington trying to get payment for the Arsenal supplies. General Ripley tried to block them at every opportunity; Secretary Stanton was by no means wholly in favor of Morton's deliberate disregard of War Department regulations, but the Indianans would give them no peace until their demands were met. First they would receive a part of their money, next they would trace another section through an ordnance commission; then it was a case of forestalling the arguments of the opposition with Secretary Chase. Creditors' demands at Indianapolis that they get their money gave added zest to the game.[90] In the middle of July they received the quarterly payment.[91] It was paid according to Morton's instructions. "I want any and all money paid on account of Indiana State Arsenal paid directly to me as Governor. Not to any agent or officer. You will understand this, and I hope (to) see that the warrants are drawn accordingly."[92] Again, "The Governor wants you to bring the Arsenal money. Don't trust it to any one . . . . ."[93] With the money at hand the Governor

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88. Ibid., pp. 417-418. In opposition to this view Morton on April 19, 1862, signed a receipt for United States Treasury payment of $68,791.60 for ammunition made at the Arsenal. The draft was given to A. Lange, Auditor of State and his receipt taken for the some on April 23, 1862. The receipt is in unclassified mss., in the Indiana State Library, Indianapolis. A letter from R. D. Owen to O. P. Morton of June 14, 1862, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917) supports the above.
89. J. Holt and R. D. Owen were the members of the Commission. Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, Document No. 89.
90. General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 199; ibid., vol. IV, pp. 36, 40, 41, 43, 46, 47, 48, 53, 77, 95, 101 and 227; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp, 416-418 reviews the case.
91. W. R. Holloway to O. P. Morton, July 14, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 101.
92. O. P. Morton to S. P. Chase, June 25, 1862, ibid., p. 36.
93. W. H. H. Terrell to W. R. Holloway, July 4, 1862, ibid., p. 60.

made speedy arrangements for paying clamorous creditors from the state Arsenal account.[94]

After this trouble, a new contract, which provided that payment for ammunition be made each month, was made between the Secretary of War and Governor Morton. The United States also agreed to forward supplies such as pwwder, lead, percussion caps, and other supplies at current prices. Materials were to be obtained by the following process: Morton was to send an itemized list of articles needed to General Ripley. General Ripley was to send the requisition on to the Secretary of War for his approval. With that approval Ripley was to fill the order.[95] Ripley generally fixed the price to be allowed. All bills for payment were to be sent to Ripley, who in turn, sent them to the second auditor of the Treasury with the request that the indicated sum be paid to Morton.[96] The Treasurer then notified Morton of his acceptance of the bill and that the money would be paid.[97] Whereupon the whole amount, including the value of the supplies was sent to Washington, and the Treasurer deducted the price of supplies that had been before agreed upon.[98] Payment was commonly in the form of legal tender notes and postal currency. This agreement was carried out without controversy until November, 1862, when General Ripley recommended that no more ammuniton be received from the Arsenal or supplies forwarded to it.

This was the occasion for an earnest protest from Morton, who said that the former monthly-payment contract had been the justification for erecting new buildings and adding new machinery and tools; that conditions were ripe for carrying on the business economically, and for a great increase in the output; and that no return had been received for the extra outlay of capital.[99] General Ripley insisted that ammunition

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[94] Ibid., p. 160.

[95] Private Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 152, 196, 197, 204.

[96] In a letter to Secretary of Treasury at Washington, dated June 25, 1862, Morton says, "I want any and all money paid on account of Indiana State Arsenal paid directly to me as Governor. Not any to agent or officer. You will understand this and I hope see that the warrants are drawn accordingly." General Dispatches, vol. IV, p. 36.

[97] General Ripley to O. P. Morton, July 22, 1863, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917); E. B. French to O. P. Morton, July 27, 1863, ibid.

[98] General Ripley to O. P. Morton, October 17, 1862; unclassified mss., Indiana State Library; Terrell, Report, vol. I, P. 417.

[99] On December 8, 1862, W. H. H. Terrell, Morton's Military Secretary, wrote W. H. Holloway at Washington, "General Ripley has decided that the Indiana State Arsenal shall no longer be continued. The Governor instructs me to say that he desires this decision revoked. You will see Robert Dale Owen and go to the Secretary of War personally and represent the great importance to the public service of continuing the manufacture of ammunition at this place. We have, as you know, everything in complete order,

from government arsenals could now be furnished western troops if judgment be exercised in ordering.[100] Morton argued that the facts did not justify the statement since every round that had been made at the Arsenal had been called for by troops, hence the need for continuance. Through his effort and the efforts of Robert Dale Owen, the Secretary of War was induced to revoke the decision of his subordinate, and promise that the Arsenal would be continued on the same basis as previously.[101] Stanton declared that Ripley's decision had been made without his knowledge.

Some little difficulty was experience occasionally in securing the monthly payments after that, but it was largely due to the necessity of observing certain forms.[103] The plans of the War Department to establish a United States arsenal at Indianapolis made arrangements easier. General Buckingham came out from Washington with Governor Morton early in October, 1862, to select the location for it, and contracted for the site.[104] Stanton issued an order for the continuance of the Indiana Arsenal until the new one was built, and promised to furnish supplies.[105] Early in January, General Ripley was dismissed from the Ordnance Department and General Ramsey put in charge, which facilitated transactions greatly.[106]

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hands, new buildings, etc. and daily calls for all the ammunition made. The Arsenal has been from the start, and there is no reason to doubt will continue to be, a great convenience and absolute necessity. It cannot safely be dispensed with. The cost of continuing it to the Government is nothing . . . . ammunitions being furnished at less rates than retail (?) prices. Besides, under the decision of the Ordnance Commission it would not be an act of good faith towards . . to cut it off in this summary way. The understanding was positive that the ammunition fabricated should be received as made by an officer of the United States and paid for monthly and all our arrangements have been made accordingly. Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 474-475.

[100] About December 26, Ripley did make a requisition for all ammunition at the Arsenal. General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 243 and 295.

[101] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 418; Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 20, 1862.

[102] Robert Dale Owen to O. P. Morton, December 10, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 252; W. R. Holloway to O. P. Morton, December 10, 1862, ibid., p. 252.

[103] Ibid., pp. 7, 11, 21, 25, 54, 57, 79, 87, 111, 112, 175, 176, 179, 190, 201, 205, 209, 222, 226, 228, 248, 249, 254, 255, 256, 266, 267, 272, 275, 279, 297, 298 and 306; ibid., vol. XV, pp. 292, 300, 318, 328, and 329; Private Dispatches, No. 16, p. 98.

[104] O. P. Morton to W. R. Holloway, October 7, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 54.

[105] W. R. Holloway to O. P. Morton, December 10, 1862, ibid., p.252.

[106] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 418.

The military auditing committee of the state in its report of September 15, 1863, stated that the total value of the ammunition made and turned over to the federal government was $676,000;[107] total cash payments to the Arsenal by the United States were $436,732.47; the value of materials received from the United States amounted to $124,240.37; and that sums due claimants amounted to $78,020.14. Of the amounts that had been paid by the United States, $211,102.11 had been deposited in the state treasury; and $69,699.18 had been turned in to the Bureau of Finance. The net profit to the Arsenal was $82,062.14 [108] All payments for ammunition were made to O. P. Morton as Governor by the United States Treasury. No law existed requiring him to turn this money into the State Treasury or to keep the Arsenal in operation.[109]

The manufacture of ammunition was continueduntil April, 1864, but the need for it after the middle of 1862 diminished rapidly, as the value of ammunition sent to the field shows.[110] In the contrast with the $676,091.39 worth of ammunition turned over to the government before September 15, 1863 $58,305.68 worth was furnished from that time to April, 1864; $124,240.37 worth of materials was furnished by the United States before that time, as compared with $38,410.39 worth of materials after September 15, 1863. Net profits after September 15, 1863 were $813.78. [111]

When the General Assembly met on January 8, 1863, the Democratic majority was fully aroused against Governor Morton's administration. They charged him with the following: First, placing arms in the hands of secret political societies to overthrow the liberties of the people; secondly, standing by and seeing citizens of the state seized and dragged out of it by federal authority without lifting a finger in their behalf; thirdly, using the army to overawe the people in elections; fourthly, seeing printing offices mobbed and private residences invaded without a protest; and finally, using appropriations of state money for his own glory.[112] They went so far as to ask of him to point out one statute that he had not violated if he could find it. Certainly he was running the state very much as he chose.

107. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 20. Statement of amounts received by Governor Morton from the Treasury of the United States on account of ordinance and ordinance stores on Arsenal ammunition covering time, from February, 14, 1864 found in unclassified mss. at the Indiana State Library.
108. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 423, says that the state had realized a clear profit of #77,457.32. The report of the military auditing committee says it was $80,309.47. The accounts agree on $6,077.31 being the value of the tools and ammunition on hand, but when the calculation of net profits comes up the difference arises. Holloway , in his Indianapolis, p. 119, evidently bases his statement on Terrell's statement.
109. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 38-42; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 414; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 255.
110. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 38-42.
111. Ibid., pp. 16, 42-50; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 423.
112. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 3, 1863.

The Democrats controlled the House by a majority of sixty to forty and the Senate twenty-seven to twenty-one, with two independents. They assembled with the grim determination of investigating everything for financial corruption and the advancement of party interests.[113] Party struggles were incessant during the entire time that a quorum was present. Resolutions thanking Morton for his efficiency in managing the military affairs of the state and his solicitude and care for its sick and wounded soldiers were voted to the table, [114] but were finally passed with reference to thanks for care of sick and wounded soldiers.[115] In May there was talk of moving the capital because of the arrogance of the Republican party.[116] The day after the Houses met a conflict was started over whether they should receive the Governor's message, and it was never formally accepted. As a result of floating rumors that the Democrats intended to seize the Arsenal, its guards were increased to three companies.[117]

It was in the midst of such strife that committees were appointed to investigate the financial affairs of the state. Nor were Republican officials at all reluctant about having them investigated, for Morton's political friends voted for the resolutions as readily as the opposition, [118] and Morton himself had carefully planned for them. Three committees were appointed to inspect the Arsenal. The first was a joint committee of nine members. After a careful investigation it unanimously reported tha the Arsenal had been safely, prudently, and economically managed, and that its continuance was essential to the public service.[119]

A second committe consisting of nine members was chosen by the House to inquire into the affairs of the Arsenal and report anything they should find of interest to the people of the State and the Legislature. It found the Arsenal in good condition.[120] The majority of this committee was politically opposed to the state administration and hence the report can hardly be said to be unduly partisan to the Governor. [121]

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113. Western Sentinel, January 12, 1863.
114. Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 12, 1863.
115. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 21, 1863.
116. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 21, 1863
117. W. H. Holloway to General Burnside, March 25, 1863, Private Dispatches, No. 16. An attempt was made to break into the powder magazine on April 16, Upon being fired upon the parties fled. See Vevay Reveille, April 17, 1863; New Albany Daily Ledger, April 14, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. IV, p. 177, and vol. XVI, p. 158 report other instances during 1862 and 1863. It was always guarded more or less of course.
118. Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 30, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 2, 1863.
119. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 420.
120. Teid., p. 420.
121. Ibid., p. 422; House Journal, 1863, pp. 3-5, 245; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 19, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal,

In a special message to the legislature, Morton offered to transfer the Arsenal to the state because of the great responsibility and anxiety it placed upon him. He wanted the Legislature to continue its operations until a United States arsenal was finished, but his request was not complied with.[122] The Governor then proposed that the Auditor and Treasurer cooperate with him in continuing its operation. They declined on the ground that the institution was not authorized by law. Being determined to have the Arsenal continue its work, Morton decided to assume the responsibility for continuing it, provided the legislative auditing committee would examine and audit all items of expenditure.[123] The military auditing board finally consented to audit them, but soon found that it had too much other business to attend to, to allow doing much with the Arsenal.[124] Hence Samuel H. Buskirk was appointed with the approval of the Governor.[125] His duties were to remain at the Arsenal and give all his attention to it, certifying from his personal knowledge to the correctness of all claims presented for the action of the board. He was required to make monthly reports to the committee so that it would know its financial condition. Buskirk's salary was $200 per month, and he did his work well, continuing there as long as the Arsenal was in the Governor's care.[126]

A third investigating committee, appointed in March, 1863, began its work on May 29.[127] It investigated the financial transactions of the Arsenal not only at Indianapolis, but also in New York City. It went East in order to make a complete report, and because Morton was anxious to free himself from all suspicion of graft.[128] The investigations at New York covered transactions amounting to thousands of dollars and lasted two weeks. Volumes of vouchers were examined in the attempt to discover fraud.[129] When it returned to Indianapolis, the majority took possession of the data. It persisted in keeping it and would not agree to submitting a report at all, hence the minority submitted one of its own late in the year, which entirely supported Morton.[130]

January 19, 1863. The composition of Arsenal investigating committee was as follows:

Harney, J. F. (Dem.)
Roberts, O. F. (Dem.)
Tarkington, J. C. (Rep.)
Baker, Timothy, (Rep.)
Collins, P. M. (Dem.)
Kemp, John (Dem.)
Marshal, Joseph (Rep.)
Anderson, A. J. (Rep.)

[122] Ibid., February 26, 1863; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 419,420.

[123] Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 767.

[124] Ibid., 1864-1865, part II, p. 37.

[125] Ibid., p.186; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 423.

[126] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, p. 767; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 423.

[127] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 29, 1863.

[128] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 525; O. P. Morton to Legislative auditing committee, April 27, 1863, Bureau of Finance, p. 11.

[129] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 426-7.

[130] Ibid., pp. 529-530.

This discussion ends with the transfer of the Arsenal to the United States. On June 15, 1862, a bill was introduced into the national House of Representatives providing for the establishment of arsenals at Columbus, Rock Island, and Indianapolis.[131] It became law on July 11; it appropriated $100,000 for the erection of each of them.[132] Senator Henry S. Lane, Governor Morton, Robert Dale Owen, and W. R. Holloway were very instrumental in getting the one at Indianapolis; and the bill ready for Congress.[133] In October of the same year General C. P. Buckingham accompanied by Governor Morton, left Washington for Indianapolis to select the proper grounds and to contract for the building of the new Arsenal.[134] $35,500 was paid for the site on which the Technical High School is now located. The General Assembly, in 1863, ceded jurisdiction over the land to the United States government and exempted it from taxation.[135]

Governor Morton and the auditing committee had been anxious to close the Arsenal during all the early part of 1864.[136] The federal government was at that time producing nearly all the ammunition it needed and the prices of materials had increased so much that the Arsenal could only with difficulty make running expenses. The United States consented to purchase the materials and ammunition on hand, so everything was appraised. In the appraisal, the Secretary of War was represented by Captain. J. M. Whittemore and Captain A. McBride. Herman Sturm represented Governor Morton.[137] The military auditing committee ordered the buildings sold, and appointed John C. New to superintend the sale. They were sold on April 18, 1864, and the new proceeds ($1,108.80) given to the care of Morton. Some of the tools and ammunition were retained for the use of the state and turned over to Asahel Stone, as Quartermaster General of Indiana. Some $47,000 worth of materials passed into the hands of the United States,[138] and the Indiana Arsenal had ceased to exist.

[131] Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2 Session (1862), pp. 2569, 3019 and 2864; Democratic Pharos, July 22, 1861, says that a meeting was held in the court house at Indianapolis on July 13 and 14 to consider the proposed location of a new national armory in the West, and to bring it to Indianapolis if it was at all possible. This meeting was held when the arsenal and armory bills were being discussed in Congress.

[132] United States Statutes at Large, 1862, chap. 148.

[133] W. R. Holloway to O. P. Morton, June 30, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. IV, p. 45; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 424-425; Democratic Pharos, July 18 and 22, 1862.

[134] Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 2, 1862; Dunn, Greater Indianapolis, p. 223.

[135] Indiana Statutes, 1863, Chap. II.

[136] W.H.H. Terrell to John Love, March 5, 1864, Bureau of Finance, p. 608.

[137] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 424.

[138] Ibid., p. 44; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 423, and Document 116.

IV. THE BATTLE RECORD, 1861-1865

1. Summary Statement

Indiana's battle record extended from June 3, 1861, in western Virginia to Palmetto Ranche, Texas, on May 13, 1865, to Georgia and Indian Territory, to Pensacola and New Orleans. The official record shows a total of 308 engagements in the various areas of contest:[1]

In East:		
Virginia	90	
Maryland	7	
Pennsylvania	1	98
In Southeast:	8	
North Carolina	2	
South Carolina	41	51
Georgia		
North of the Ohio:		
In Ohio	1	
In Indiana	1	2

In East Mississippi Valley:		
Kentucky	16	
Tennessee	51	
Alabama	18	
Mississippi	24	
Louisiana	15	124
In West Mississippi Valley:		
Missouri	9	
Arkansas	19	
Indian Territory	2	
Texas	3	
		33
TOTAL		308

Some principal engagements and units and time involved were as follows:[2]

ACTION	NUMBERS OF REGIMENTS OR BATTERIES INVOLVED	DATE
Antietam	66	September 17, 1862
Atlanta	55	July-September 1864
Arkansas Post, Ark.	8	January 11, 1865
Black River Bridge, Miss.	9	May 17, 1863
Bentonville, N. C.	20	March 19, 1865
Corinth, Miss. (Siege)	34	April-May, 1862
Chickamauga, Ga.	39	September 19-20, 1863
Champion Hills, Miss	17	May 16, 1863
Dallas, Ga.	28	May 27, 1864
Franklin, Tenn.	25	Nov. 30, 1864
Kenesaw Mountain, Ga.	55	June 27, 1864
Missionary Ridge, Ga.	37	November 25, 1863
Mobile, Ala. (siege)	16	March-April, 1865
Nashville, Tenn.	43	December 15-16, 1864
Peach Tree Creek, Ga.	22	July 20, 1864
Perryville, Ky.	19	October 8, 1862
Resaca, Ga.	50	May 15, 1864
Stone River, Tenn.	31	Dec. 31-Jan. 2, 1863
Shiloh, Tenn.	17	April 6-7, 1862
Vicksburg, Miss.	24	May-July, 1863

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1. Terrell, Report (1960), 567.
2. Ibid., vol. I, Appendix, 98-107.

2. Detailed Analysis: Infantry, Cavalry, Light Artillery

A more detailed analysis of battle action generally for infantry, cavalry and light Artillery units during the war is as follows:[3]

THREE MONTHS SERVICE (infantry)

Indianapolis
6th Regiment, April to August, 1861 Indianapolis
In western Virginia, 1861: Philippi, Grafton, Laurel Hill
7th Regiment, April to August, 1861
Indianapolis
Western Virginia, 1861: Webster, Cheat Mountain, Bealington,
8th Regiment, April to August, 1861 Indianapolis
Western Virginia, 1861: Clarksburg, Buckhannon, Rich Mountain,
9th Regiment, April to August, 1861 Indianapolis
Western Virginia, 1861: Philippi, Grafton, Laurel Hill
10th Regiment, April to August, 1861 Indianapolis
Western Virginia, 1861: Clarksburg, Buckhannon, Rich Mountain
11th Regiment, April to August, 1861 Indianapolis
Ohio river, 1861: River guard duty, Evansville
Western Virginia, 1861: Cumberland, Romney, Martinsburg, Kelley Id.

THREE YEARS REGIMENTS

6th Regiment, September, 1861 to September, 1865 Madison
In Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861 to 1863: Elizabethtown, Bowling Green, Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth, Stone River, Chattanooga
In Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Atlanta
In pursuit of Hood, 1864: Chattanooga
7th Regiment, September, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
Virginia campaign, 1862: Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg
Virginia, 1864: Battles of the Wilderness, Petersburg, Weldon
8th Regiment, August, 1861 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In Missouri and Arkansas with Fremont, 1861-1863: Springfield Pea Ridge, Helena
Vicksburg Campaign, 1863: Port Gibson, Champion Hills, Jackson, Vicksburg
In Louisiana and Texas, 1863-1864
In Shenandoah Valley, 1864: Fishers Hill, Cedar Creek
In Georgia, 1865: Savannah
9th Regiment, August, 1861 to September, 1865 Laporte
In Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862: Shiloh, Corinth, Murfreesboro
Pursuit of Bragg, 1862: Perryville, Stone River
Tennessee and Alabama, 1863: Chattanooga, Bridgeport
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Big Shanty, Jonesboro
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Galesvllle, Columbia, Franklin,Nashville
In Louisiana and Texas, 1865
10th Regiment, September, 1861 to July, 1865 Lafayette
In Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861 to 1862: Mill Springs, Shiloh, Corinth

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3. Terrell, Report (1869) and the reprint, 1960; Dictionary of American Biography (1946). Units are infantry unless otherwise indicated. There is some conflict as to time and muster.

  - In pursuit of Bragg, 1862: Perryville, Nashville, Chickamauga
  - Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, Savannah
  - Carolinas, 1865: Columbia, Goldsboro, Raleigh
- 11th Regiment, August, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
  - Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861 to 1862: Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth
  - Tennessee and Arkansas, 1862-1863: Helena, Milliken's Bend
  - Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Port Gibson, Champion Hills, Jackson
  - Louisiana, 1863 to 1864: New Orleans, Opelousas
  - Western Virginia, 1864: Harpers Ferry, Winchester, Fishers Station, New Market, Cedar Creek
- 12th Regiment, May, 1861 to May, 1865 Indianapolis
  - Western Virginia, 1861-1862: Shenandoah, Leesburg, Winchester
  - Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862: Richmond, Holly Springs (Miss.), Vicksburg
  - Chattanooga and east Tennessee, 1863: Missionary Ridge
  - Atlanta campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw Mountain, Jonesboro
  - Pursuit of Hood, 1864
  - March to the Sea, 1864 to 1865: Savannah, Columbia, Goldsboro
- 13th Regiment, June 1861 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
  - In Virginia, 1861-1862: Rich Mountain, Cheat Mountain,Winchester
  - Peninsular campaign, etc., 1862 to 1863
  - Against Charleston, S. C., 1864: Charleston, Jacksonville
  - Virginia, 1864 to 1865: Petersburg, Richmond
- 14th Regiment, June, 1861 to July, 1865 Terre Haute
  - Western Virginia, 1861: Rich Mountain, Cheat Mountain, Romney
  - Shenandoah Valley, 1862
  - Eastern Virginia and Maryland, 1862 to 1863: Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg
  - Eastern Virginia, 1864: Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor
- 15th Regiment, May 1861 to August, 1865 Lafayette
  - Western Virginia, 1861: Rich Mountain, Greenbrier
  - Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862: Corinth, Perryville
  - Pursuit of Bragg, 1862, and Kirby Smith, 1862, in Kentucky and Tennessee
  - East Tennessee, 1863: Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Knoxville
- 16th Regiment, August, 1861 to June, 1865 Richmond
  - In western Virginia, 1861: Balls Bluff, Winchester, Warrenton
  - Central Kentucky against Kirby Smith, 1862
  - Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Dallas, Chickasaw Bayou, Ark. Post
  - In Louisiana, 1863 to 1865: Red River
- 17th Regiment, May, 1861 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
  - In western Virginia, 1861: Tygarts Valley, Cheat Mountain, Greenbriar
  - Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862: Shiloh, Corinth (Miss.), Murfreesboro, pursuit of Bragg, 1862
  - East Tennessee, 1863: Rosecrans campaign, Chattanooga, Knoxville
  - In Atlanta campaign, 1864: Dalton, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood
  - Wilson's Raid in Alabama, 1865
- 18th Regiment, August, 1861 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
  - In Missouri and Arkansas, 1861 to 1862: Pea Ridge, Helena
  - Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Port Gibson, Champion Hills
  - Louisiana and Texas, 1863: New Orleans, Teche River, Esperanza
  - Virginia, 1864: Fishers Hill, Cedar Creek
  - Georgia, 1864: Savannah, Augusta

- 19th Regiment, July, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
    - Western Virginia and Maryland, 1861-1862: Falls Church, Shenandoah Valley, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville
    - Operations, 1863-1864: Gettysburg, Rapidan, Cold Harbor, Petersburg
- 2oth Regiment, July, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
    - Maryland and North Carolina, 1861: Baltimore, Hatteras Inlet
    - Eastern Virginia, 1862: Fortress Monroe, Frazier's Farm
    - Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1863: Chancellorsville, Gettysburg
    - Eastern Virginia, 1864-1865: Rapidan, Petersburg, Richmond
- 21st Regiment, July, 1861- January, 1866 Indianapolis
    - On Potomac, 1861: Baltimore, Newport News
    - Louisiana operations, 1862-1863: New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Bayou Teche
    - Red River campaign, 1864
    - Louisiana and Mobile, 1865
- 22nd Regiment, August, 1861-July, 1865 Madison
    - Missouri and Arkansas, 1861-1862: Springfield, against Price, Pea Ridge, Batesville
    - In northern Mississippi and Tennessee, 1862: Corinth, Perryville, Stone River, Chattanooga
    - East Tennessee, 1863: Missionary Ridge
    - In Georgia Campaign, 1864: Resaca, Rome, Kenesaw, Jonesboro Savannah
    - Carolinas and north, 1865: Averysboro, Bentonville, Washington City
- 23rd Regiment, July, 1861 to July, 1865 New Albany
    - Kentucky and North Mississippi, 1861-1862: Fort Henry, Shiloh, Corinth, Holly Springs
    - In Mississippi campaigns, 1863: Champion Hill, Vicksburg, Jackson
    - Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
    - Carolinas, 1865: Goldsboro, Beaufort, Bentonville
- 24th Regiment, July, 1861 to November, 1865 Vincennes
    - In Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, 1861-1862: Donelson, Shiloh
    - Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Port Gibson, Champion Hill, Vicksburg
    - Louisiana and Mobile, 1863: New Orleans, Morganza, Barrancas, Blakely, Selma, Galveston (Texas)
- 25th Regiment, August, 1861 to July, 1865 Evansville
    - Missouri, 1861: Black Water, Sedalia
    - west Tennessee and north Mississippi, 1862-1863: Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, Holly Springs
    - Mississippi operations, 1863: Meridian, Vicksburg
    - Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, Jonseboro, pursuit of Hood Savannah
    - Carolinas, 1865: Beaufort, Goldsboro, Bentonville
- 26th Regiment, August, 1861 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
    - Missouri and Arkansas, 1861-1862: Springfield, Sedalia
    - Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Yazoo City, Port Gibson, Vicksburg
    - Louisiana and Texas, 1863-1864: Carrollton (La.), Morganza, Brownsville, Donaldson (La)
    - Mississippi, 1865: Mobile, Spanish Fort, Selma, Meridian
- 27th Regiment, September, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
    - Maryland and eastern Virginia, 1861-1862: Shenandoah, Winchester, Strasburg, Cedar Mountain, Antietam

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON CAMPAIGN
Feb., 1862



SHILOH CAMPAIGN, April, 1862



PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, March-July, 1862



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN, May-June, 1862





ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN
Sept., 1862

87. CHATTANOOGA PLACE NAMES,1863-1864



Railroads .... Union .... Confederate ---------



86. FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN
Nov. 1862

FREDERICKSBURG AND CHANCELLORSVILLE
April 30 to May 6, 1863



BRAGG-KIRBY SMITH CAMPAIGNS, Sept.-Dec., 1862





STONE RIVER
Dec. 29, 1862 to Jan. 3, 1863

TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN, June, 1863



MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGNS, 1863



GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, July, 1863



WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN, May, 1864



CAMPAIGNS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI



CAMPAIGN: WILDERNESS TO RICHMOND, May-June, 1864





RICHMOND-PETERSBURG
CAMPAIGNS
June, 1864 - March 31, 1865



ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, 1864
HOOD CAMPAIGN, Oct.-Dec., 1864



ATLANTA-SAVANNAH-RALEIGH
CAMPAIGNS, Oct. 1864 to
April, 1865



RICHMOND-PETERSBURG TO APPOMATTOX, April 3 to 9, 1865

Virginia-Pennsylvania, 1863: Chancellorsville, Gettysburg
Tennessee, 1863-1864: Tullahoma (Tenn.)
Georgia and Carolinas, 1864-1865: Resaca, Atlanta, Savannah Goldsboro Madison

28th Regiment (Cavalry), August, 1861, to September, 1865 Evansville/
Mississippi-Arkansas, 1861-1862: Black River, Pilot Knob, Helena
Eastern Virginia, 1862-1865: Strasburg, Cross Keys, Cedar Mountain, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, White House

29th Regiment, August, 1861 to after October, 1865 Laporte
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Bowling Green, Shiloh, Corinth, pursuit of Bragg, Stone River, Chattanooga
Alabama-Georgia campaign, 1864: Decatur, Dalton, Marietta

30th Regiment, September, 1861 to November 1865 Fort Wayne
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1862: Bowling Green, Shiloh, Corinth, pursuit of Bragg
Eastern Tennessee, 1862-1863: Stone River, Chattanooga
Atlanta campaign, 1864: Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Nashville
Texas, 1865: Army of Occupation; Green Lake, Texas

31st Regiment, September, 1861 to December, 1865 Terre Haute
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1862: Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, pursuit of Bragg
Eastern Tennessee with Rosecrans, 1863: Stone River, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Nashville
Texas, 1865: Army of Occupation

32nd Regiment, August, 1861, to December, 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Munfordsville, Shiloh, Corinth, pursuit of Bragg, Stone River, Chattanooga
Atlanta campaign, 1864: Resaca, Dallas, Atlanta
Texas, 1865: Army of Occupation

33d Regiment, September, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861-1863: Loudon, Cumberland Gap, Columbia, Franklin, Tullahoma, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Cheraw, Fayetteville, Goldsboro, Bentonville, Richmond, Washington City

34th Regiment, September, 1861 to February, 1865 Anderson
Kentucky-Missouri, 1861-1862: Elizabethtown, Cairo (Ill.), New Madrid (Mo.), Fort Pillow
Arkansas-Vicksburg, 1863-1864: Aberdeen, Helena, Yazoo Pass, Vicksburg, Port Gibson, Jackson
Louisiana-Texas, 1864-1865: Teche, Opelousas, Pass Cavallo (Texas), New Orleans, Palmetto Ranche (Texas), Brownsville

35th Regiment, December, 1861 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Bardstown, Nashville, pursuit of Bragg, Murfreesboro, Stone River, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Bragg
East Tennessee and Texas, 1865: Nashville, Texas Army of Occupation.

36th Regiment, September, 1861 to October, 1865 Richmond
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861-1863: Shiloh, Corinth, pursuit of Bragg, Stone River, Chattanooga
Atlanta campaign, 1864: Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Chattanooga
Texas, 1865: Army of Occupation

37th Regiment, September, 1861 to July, 1865 Lawrenceburg
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Bowling Green and railway guard, Stone River, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Chickamauga, Resaca, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas, 1865: Goldsboro, Raleigh
38th Regiment, September, 1861 to July, 1865 New Albany
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Munfordsville, Nashville, Perryville, Stone River, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Chickamauga, Resaca, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Bentonville, Raleigh
39th Regiment, August, 1861, to July, 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1862: Nashville,,Shiloh, Corinth, Stone River
Atlanta campaigns, 1864: In Rousseau and McCook Raids, Jonesboro, Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865; Morrisville
40th Regiment, December, 1861 to after December, 1865 Lafayette
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Bowling Green, Nashville, pursuit of Bragg, Stone River, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dallas, Kenesaw, Peach Tree Creek, pursuit of Hood, Nashville
Texas, 1865: Army of Occupation, La Vaca
41st Regiment (2nd Cavalry), September, 1861 to July; 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth,Bragg and Buell campaign, Perryville; Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, in Wilson's Raid in Alabama
42nd Regiment, October, 1861 to July, 1865. Evansville
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Owensboro, Nashville, in Buell-Bragg contest, Perryville, Stone River, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Rome, Resaca, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Bentonville, Richmond
43rd Regiment, September, 1861 to June, 1865 Terre Haute
Western Kentucky and Missouri, 1861-1862: Calhoun, New Madrid, Island No. 10., Helena
On Mississippi River, 1862: White River (Ark.), Grenada (Miss.), Yazoo Pass, Helena, Little Rock
Louisiana, 1864: Red River Campaign
Arkansas, 1864: Pine Bluff
Indiana, 1864-1865: Guard duty at Camp Morton
44th Regiment, October, 1861-September, 1865 Fort Wayne
Western Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861-1863: Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth (Miss.), pursuit of Bragg, Perryville, Stone River, Cumberland Mountains, Chattanooga
East Tennessee;
East Tennessee, 1864-1865: Chickamauga
45th Regiment (Third Cavalry), 1861-1865 Madison
Right Wing in Virginia and Maryland, 1861-1862: Fredericksburg, Stoneman's Raid, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg
Virginia, 1864: Kilpatrick's Raid, Wilson's Raid, Sheridan's Raid, Spottsylvania

Left Wing in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861-1862: Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth, Buell-Bragg campaign, Stone River, Chattanooga
Atlanta Campaign, 1864: Atlanta, Savannah
46th Regiment, October, 1861 to September, 1865 Logansport
Kentucky-Missouri-Tennessee, 1861-1863: Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, Arkansas Post
Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Milliken's Bend, Port Gibson, Champion Hills
Louisiana campaign, 1863-1864: Teche, New Orleans, Texas
Central Kentucky, 1864-1865, under Bainbridge
47th Regiment, October, 1862 to October, 1865 Anderson
Kentucky-Missouri-Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bardstown, New Madrid, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, Yazoo Pass
Vicksburg campaign, 1864: Champion Hills, Vicksburg, Jackson
Louisiana, etc., 1863-1864: Banks expedition on Red River, Mobile, Shreveport
48th Regiment, December, 1861 to July, 1865 Goshen
Kentucky-Missouri-Tennessee, 1861-1862: Paducah, Corinth, Iuka, pursuit of Price
Vicksburg campaign, 1864: Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hills, Vicksburg
East Tennessee and Georgia campaigns, 1863-1864: Chattanooga, Huntsville, Cartersville, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
The Carolinas and north, 1865: Beaufort, Columbia, Goldsboro, Virginia
49th Regiment, October, 1861 to September, 1865 Jeffersonville
Eastern Kentucky, 1862: Bardstown, Cumberland Gap, western Virginia
Mississippi, 1862-1863: Chickasaw Bayou, Milliken's Bend, Arkansas Post, Champion Hills, Vicksburg, Jackson
Louisiana and Texas, 1863-1864: New Orleans, Opelousas, Matagorda, Alexandria
50th Regiment, September, 1861 to September, 1865 Seymour
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bardstown, Nashville, Munfordsville, Memphis
In Arkansas, 1863-1864: Little Rock, Lewisburg, Saline River
Southern Alabama, 1865: Mobile, Spanish Fort
51st Regiment, December, 1861 to December, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bardstown, Shiloh, Corinth, in Buell-Bragg contest
Streight's Raid in Alabama and Georgia, 1863, Gaylesville
Tennessee and North Alabama, 1864: Nashville, Chattanooga, Atlanta Pulaski, pursuit of Hood, Nashville
Louisiana and Texas, 1865: San Antonio Rushville-
52nd Regiment, February, 1862 to September, 1865 /Indianapolis
Tennessee and Arkansas, 1862-1863: Forts Donelson and Henry, Shiloh, Corinth, Fort Pillow
Georgia and Mississippi, 1863: Raid on Meridian, Vicksburg
With Banks on Red river, 1864: pursuit of Forrest, 1864
Tennessee and Missouri, 1864: Memphis, Franklin (Mo.), pursuit of Price, Nashville, pursuit of Hood
In Alabama, 1865: Mobile, Spanish Fort, Blakely, Montgomery
53rd Regiment, February, 1862 to July, 1865 Rockport
Tennessee and north Mississippi, 1862: Shiloh, Corinth, Holly

Springs, Memphis, Hatchie
Middle Mississippi, 1863-1864: Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, Jackson, Natchez, Meridian
Georgia campaign, 1864: Kenesaw, Atlanta, Peach Tree Creek, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond

54th Regiment (One Year), October, 1862 to December, 1863 Indianapo.
Mississippi, 1862-1863: Yazoo, Chickasaw Bluffs, Arkansas Post, Milliken's Bend, Vicksburg, Jackson
In Louisiana, 1863: Teche, Opelousas, New Orleans

55th Regiment)Three Months, Railroad Guard), 1862-1863 Indianapolis
Indianapolis, 1862: Camp Morton prison guard
Kentucky, 1862: Kirby Smith Campaign in central Kentucky

56th (Railroad) Regiment, 1861-1862: Failed to fill; merged with 52nd

57th Regiment, November, 1861 to December, 1865 Richmond
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bardstown, Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth, Tullahoma, pursuit of Bragg, Perryville, Stone River, Chattanooga, Knoxville (1863-1864)
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dalton, Kenesaw, Peach Tree Creek, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Franklin, Nashville
Texas, 1865: La Vaca

58th (Engineer) Regiment, October, 1861 to July, 1865 Princeton
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bardstown, Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth, pursuit of Bragg, Stone River, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Knoxville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Richmond, Washington City

59th Regiment, February, 1862 to July, 1865 Gosport
Tennessee and north Mississippi, 1862-1863: New Madrid, Pillow, Corinth
Mississippi, 1862-1863: Oxford, Helena (Ark.), Milliken's Bend, Grand Gulf, Port Gibson, Champion Hills, Jackson, Vicksburg
East Tennessee and Georgia, 1863-1864: Memphis, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington City

60th Regiment, November, 1861 to March, 1865 Evansville
Kentucky-north Mississippi, 1862: Munfordsville, Memphis, Arkansas Post
Mississippi campaign, 1863: Milliken's Bend, Port Gibson, Champion Hills, Vicksburg, Jackson
Louisiana and Texas, 1863-1865: Teche, Pass Cavallo (Texas), Red River campaign, New Orleans

61st (Second Irish) Regiment: Consolidated with 35th Madison
62nd Regiment: Consolidated with 53rd Regiment Rockport
63rd Regiment, October, 1862 to June, 1865 Covington
Virginia, 1862: Second Manassas
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1863-1864: Shepherdsville, Knoxville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Cassville, Kenesaw, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Franklin, Nashville
North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Kingston, Raleigh, Greensboro

64th Regiment. Failed to fill

65th Regiment, August, 1862 to June, 1865 Princeton
Kentucky and East Tennessee, 1862-1864: Glasgow, Knoxville, Blountsville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Franklin (Tenn.), Nashville
North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Greensboro

66th Regiment, August, 1862 to June, 1865 New Albany
Kentucky and West Tennessee, 1862-1864: Kirby Smith campaign, Corinth (Miss.), Pulaski, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond (Va.), Washington City

67th Regiment, August, 1862 to after November, 1865 Madison
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864: Mumfordsville, Memphis
North Mississippi, 1863: Arkansas Post, Port Gibson, Champion Hills, Vicksburg, Jackson
Louisiana, 1863-1864: Teche, Red River expedition
South Mississippi and Louisiana, 1864: Mobile, Morganza (La.), Galveston (Texas)

68th Regiment, August, 1862 to June, 1865 Greensburg
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864: Munfordville, Hoover's Gap, Chattanooga, Knoxville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dalton, pursuit of Hood

69th Regiment, August, 1862 to July 1866 Richmond
Kentucky, Tennessee, North Mississippi, 1863: Richmond, Memphis, Chickasaw Bluffs, Arkansas Post
Mississippi campaign, 1863: Milliken's Bend, Port Gibson, Champion Hills, Vicksburg, Jackson
Louisiana and Texas, 1863-1864: Teche, Matagorda, Indianola, New Orleans, Alexandria
Alabama, 1865: Mobile, Barrancas (Fla.), Pensacola, Selma

70th Regiment, August, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bowling Green, Munfordville, Gallatin
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Marietta, Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Raleigh, Richmond (Va.), Washington City

71st (Sixth Cavalry) Regiment, August, 1862 to September, 1865 Haute Terre/
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864: Richmond, Knoxville, Holston river
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dalton, Resaca, Kenesaw, Stoneman's Raid on Macon, Rousseau's Raid into Alabama, pursuit of Hood, Nashville, Tennessee, (1865)

72nd (Mounted Infantry) Regiment, August 1862 to June, 1865 Lafayette
Kentucky, Tennessee, 1862-1863: Against Bragg, Tullahoma, Hoover's Gap, Chattanooga, pursuit of Wheeler in middle Tennessee
Mississippi, 1863: Meridian Raid, Memphis
Georgia Campaign, 1864: Atlanta, Wilson's Raid (Ala.), pursuit of Jefferson Davis

73rd Regiment, August, 1862 to July, 1865 South Bend
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Richmond, pursuit of Bragg, Gallatin, Stone River, Streight's Raid (Ala. and Ga.)
Tennessee and Alabama, 1864-1865: Crooked Creek (Ala.), Cedar Bluffs, railway guard northern Alabama, pursuit of Hood, Nashville

74th Regiment, August 1862 to June 1865 Ft. Wayne
Kentucky and east Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bowling Green pursuit of Bragg, Gallatin, Munfordsville, pursuit of Morgan, Nashville, Tullahoma, Hoover's Gap. Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dallas, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond (Va.) Washington City

75th Regiment, August, 1862 to June 1865 Wabash
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Lebanon, Hoover's Gap, Tullahoma, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Dallas, Kenesaw, Peach Tree Creek, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Bentonville, Raleigh, Richmond (Va.), Washington City.

76th (30 Days) Regiment, July-August, 1862 Greensburg
Kentucky against guerillas: Newburg, Ohio river guards

77th (4th Cavalry) Regiment, August, 1862, to June 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky-Tennessee campaigns, 1862-1864: Madisonville, pursuit of Morgan, Munfordsville, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, East Tennessee, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, McCook Raid, Wilson's Raid in Alabama (1865)
Tennessee, 1865: Nashville

78th (60 Days) Regiment, August to October, 1862 Greencastle
Kentucky, 1862: Action against guerillas along the border

79th Regiment, September, 1862, to June 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864: Pursuit of Bragg, Perryville, Nashville, Stone River, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Knoxville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Marietta, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Franklin, Nashville
Tennessee, 1865: Huntsville (Ala.), Greeneville

80th Regiment, September, 1862 to August, 1865 Princeton
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864: Pursuit of Bragg, Perryville, against Morgan's raiders, Knoxville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dalton, Kenesaw, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Franklin, Nashville
North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Goldsboro, Raleigh

81st Regiment, August, 1862 to June, 1865 New Albany
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864: Perryville, Stone River, Winchester, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dalton, Resaca, Kenesaw, Marietta, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Franklin (Tenn.), Nashville, east Tennessee

82nd Regiment, August, 1862 to June, 1865 Madison
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Pursuit of Bragg, Stone River, Hoover's Gap, Chattanooga

Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Peach Tree, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolina and North, 1865: Bentonville, Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington

83rd Regiment, September, 1862 to July, 1865 Lawrenceburg
West Tennessee and north Mississippi, 1862: Memphis, Chickasaw Bayou, Arkansas Post (1863), Champion Hills
Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Vicksburg, Jackson, Memphis
East Tennessee, 1863: Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Dallas, Kenesaw, Jonesboro, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Beaufort, Columbia, Goldsboro, Bentonville, Richmond, Washington

84th Regiment, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Richmond
Kentucky and east Tennessee, 1862-1863: Kirby Smith campaign, Point Pleasant (W.Va.), Nashville, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Cleveland (Tenn.)
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Jonesboro, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood
Tennessee, 1865: Nashville, Huntsville (Ala.), Knoxville

85th Regiment, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Terre Haute
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Lexington, Nashville, Columbia, Tullahoma, Franklin, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Dallas, Peach Tree, Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Averysboro, Bentonville, Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington

86th Regiment, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Lafayette
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Pursuit of Bragg, Nashville, Gallatin, Stone River, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kingston, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Franklin, Nashville, Huntsville, (Ala.)

87th Regiment, August, 1862 to June, 1865 South Bend
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Perryville, Gallatin, Tullahoma, Hoover's Gap, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington

88th Regiment, August, 1862 to June, 1865 Fort Wayne
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Against Kirby Smith, Perryville, Nashville, Stone River, Tullahoma, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dalton, Kenesaw, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolina and north, 1865: Fayetteville, Goldsboro, Bentonville, Richmond, Washington

89th Regiment, August, 1862 to July, 1865 Wabash
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Munfordsville, Buell-Bragg campaign, Memphis
Vicksburg campaign, 1864: Meridian Raid, Jackson, Vicksburg
Louisiana and Arkansas, 1864: Semmesport, Alexandria, Sabine Cross Roads, Nachitoches, pursuit of Price
Alabama, 1864: Pursuit of Hood, Mobile, Spanish Fort

90th (Fifth Cavalry) Regiment, August, 1862 to September, 1865, Indianapolis
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1864: Ohio river guard, Glasgow, pursuit of Morgan in Kentucky and Ohio, Glasgow, Knoxville, Greeneville, London,
Georgia campaign, 1864: North Georgia, Dalton, Stoneman Raid, Atlanta
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1865: Louisville, Pulaski against guerillas

91st Regiment, October, 1862 to June, 1865 Evansville
Kentucky-Tennessee, 1862-1864: Campaign against Morgan, Russellville, Cumberland Gap, Knoxville, Cleveland
Georgia campaign, 1864: Kingston, Kenesaw, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Franklin, Nashville
Carolinas and north, 1865: Wilmington, Goldsboro, Raleigh, Salisbury

92nd Regiment: July 1862. Failed to fill. Merged with 93d. New Albany

93d Regiment: October, 1862 to August, 1865 Madison
West Tennessee and Mississippi, 1862-1863: Memphis, Oxford, Corinth, Grand Gulf, Jackson, Vicksburg, Memphis, Oxford, pursuit of Hood
Alabama, 1865: Mobile, Spanish Fort, Blakely, Montgomery, Selma

94th, 95th and 96th Regiments. Failed to fill. Lawrenceburg, Richmond and Indianapolis

97th Regiment, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Terre Haute
Tennessee and north Mississippi, 1862-1863: Memphis, Holly Springs, Moscow
Vicksburg campaign, 1863: Vicksburg, Jackson, Big Black River
East Tennessee and Georgia, 1863-1864: Chattanooga, Resaca, Dallas, Kenesaw, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Columbia, Bentonville, Goldsboro, Richmond

98th Regiment, July 1862. Failed to fill; merged with 100th, Lafayette

99th Regiment, October, 1862 to June, 1865 South Bend
West Tennessee and Vicksburg campaign, 1862-1863: Memphis, Moscow, Vicksburg, Jackson, Big Black, Memphis
East Tennessee, 1863-1864: Chattanooga, pursuit of Bragg, Knoxville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Dallas, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Columbia, Fayetteville, Bentonville, Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington City

100th Regiment, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Fort Wayne
West Tennessee and Vicksburg campaign, 1862-1863: Memphis, Holly Springs, Vicksburg, Jackson, Big Black, Memphis
East Tennessee and Georgia campaign, 1863-1864: Chattanooga, pursuit of Bragg, Knoxville, Dalton, Resaca, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
Carolinas and north, 1865: Beaufort, Columbia, Bentonville, Goldboro, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington City

- 101st Regiment, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Wabash
  - Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Glasgow, pursuit of Bragg, pursuit of Morgan, Milton, McMinnville, Chattanooga
  - Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Dallas, Kenesaw, Atlanta, pursuit of Hood, Savannah
  - Carolinas and north, 1865: Goldsboro, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington City
- 102-114 (Infantry), (Minute Men), Regiments: July, 1863, Morgan's/ Raid
- 115th (Six Months) Regiment, August, 1863 to February, 1864, Indianapolis
  - Kentucky-East Tennessee, 1863: Cumberland Gap, Greeneville
- 116th (Six Months) Regiment, August, 1863 to February, 1864, Lafayette
  - Kentucky-East Tennessee: Nicholasville, Cumberland Gap, Walker's Ford
- 117th (Six Months) Regiment, September, 1863 to February, 1864, Indianapolis
  - East Tennessee, 1863-1864: Cumberland Gap, Greenville, Knoxville, Bean's Station
- 118th Regiment, September, 1863 to February, 1864 Wabash
  - East Tennessee: Cumberland Gap, Greenville, Cumberland
- 119th Regiment (Seventh Cavalry), October, 1863 to February, 1866
  - West Tennessee: Union City, Paris, Okalona (Miss.)
  - Pursuit of Price in Arkansas, 1864, and Cape Girardeau
  - Louisiana and Texas, 1864-1865: Alexandria, Hempstead
- 120th Regiment, March 1864 to January, 1866 Columbus
  - Against Atlanta, 1864 Resaca, Kenesaw, Jonesboro
  - Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Resaca, Dalton
  - Central Tennessee, 1864: Franklin, Nashville
  - North Carolina operations, 1865: Wilmington, Goldsboro, Raleigh
- 121st Regiment (Nineth Cavalry), March 1864 to August, 1865, Indianapolis
  - Nashville area, 1864
  - Pursuit of Hood, 1864
  - New Orleans and Vicksburg, 1865
- 122nd Regiment (Cavalry), 1863, merged with 120th Regiment
- 123d Regiment, March 1864 to August, 1865 Greensburg
  - Tennessee, 1864: Nashville, Charleston, Cleveland
  - Atlanta campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Decatur
  - Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Gaylesville, Alabama
  - Operations in Tennessee, 1864: Franklin, Nashville
  - North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Newbern, Goldsboro, Raleigh
- 124th Regiment, March 1864 to August, 1865 Richmond
  - Central Tennessee, 1864
  - Atlanta campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Decatur
  - Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Dalton, Pulaski (Tenn.), Franklin, Nashville
  - North Carolina, 1865: Goldsboro, Charlotte
- 125th Regiment (Tenth Cavalry), February, 1864 to August, 1865, Columbus
  - Tennessee and north Mississippi, 1864: Pulaski, Decatur, Nashville
  - New Orleans and Mobile, 1865: Spanish Fort, Fort Blakely
  - Alabama and Mississippi, 1865: Columbus, Vicksburg

126th Regiment (Eleventh Cavalry), March, 1864 to September, 1865, Indianapolis
Tennessee and north Alabama, 1864: Nashville
Pursuit of Hood, 1864
Missouri and Kansas, 1865: Rolla, Fort Riley
127th Regiment (Twelfth Cavalry), March, 1864 to November, 1865, Indianapolis
Tennessee and north Alabama, 1864-1865: Nashville, Huntsville, Decatur
Vicksburg and New Orleans, 1865:
Mobile, Columbus, Vicksburg, 1865
128th Regiment, March 1864 to April, 1866, Michigan City
East Tennessee, 1864: Nashville, Chattanooga
Against Atlanta, 1864: Dalton, Resaca Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Chattanooga, Franklin, Nashville
North Carolina, 1865: Kingston, Goldsboro, Raleigh
129th Regiment, March 1864 to August, 1865 Michigan City
Atlanta campaign, 1864: Decatur, Atlanta
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Gaylesville, (Ala.), Chattanooga, Franklin, Nashville
Into North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Kingston, Goldsboro, Raleigh
130th Regiment , March 1864 to December, 1865 Kokomo
East Tennessee, 1864: Nashville, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Atlanta, Jonesboro
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Gaylesville, (Ala.), Nashville, Franklin,
In North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Kingston, Goldsboro, Greensboro, (N.C.)
131st Regiment (Thirteenth Cavalry), April 1864 to November, 1865
In Tennessee and Alabama, 1864: Nashville, Huntsville, Nashville (Dec. 1864)
Vicksburg, New Orleans, Mobile, 1865
Grierson's Raid, 1865: Mobile, Columbus, Vicksburg
132nd Regiment (100 Days'), May to August, 1864 Indianapolis
Tennessee and North Alabama: Railway guards
133d Regiment (100 Days), May 1864 to August, 1864 Indianapolis
Tennessee and North Alabama: Railway guards
134th Regiment (100 Days), May, 1864 to August, 1864 Indianapolis
Tennessee and North Alabama
135th Regiment (100 Days), May to August, 1864 Indianapolis
In Tennessee and North Alabama: Railway guards
136th Regiment (100 Days), May to September, 1864 Indianapolis
In Tennessee and North Alabama: Railway guards
137th Regiment (100 Days), May to August, 1864 Indianapolis
In Tennessee and North Alabama: Railway guards
138th Regiment (100 Days), May to August, 1864 Indianapolis
In Tennessee and North Alabama: Railway guards
139th Regiment (100 Days), June to September, 1864 Indianapolis
In Tennessee and North Alabama: Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Railway guards,Memphis, Chattanooga

140th Regiment, October, 1864 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Tennessee, 1864: Nashville, Murfreesboro, Clifton
In North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Kingston, Goldsboro, Raleigh.
141st Regiment, July, 1864; failed to fill; joined to 140th
142nd Regiment, November, 1864 to July, 1865 Fort Wayne
In Tennessee, 1864-1865: Nashville
143d Regiment, February, 1865 to October, 1865 Indianapolis
In Tennessee, and Kentucky, 1865: Nashville, Fort Donelson
144th Regiment, March, 1865 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
Western Virginia, Maryland
145th Regiment, February, 1865 to January, 1866 Indianapolis
In Georgia: Dalton, Marietta
146th Regiment, March, 1865 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
In Shenandoah Valley, Maryland and Delaware
147th Regiment, March, 1865 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
Shenandoah Valley
148th Regiment, February, 1865 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
In Middle Tennessee
149th Regiment, March, 1865 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
In Tennessee and northern Alabama: Decatur, Nashville
150th Regiment, March, 1865 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In western Virginia
151st Regiment, March 1865 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
In Tennessee: Nashville, Tullahoma
152nd Regiment, March, 1865 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In Shenandoah Valley and nearby West Virginia
153rd Regiment, March, 1865 to September, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky: Hopkinsville, Louisville
154th Regiment, April, 1865 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In Shenandoah Valley, Maryland, Delaware
155th Regiment, April, 1865 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In Maryland and Delaware
156th Regiment, April, 1865 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In Shenandoah Valley

LIGHT ARTILLERY, 1861-1865

1st Battery, August, 1861 to August, 1865 Evansville
Missouri, 1861: Springfield and Black Water
In Arkansas, 1862: Pea Ridge, Helena
Vicksburg Campaign, 1863: Milliken's Bend, Port Gibson, Champion Hill, Vicksburg, Jackson
In Louisiana, 1863-1864: Teche country, Red River
Alabama, 1865: Spanish Fort, Montgomery
2nd Battery, August, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Missouri, 1861-186 : Springfield
In Kansas and Indian Territory, 1862-1863: Ft. Leavenworth, Baxter Springs, Newtonia, Mo.
In Arkansas and Indian Territory, 1864: Perryville, Ft. Smith, Moscow
In Tennessee, 1864: Nashville
3d Battery, August, 1861 to August, 1865 Connersville
In Missouri, 1861-1863: Jefferson City, Kirksville, Springfield, Rolla

In West Tennessee and Mississippi, 1863-1864: Memphis, Vicksburg, Meridian
Red River, 1864: Pleasant Hill, Alexandria
In northern Mississippi, 1864: Vicksburg, Tupelo, Jackson, Oxford
Against Price, 1864, in Missouri and Arkansas
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Nashville
Alabama, 1865: Mobile, Selma

4th Battery, September, 1861 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863: Bowling Green, Nashville, Stone River, Tullahoma, Chattanooga
Tennessee, 1864: Murfreesboro, Murfreesboro (Fort Rosecrans)

5th Battery, November, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky-northern Alabama, 1861-1862: Bowling Green, Nashville, Huntsville
Pursuit of Bragg, 1862; Perryville, Ky.; Murfreesboro
Georgia, 1864: Ringold, Resaca, Kenesaw, Jonesboro

6th Battery, September, 1861 to July, 1865 Evansville
In Kentucky-Tennessee, 1861-1862: Henderson, Shiloh
In northern Mississippi, 1862-1863: Corinth, Holly Springs, Vicksburg, Jackson
West Tennessee, 1863-1864: Memphis
North Mississippi, 1864: Vicksburg, Tupelo, Oxford

7th Battery, December, 1861 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861-1862: Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth (Miss.), Perryville
Pursuit of Bragg, 1862
In Rosecrans campaign in Tennessee, 1863: Stone River
Georgia campaign, 1863-1864: Chattanooga, Ringgold, Atlanta

8th Battery, December, 1861 to January, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky and Tennessee, 1861-1863: Munfordsville, Perryville, Nashville, Stone River, Tullahoma, Chattanooga
In Georgia, 1864: Resaca
Pursuit of Bragg, 1864
In Tennessee, 1864-1865: Chattanooga

9th Battery, December, 1861 to June, 1865 Indianapolis
West Tennessee and northern Mississippi, 1862: Shiloh, Corinth, Holly Springs, Oxford
West Tennessee and Kentucky, 1863-1864: Moscow, Columbus, Cape Girardeau, pursuit of Forest
Middle Mississippi, 1864: Sherman's Raid: Jackson, Meridian, Vicksburg
Red River, Louisiana, 1864: Alexandria, Shreveport,Nachitoches, Yellow Bayou
In West Tennessee and northern Mississippi, 1864: Memphis, Tupelo
Pursuit of Price in Arkansas, 1864
Pursuit of Hood, 1864

10th Battery, January, 1862 to July 1865 Columbus
In western Tennessee and Kentucky, 1862: Shiloh, Corinth
Pursuit of Bragg, 1862-1863: Stone River, Tullahoma
In Tennessee, Rosecrans campaign, 1863: Chattanooga
In Georgia campaign, 1864
North Alabama and Tennessee, 1864-1865

11th Battery, December, 1861 to June, 1865 Ft. Wayne
Tennessee and north Alabama, 1862: Shiloh, Corinth, Huntsville
Tennessee, 1862: Pursuit of Bragg
East Tennessee, 1863: Rosecrans campaign, Rossville, Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Atlanta
Southeast Tennessee, 1864: Chattanooga
12th Battery, January 1862 to July, 1865 Jeffersonville
In Tennessee and northern Alabama, 1862: Nashville, Shiloh, Corinth
Southeast Tennessee, 1863: Rosecrans campaign, Chattanooga
Middle Tennessee, 1864-1865: Nashville
13th Battery, February, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky and Tennessee: Monterey, Munfordsville
Pursuit of Bragg, 1862: Versailles
In Tennessee, 1862-1865: Hartsville, Gallatin, Chattanooga(1865)
14th Battery, March, 1862 to August, 1865 Indianapolis
In west Tennessee and northern Mississippi, 1862: Shiloh, Corinth, Jackson (Tenn.)
Middle Mississippi, 1864: Sherman's Raid on Meridian
In northern Mississippi and Tennessee, 1864: Guntown, Nashville
In pursuit of Hood, 1864
Alabama, 1865: Mobile, Spanish Fort, Montgomery
15th Battery, July, 1862 to June, 1865 Indianapolis
Upper Virginia, 1862: Harpers Ferry
In Kentucky and East Tennessee, 1863-1864: Morgan's Raid, Loudon, Knoxville
In Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Kenesaw, Decatur, Jonesboro
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Chattanooga, Columbia, Franklin, Nashville
In North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Raleigh, Greensboro
16th Battery, March, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Virginia, 1862: Slaughter's Mountain, Rappahannock, Antietam
In Maryland and Virginia, 1862: Leesburg, Washington City
17th Battery, May, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Maryland, 1862: Baltimore, Harpers Ferry
On upper Potomac, 1862-1863
Shenandoah Valley, 1864-1865: Shenandoah Valley with Sheridan, Cedar Creek
18th Battery, August, 1862 to June, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky, 1862: Frankfort, Bowling Green
Tennessee, 1863: Rosecrans campaign, Murfreesboro, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Mission Ridge, Knoxville
In Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Atlanta
Pursuit of Hood, Etc.: Nashville,
Wilsons Raid in Alabama: Selma, Macon, (Ga.)
In Tennessee, 1865: Chattanooga, Nashville
19th Battery, August, 1862 to June, 1865 Indianapolis
Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862: Perryville, Lebanon, Murfreesboro
With Rosecrans in Tennessee, 1863, and at Chattanooga
Georgia campaign, 1864: Dalton, Kenesaw, Peach Tree Cree
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Gaylesville, (Ala.)

March to the Sea to Savannah, 1864
In the Carolinas, 1865: Columbia, Goldsboro, Newbern
Grand Review at Washington, 1865
20th Battery, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Indianapolis
In Tennessee, 1863: Nashville
Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta, Jonesboro
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Chattanooga, Nashville
21st Battery, September, 1862 to June, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky, k862-1863: Lexington, Richmond, Nashville
In Tennessee, 1863: Carthage
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Nashville
22nd Battery, December, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky and middle Tennessee, 1863-1864: Bowling Green, Knoxville
Georgia, 1864: Atlanta
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Columbia, Franklin, Nashville
In North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Kingston, Durham Station, Greensboro
23d Battery, November, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky and east Tennessee, 1863: Cumberland Gap, Knoxville
In Georgia campaign, 1864: Atlanta
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Franklin, Nashville
In North Carolina, 1865: Wilmington, Goldsboro, Raleigh
24th Battery, November, 1862 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Kentucky, 1863: Lebanon, pursuit of Morgan
In East Tennessee, 1863-1864: Loudon, Knoxville, Charleston
In Georgia campaign, 1864: Resaca, Decatur
Stoneman's Raid through Georgia, 1864
Pursuit of Hood, 1864: Columbia, Nashville
25th Battery, November, 1864 to July, 1865 Indianapolis
In Tennessee and northern Alabama, 1864-1865: Nashville, Huntsville, Decatur
26th Battery, June, 1861 to July, 1865 Greensburg-Indianapolis
Western Virginia, 1861-1862: Cheat Mountain, Shenandoah Valley, Winchester
Kentucky and east Tennessee, 1863-1865: Danville, Knoxville, Greeneville
27th Battery, June, 1861 to July, 1865 Greensburg-Indianapolis
In Western Virginia: Cheat Mountain
Shenandoah Valley, 1862: McDowell, Cross Keys, Winchester
In central Kentucky, 1863: Danville, Somerset
East Tennessee, 1863-1865: Carter's Station, Watauga River, Charleston, Knoxville
On Stoneman's Raid, 1865: East Tennessee, North Carolina
28th Regiment (Colored Infantry), April 1864 to November, 1865, Indianapolis
Virginia, 1864-1865: Chickahominy Swanps, Prince George Court House, Petersburg "Crater," Hatcher's Run, Richmond, City Point
In Texas, 1865: Indianola, Corpus Christi

3. Centralizations

Further analysis shows heavy concentrations of troops in Kentucky-

Tennessee, Mississippi, Virgina. Military operation in Kentucky were usually on small scale except for the Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg penetrations in 1862. Raids were frequent on either side to create a diversion in enemy forces, destroy railways and bridges, capture supplies and mounts, weaken the enemy generally and psychiologically. Besides raids and operations in Virginia in 1864, especially, others were staged: Kilpatrick's to Richmond, Wilson's in Alabama and Georgia, Sheridan's in the Valley, Sherman's in Mississippi, Stoneman's in Virginia and Georgia and Rousseau in Alabama, Third Cavalry (45th Regiment) was a favorite unit for raiding.

V. STATE MILITIA AND RAIDS INTO THE STATE

1. Indiana Legion Organized

STATE MILITIA IN INDIANA during the war was called the "Indiana Legion." The militia had been organized early and was relatively in good standing until about 1832, when there were some 54,000 officers and men organized into regiments, brigades and divisions. Then disintegration set in and in 1834 the units were entirely abandoned and equipment lost or carried away. There was renewed interest in it at the time of the Mexican War. And there was a spurt of reorganization as the Kansas situation arose in the 1850's; in the winter of 1859-1860 about 500 men were in the militia, without organization or equipment. During the winter of 1860-1861 with the rise of secession both Governors Lane and Morton recommended reorganization to the General Assembly but nothing was done beyond collecting a few useless arms. $10,000 of Legion money was in trust funds and not available for use. Immediately upon accession to the governorship Morton tried to secure arms from Washington but none was obtained. Then the bombardment of Fort Sumter highlighted need for defense measures; this was reflected in a law of May 11, 1861, and efforts to enroll personnel were made in all the counties.

The lack of equipment again caused deterioriation in the ranks during the summer of 1861, but there were many enlistments for war service, personnel feeding through the militia organization then and throughout the war. Success was most noticeable in the southern counties during emergency periods in 1862 and 1863. In September, 1861, plans for service were matured and in October the first "Encampment of Instruction" for officers was held at Indianapolis under the direction of Henry B. Carrington, United States Army, and which resulted in improvement of county organizations. Principal names of officers were Major General John Love, Marion County, general-in-chief, and Generals John L. Mansfield, James Hughes, Andrew Lewis, James E. Blythe, Henry Jordan, Alexander C. Downey, Morton C. Hunter and Richard W. Thompson, each in command of one of the various nine brigades. In time the units were armed and drilled. Designated units were used in guard duty on the Ohio, in making arrests in Kentucky, in guard duty at Camp Morton for short periods, etc. Usually units were infantry but there was a cavalry company which could be used for more rapid movement. Morgan's Raid in July, 1863, was the occasion for much activity and little accomplishment. Confederate operations in Kentucky were always a matter of interest in that they might again enter the state. In this case the Legion might be sent into that state for offensive-defensive operations. Always the Legion was under the command of Governor Morton.

The Militia Law of May, 1861, enacted by special session of the legislature, was entitled, "An act for the organization and regulation of the Indiana Militia, prescribing penalties for violations of said regulations, providing for the election and appointment of officers, defining the duties of military and civil officers, penalties for the neglect or violation thereof, providing for courts martial, councils of administration and military encampments, making appropriations for

the support of said militia, repealing all laws heretofore enacted on that subject, saving certain acts herein named, and declaring an emergency for the immediate taking effect thereof." It then was planned to provide for the defense of the state without necessity of calling on troops in general service. It invited service rather than compelled it, unless compulsion arose from commonly recognized emergencies. And the organization relapsed at the end of the war, to the disgust of the radicals.

2. Uses: Raids into Indiana; into Kentucky

We shall now review various emergenciesand other periods when the Indiana Legion was sspecially active. The first of these was the raid on Newburgh on the Ohio on July 18, 1862, led by Adam R. Johnson of Henderson, Kentucky. The town was a hospital center and depot for army supplies and equipment and was entirely without guard. Local citizens in sympathy with the Confederacy had kept Johnson informed. He and a small force ferried across the river, put hospitalized soldiers on parole, pillaged local business establishments, and retreated into Kentucky. Alleged Indiana accomplices were killed by local residents. Union gunboats soon appeared on the river and mounted men, but there was nothing then for them to do.

In the same month a force under Confederate General Kirby Smith moved northward into central Kentucky. Already Morton had dispatched forces to restrict his operations. The Newburgh raid strengthened Morton's determination to pour enough troops into that part of Kentucky to crush opposition to federal aims. General Boyle gave consent. The call went out; response was immediate. Federal assistance was freely given. By July 22 a force of 1,000 had crossed the river to Henderson; the town was seized and detachments scoured the river and vicinity but found little opposition. Enlistment had been for thirty days at the end of which time Legionaires returned to their homes. Perhaps 20,000 had gathered at the various rendezvous. Funds were lacking for paying the troops, but loans were obtained from Indianapolis and Cincinnati to the amount of about $500,000 to meet soldiers' pay before they entered Kentucky. Raider John Morgan ran circles around Union forces there.

Confederates being strong in Kentucky and Tennessee in August and September, 1862, Morton declared martial law in counties along t the Ohio in order to engage in military training and to provide arms. Then Union forces were defeated at the battle at Richmond, Kentucky, late in August; Indiana regiments lost heavily. Kirby Smith advanced into the vicinity of Covington, Kentucky; Indiana assisted materially in the defense of Cincinnati through supply of leadership, regiments and ammunition. Then Smith moved to Frankfort, and Louisville was threatened by General Bragg. Munfordsville was taken by the Confederates. Union defenses were strengthened. Then in the battle at Perrysville on October 8, Union forces prevailed and Confederates withdrew southward. The Ohio Valley was quiet again.

Then in June, 1863, came the Captain Thomas H. Hines raid across the Ohio above Cannelton with sixty-two men to gather horses for Confederates. He pretended to be part of Union forces, moved in the direction of Paoli, Hardinsburg and Fredericksburg. Local militia hur-

THE CIVIL WAR IN INDIANA

NAMES OF PROMINENCE
AND LOCATION KEY:

1 Bright, Jesse D.
2 Julian, George W.
3 Smith, Caleb
4 Voorhes, Daniel W.
5 Colfax, Schuyler
6 Morton, O. P.
7 Wallace, Lewis
8 Lane, Henry S.
9 Lanier, J. F. D.
10 Owen, R. D.
11 Burnside, A. E.
12 Hendricks, T. A.
13 Dodd, H. W.
14 Baker, Conrad
15 Heffren, Horace
16 Bowles, W. A.
17 Bingham, J. J.
18 Milligan, L. P.
19 Hannaman, William
20 White, A. S.
21 Porter, A. G.
22 Dunn, W. G.
23 Haskell, M. S.
24 Holman, W. S.
25 Law, John
26 Reynolds, Joseph
28 Terrell, W. H. H.
29 Horsey, Stephen



riedly assembled, cornered Hines on Blue River Island and captured or killed all but three in the expedition. Hines then joined General John H. Morgan's forces and accompanied him in his raid north of the Ohio in July. The invaders were attempting a diversion to weaken Rosecrans campaign in Tennessee and to test Unionism north of the Ohio. The Morgan advance was made in two columns. Captain Davis and party crossed at Twelve-Mile Island and was speedily captured.

Morgan and Hines crossed at Brandenburg on July 8, with about 2,200 men and officers, using captured steamers for ferry service. Again Legionares rushed armed forces to oppose the expedition but they did not know Morgan's plans and lacked cavalry. The invaders advanced via Corydon, Palmyra, Poole, Salem, Lexington, Vernon, Versailles and Harrison, Ohio. The state had been stripped of troops to aid Buell's campaign in Kentucky; Michigan and Illinois troops were sent in. Arms were gathered from any source. General Hobson with federal troops was in hot pursuit. Militiamen were running hither and yon. Morgan gathered food supplies, fresh horses, destroyed bridges, tore up railroad track, captured telegraph offices, took public funds at county seats and robbed stores, burned wheat fields, scattered false information, etc. There were minor engagements but nothing at all decisive. Morgan fled the state on July 13, into Ohio. Morton offered Governor Tod 5,000 Indiana troops to assist in the capture; state forces followed as far as Cincinnati, then returned to Indianapolis. Morgan continued his zigzag way across southern and eastern Ohio until finally captured near Lisbon with 250 officers and men, and confined in the Ohio penitentiary for a short period, then escaped and returned to Kentucky. There remained the task of evaluating damages incurred by citizens of Indiana and restoring stolen horses if possible. Damage claims hung over until March, 1867, when plans were made for payment from the state treasury. Claims amounted to $497,400, of which $413,600 were recommended for allowance but payment lagged as state legislature failed to act and federal authorities hesitated to assume the obligation. In 1879, $82,300 was paid and in the years from 1884 to 1887, another $19,000 was allowed as general war claims. Of course pay for troops was supplied at once.

Again in May, 1864, Confederates pressed into Kentucky to destroy railroad bridges to prevent delivery of reenforcements for Sherman's army then on the way into Georgia on the Atlanta campaign. And again General John Morgan was in command. He advanced with 2,400 mounted men through Pound Gap to Mount Sterling, Paris and Cynthiana. Union forces were massed at Pound Gap and not available for operations. Appeals were made to Morton to send assistance. Four regiments were sent and again the Indiana Legion was called out in southern counties. Morgan moved rapidly. Even though he was defeated at Mount Sterling on May 9, he captured Lexington the next day and moved to Georgetown and Cynthiana, continued to destroy government property, and defeated Unionist General Edward H. Hobson. Soon he was defeated by General Stephen G. Burbridge, but again escaped, this time into Virginia, where he lost his command. Again reenforcements poured through on the railroads to Sherman.

But the Confederacy was not content. During July, 1864, guerilla-like bands grouped under the command of Colonel Adam R. Johnson, of

Newburgh-raid fame. It was feared he would seriously discourage Unionists in Kentucky, might again burn bridges and raid Indiana and destroy property. The Legion was again called out for guard duty on the Ohio. Steamers were commandeered to ferry troops across into Kentucky at Uniontown and Morganfield. Cavalry was sent toward Shawneetown, Illinois, to scatter opposition in that area. Resistance was slight. Then federal troops arrived in sufficient force to enable Legionaires to return home by way of Henderson.

Thus we have illustrated relations between Indiana and Kentucky. When Unionists were in charge there Morton withheld his fire; when Generals Smith and Bragg moved up from the south he strove to defeat them and save communications with Union forces farther south. When raiders appeared or threatened invasion of the state, Morton's forces pursued them even into Kentucky and without too much authority from Washington. For a general to fall from grace with Morton, it meant the end of his career as a general, evidence General Don Carlos Buell in 1862, who moved too slowly to suit the Governor regardless of Buell's local situation.[1] Morton was greatly interested in stopping the flow of contraband goods south, which was gradually accomplished, as shown elsewhere.[2]

1. Terrell, Report, I (1960), 135-287; Stampp, Indiana Politics during the Civil War, chap. 9; Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, chap.26; Morton, Correspondence Boxes, Indiana State Archives.
2. Terrell, Report (1960), pp. 497-498.

VI. OVERCOMING OPPOSITION TO THE WAR WITHIN THE STATE

1. Basis, Organization, Program

OPPOSITION TO THE WAR there was from the beginning, but especially was this true along the border where the influence of southern social and political ties were strong.[1] Many in the Northwest had emigrated from the South and had retained much of the southern attitude.[2] With the firing upon Fort Sumter some attempt was made to justify South Carolina. That feeling was not common at first, but soon it assumed definite form as the war with its attendant severities progressed. The draft, the lack of complete and immediate success of the Union armies, the arbitrary arrests, and the constant restriction upon individual liberty constantly increased the opposition to the war administration.[3] Party lines in Indiana were already tense from the political contests of previous years, as a result of which those not included in the ranks of the Republican party or closely identified with its purposes feared to permit the war administration to proceed free from criticism. The war party in turn denounced any severe criticism of its program as rank treason and insisted that it be dealt with as such. Hence the opposition turned to secret organizations to further its program. The wonder is that the war program succeeded at all.

The most important of these were the Knights of the Golden Circle, the Order of American Knights, and the Sons of Liberty. The first of these was already in existence at the outbreak of the war.[4] Its prime purpose to that time had been to take possession of Mexico by means of filibustering expeditions, the extension of slavery to it, and to insure its continued possession by emigration from the United States. In 1859 it had perhaps 15,000 members. Texas was quite naturally the most fertile field for its growth. With the outbreak of the war it became necessary to compromise with the secession movement. To secure a further hearing in the South, which was the most greatly interested in its purposes, it had to operate as an ally against the federal administration to the extent of giving aid to the South in case of actual war. Public opinion there was too much of a unit to make necessary or possible the operations of a secret society, hence its work centered along that ever shifting "border" between federal and Confederate control.

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1. Terrell, Report, Vol. I, pp. 228-314, gives a general survey of the opposition toward the war in Indiana.
2. Ibid., Appendix, p. 282.
3. A. P. Hovey to General L. Thomas, August 10, 1865, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library; Logan Esarey, A History of Indiana from 1850 to the Present (Indianapolis, 1918), vol. II, p. 81. Democrats opposed protective tariff, the growing national debt, draft laws.
4. Ibid., pp. 778-793. Peace Democrats opposed the preliminary proclamation of emancipation in September 1862; war-Democrats and Republicans were on the defensive in the election of 1862 in which the opposition won state and national elections.

Soon after the firing upon Fort Sumter newspapers in the Northwest began to print articles on the Knights of the Golden Circle. The influence of the order grew until it became an important factor in causing the Republicans to lose the elections of 1862. But it was not until early in 1863, when all forms of regular state government were abandoned, that the order became prominent throughout the North, and especially in Indiana and the Northwest. At that time active resistance to the prosecution of the war was reported in many of the counties of the state.[5] The actual membership of the various societies can not be determined, as no complete records were kept, and some of the local records were destroyed when their program was made public in 1864. Official estimates made during the war are probably too high; the tendency of the present day is possibly to under estimate the strength of the societies.[6]

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5. Mayo Fesler, Secret Political Societies in the North During the War, in Indiana Magazine of History, vol. XIV, (September, 1918) p. 208. This work will be cited hereafter as Fesler, Secret Political Societies. Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, pp. 282-285. Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, p. 686. On June 25, 1862, Morton wrote Stanton concerning organized opposition in Indiana, "The f fact is well established that there is in Indiana a secret political organization estimated and claimed to be ten thousand strong, the leading objects of which are to embarass all efforts to recruit men for the military service of the United States, to embitter public sentiment and manufacture public opinion against the levying and collection of taxes to defray the expenses of the present war, and, generally, to create distrust in and bad feeling toward the Government and its recognized and legally constituted authorities. Another object is to circulate and foster newspapers of extremely doubtful loyalty,--papers that sympathize with the rebellion and oppose and disparage continually and persistently, the efforts of the Government to put down traitors and crush out treason. The sheets, particularly favored in this way, I believe to be the Indiana State Sentinel, published in this city, the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Dayton Empire, and the Chicgo Times. They are doing incalculable injury to the Union cause, not, it is true, openly and in plain terms, but by inviting malignant and vituperative attacks upon Union men, by the continual apologies for the crimes committed by the leaders of the rebellion and by their failure to condemn their cause and conduct. By means of these presses bad feeling, discontent and a disposition to resist the laws are engendered in the minds of many citizens, --not only in Indiana but in many of the neighboring counties in Kentucky. Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 9-11.
6. "Various estimates have been made by leading members, and by government officials who were engaged in ferreting out their plans. G. E. Dunn, second in command of the order in Missouri, in a sworn statement before Provost-Marshal Sanderson at St. Louis in July, 1864, declared the membership of the American Knights in that State to be 100,000; in Illinois, 100,000; in Indiana, 125,000; in Ohio, 40,000; in Michigan, 20,000 to 25,000. . . . . In conference with Confederate agents in Canada in 1864,

SOME PERSONS AND PLACES OPPOSED TO THE WAR



Members of the orders favored the servitude of the negro to the white man, decentralized government, states' rights, endorsed the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, and favored leaving the slavery question to be settled by states acting individually. They opposed the use of military force in government, joining the army to free the slave or force upon the South the political views of the North, and opposed the use by the federal government of powers not clearly defined in the Constitution.

Each of these orders had its military division, which was generally unknown to many who had taken only the less important degrees of membership. Sons of Liberty were pledged to "take up arms against any Monarch, Prince, Power or government usurped, which may be found in arms and waging war against a people endeavoring to establish a government for themselves of their own free choice."[7] Very few really knew what the pledge meant. The American Knight pledged himself, "At all times, if needs be, to take up arms in the cause of the oppressed --in my country first of all--against any monarch, prince, potentate, power, or government usurped, which may be found in arms and waging war against a people or peoples who are endeavoring to establish or have inaugurated a government for themselves of their own free choice in accordance with and founded upon the eternal principles of Truth."[8]

The Knights of the Golden Circle made provision for companies of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.[9] Many of the lodges practiced military drill and carried arms, but the majority thought they were only preparing to protect their rights.[10] Their opposition was aimed more at the party in power than at the government as such. General Morgan seems to have received little support from these societies as such in his raids of 1863 and 1864.

Throughout the war members of the orders were repeatedly charged by Republicans with being traitors. That is the charge that every official report to Washington bears. Perhaps the nearest approach to treason was made in the negotiations with Confederate agents in 1864

Mr. Clement L. Vallandigham represented the strength of the Sons of Liberty at 300,000, of whom 85,000 were in Illinois; 50,000 in Indiana; and 40,000 in Ohio. In a speech at Dayton, in the summer of 1863, he placed the number at 500,000, which Judge Advocate Holt, in his report concerning Secret Associations and Conspiracies against the Government, says is much nearer the true total. Fesler, Secret Political Societies, p. 189. See also Henry B. Carrington to President Lincoln, March 19, 1863, Official Records , Series II, vol. V, p. 364 and 365; General Rosecrans to E. M. Stanton, September 11, 1864, ibid., Series II, vol. VII, p. 802; J. Holt to E. M. Stanton, October 1, 1864, ibid., p. 935.

[7] Fesler, Secret Political Societies, p. 227.

[8] Ibid., p. 228.

[9] ibid., p. 231.

[10] Ibid., p. 231.

for the "Northwest Confederacy", or in the case of the "Camp Douglas Conspiracy" of the same year.

2. Northwest Conspiracy and Election of 1864

From the first the Confederate leaders had hoped for the separation of states of the Northwest from the East and "either the organization of those states into a Northwestern Confederacy in alliance with the South or their admission into the Southern Confederacy as States." Consequently they noted with the greatest satisfaction the growing organized opposition in that section. Early in 1863 many Republicans feared the South would succeed. In 1864 the Confederacy was driven by Union armies and naval operations to the last extremity in its efforts to win the war.[11] It was also losing favor with European countries. Consequently it turned in desperation to plans for fomenting an uprising in the Northwest, for releasing some 40,000 Confederate soldiers imprisoned there, seizing arsenals and armories there,[12] and gaining control of routes of transportation. The South hoped thereby to cause General Grant to draw back from before Richmond, or Sherman from Georgia, and win the consequent gains to Southern forces and increased favor from European capitals.

Commissioners were sent to Canada, and the sum of $900,000 was placed at their disposal to be used for accomplishing their purpose.[13] They conferred with northern men opposed to the war and residing in Canada due to northern prosecutions. These men took Confederate money, returned to the United States, and arranged for the Chicago conference of July 20, 1864. That conference named August 16, the date of a Democratic mass-meeting at Indianapolis, as the day for the uprising. The Confederate government furnished other sums of money for the work and other conferences were held, but the northern leaders were never confident of the success of the plan. Arrests of some on their return from a conference at St. Katherine, Canada, told them only too well that they were under constant surveillance. They knew too that the rank and file of the organizations were timid and afraid of the law. The date for the uprising had to be changed to August 29, when the opposition leaders were fully demoralized by the arrival of strong reenforcements to the troops at Camp Douglas. The most of the Confederate commissioners returned to Canada.[14]

But a few of them remained in the vicinity of Chicago, conferring with some of the more radical "peace" men to plan an attack upon Camp Douglas to release the rebel prisoners there, and seize the arsenal at

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[11] Ibid., pp. 242-243.

[12] Prisoners at Camp Morton knew of the plots to liberate them. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 170.

[13] William Babcock Weeden, War Government, Federal and State, in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, 1861-1865 (New York, 1906), p. 343; Fesler, Secret Political Societies, pp. 243-255.

[14] Ibid., pp. 255-256. See also Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 20,-22 and 273; Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, pp. 785-791; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 399-417; Official Records, Series II, vol. VIII, p. 533. Commander Harrison S. Dodd and other leaders of

Rock Island. They hoped then to effect a junction with Confederate forces operating in Kentucky.[15] Tuesday, November 8, the night of the presidential election, was the time chosen for the stroke. But again the plans of the commissioners were frustrated. Colonel Sweet, in command of Camp Douglas, arrested the ring-leaders on the night of November 6-7, sent squads of soldiers to make seizures of arms and ammunition in the vicinity of Camp Douglas. The next day the arrests totaled 106. Others connected with the "conspiracy scattered in every direction and the last attempt of the kind was over."[16]

The opposition in Indiana was more strongly entrenched than any other state in the North. It was expressed in elections and in the efforts of the war party to prevent their success at the polls and taking entire control of the government of the state. The election of 1860 had been won by the Republicans partly as the result of a shrewd choice of candidates and suppression of the real issues. Lieutenant-Governor Morton, far more radical and outspoken than Governor Henry S. Lane, succeeded to the governorship two days after Lane's inauguration. Then came the contest of principles for carrying on the war, growing constantly more bitter as the war continued.

Failure to bring the war to a conclusion; the reaction of public opinion from the early days of the war; opposition to the growing tendency to make the war one for the freedom of the slave; opposition to arbitrary arrests, and the proclamation of martial law in some sections of the North; the enforcement of the conscription act; the absence of the conscription act; the absence of many in the army; and the general pressure of the war administration upon the voters were important factors enabling the Democratic successes in the elections of 1862.[17] The Republican forces did what they could to save themselves but the tide of the opposition was too strong.[18] They lost every important office to be filled in that election. They lost control of the General Assembly.[19] Governor Morton himself remained in office only because he did

the Indiana Sons of Liberty were arrested for treason about September 1 and held in confinement at Indianapolis.

[15] Fesler, Secret Political Societies, pp. 274-278.

[16] Ibid., p. 271.

[17] Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. IV, p. 163; Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 10, 17, 22, 23, 25 and 28 and November 1, 6, 13 and 17, 1862; Democratic Pharos, November 5, 1862; Plymouth Democrat, January 16, 1862; Democratic Banner of Liberty, October 23 and 30, 1862.

[18] General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 6, 58, 88, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 104, 109, 110, 121. On October 15, 1862, Governor Morton telegraphed President Lincoln, "The Democracy has carried Indiana by at least five thousand (5,000) majority. McKee Dunn is beaten." Ibid., vol. XV, p. 310. The election was a repudiation of unionism." Stampp, Indiana, 157

[19] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 15 and 19, 1863, gives the political composition of the General Assembly. See also Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 9, 1863; and Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 203-208.



127. 1856

128. 1860

129. 1864

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN INDIANA, 1856-1864

not have to stand for reelection.

3. In 1863-1865 Generally

The "peace" Democrats turned at once to reap the fruits of their victory, and were supported by all the force of the Knights of the Golden Circle. They pledged themselves against furnishing another dollar or another man for the war; they condemned the party in power "because its policy was to divide and not restore the union."[20] Their constitutional views they summed up as, "The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was."[21] They had many plans for bringing about peace, one of which was to call a meeting of the states of Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois, and work out a common plan for action.[22]

Morton was well aware that the General Assembly planned to endorse the action of the southern states in seceding from the Union, and that the legislature of Illinois was planning to do the same.[23] The Opposition charged Governor Morton with placing arms in the hands of the Union Leagues, of which Morton was the head, to enforce his wishes upon the Democrats.[24] The crisis of the contest came during the session of the General Assembly from January to March, 1863. It was deadlocked from the first. Democrats would attend to no legislation until Morton's war policy was changed and they had registered an effective protest against Republican war activities. Governor Morton and his supporters would tolerate no such program. The Democrats in the House refused to accept his official message; gave a hearty endorsement to that of Horatio Seymour, Democratic Governor of New York instead; tried to pass a bill to take from the governor his military powers and give it to a military board controlled by Democrats without whose consent nothing could be done. The majority threatened to leave unpassed the appropriation bills for paying the regular expenses of the state government until its demands were acceded to.

Republicans delayed business by non-attendance as much as they could, but by noon of February 25 the Military Bill had been engrossed for third reading. Republicans had no means of defeating the measure, except by leaving the House without the quorum required by the Constitution. The House could compel the attendance of the minority should it try to continue its former tactics of non-attendance. Consequently it "bolted", and on March 3 all, except two members left at Indianapolis to act as spies, went to Madison, Indiana, to be able to leave the state beyond the reach of the sergeant-at-arms should the

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20. Democratic Pharos, January 14, February 11 and October 7, 1863; Vevay Reveille, April 2, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 10 and 15 and October 7, 1863; Logansport Journal, June 27, 1863; New Albany Daily Ledger, January 17, 1863. See also Report and Evidence of the Committee on Arbitrary Arrests in the State of Indiana (Indianapolis, 1863), pp. 1-164.
21. Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. IV, p. 167.
22. New Albany Daily Ledger, January 7, 1863.
23. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, January 3, 1863, Official Records, Series III, vol. III, p. 4; Madison Courier, February 2, 1863.
24. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March,3, 1863.

majority try to compel attendance. It notified the majority that it would stay there until assurance was given that no further effort would be made to pass the Military Bill. All attempts at compromise failed; Republicans faced the seemingly impossible task of running the state government without legislative appropriations.[25] The session was due to end on March 9 by Constitutional limitation.[26] The deadlock continued until the end, the minority returning to Indianapolis on the day of adjournment.[27] Not even appropriation bills were passed for running the state government.

At the same time that the Democratic majority was planning to deprive Governor Morton of his military power, it sought to deprive Mayor Caven of Indianapolis of his judicial powers. On February 21, 1863, William E. Niblack introduced a bill into the House to create a judge to act under the supervision of the legislature, and exercise the judicial powers of the mayor.[28] The names of David Macy, William O. Rockwell, R. H. Hall, and John W. Dodd were suggested for commissioners. The same bill was introduced into the Senate as Senate Bill No. 171. While it got no further than introduction, it shows the limits to which those opposed to the war were willing to take their opposittion.[29]

After this session of the Legislature the contest for control was a fight to the death. Comparatively free elections, such as that of 1862, became a thing of the past; methods used in the election of 1862 in Kentucky were resorted to. Morton did his best to defeat Democratic candidates and elect those of his own choice.[30] In the city elections in Indianapolis in May, 1863, the Democratic candidates refused to run because the Republican council would not allow them representation on the election boards. Only a few Democratic votes were cast, and those few were recorded by voters writing over names on Republican candidates.[31]

[25] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 239-264.

[26] Brevier's Reports, 1863; Indiana constitution, art. IV, Sec. 29. Columns and columns of partisan discussion appeared in the press. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, January 5, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 1, 3, 4, 5, 28, March 2, 3, 4, 9, 18, and May 4, 1863; New Albany Daily Ledger, January 15, 1863;Washington Democrat, March 5 and 19, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 19, and 30, February 5, 6, 19, 27, March 2, 3, 4, 6, and June 5, 1863; Democratic Pharos, January 7, 14, 1863; Logansport Journal, January 10, February 14, and March 14, 1863. See also Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 213-214; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 239-264.

[27] New Albany Daily Ledger, March 9, 1863.

[28] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 23, 24 and March 18, 1863.

[29] Ibid., February 23 and March 11, 1863.

[30] O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, April 17, 1863, Private Dispatches, vol. XVI, p. 172.

[31] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 2, 6, 1863. Republicans made some gains in the county elections in 1863. In June, 1863, opposition to the war reached a peak when advocates crowded into Indianapolis to express their views. The Morton group charging

The election of 1864 brought the opposing forces to a face to face battle once more. The prizes were high. Should the Republicans lose the governorship and not gain control of the General Assembly the administration that had carried on the state government by every high-handed method would be swamped in litigation, their acts would not be legalized by future legislation, and they would probably have to stand good for much of the money handled irregularly. A Democratic success would have been much as Morton and Stanton agreed in 1863, as they looked ahead to success or failure in the war. Morton had said, "if the cause fails, you and I will be covered with prosecutions, and probably imprisoned or driven from the country"; to which Stanton replied, "If the cause fails, I do not wish to live."[32]

The campaign brought out a strong ticket on each side. Joseph E. McDonald opposed Governor Morton. The Democrats used the organization of the Sons of Liberty to win. Morton tried to get the draft delayed to save as many votes as possible, but was refused permission by Secretary Stanton.[33] The draft was delayed in spite of his refusal. Anti-Republican forces welcomed the constant arrival of refugees from the south into Indiana because they would vote the Democratic ticket.[34] Many of those going north had been wealthy, were intelligent men, and active politicians who would spare no effort to win the coming election.[35] On August 19 Governor Morton protested to Secretary Stanton against the practice, declaring, "Our people feel that if this continues, we might as well give up the contest." [36]

Morton secured permission for many Indiana soldiers to return home on furlough for the election; furloughs of sick and wounded soldiers in Indiana were extended to November 10, which gave them time to vote.[37] These soldiers voted at every polling place, the number of

treason, searched passengers on trains and caused arms to be discarded in the so-called "Battle of Pogue's Run"

32. Foulke, Life of O. P. Morton, vol. I, p. 261; Wilson, Edwin M. Stanton, Century Magazine, vol. XXV (1870), p. 242.
33. E. M. Stanton to General Grant, October 11, 1864, Official Records, Series I, vol. XLII, part II, pp. 783-784; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 22, 1864.
34. Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 24, 1864; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, October 26, 1864; ibid., September 6, 1864, announces the arrival of 500 southerners; O. P. Morton to Thomas W. Gibson, quoted in Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, August 21, 1864. On August 17, 1864, Gibson sent Morton a clipping from the Louisville Courier Journal, "To be sent north of the Ohio River: Eighty-seven deserters from the rebel army, and fifty-one disloyal citizens from Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama, were received in the city yesterday from the front. The deserters will take the oath of amnesty, and the citizens will be paroled and sent north of the Ohio River to remain during the war."
35. Thomas W. Gibson to O. P. Morton, August 17, 1864, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917).
36. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, August 19, 1863, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library.
37. New Albany Daily Ledger, October 8, 1864;Foulke, vol,I,pp.367-370.



PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,1856-1868

votes cast depending largely upon the number of times they could reach the polls. Much intimidation was provided for Democrats coming to the polls near Indianapolis at least.[38] A regiment of infantry from Massachusetts, stationed in and around Indianapolis took an active part in voting for Morton's program, as did 200 Michigan troops who were passing through Indianapolis on election day.[39] The Republican ticket won by substantial majorities for Morton, Lincoln, and the General Assembly.[40]

So active and determined did the Democratic opposition become that the war party turned to a secret organization of its own. Union Leagues were formed throughout the North in 1863,[41] and organizations were extensively formed in Indiana. The constitution of the Union League formed at Madison, Indiana, stated its purpose as, to forget all party differences; to place the salvation of the Union above all other questions; that it was for the maintainence of the government against all enemies, whether at home or abroad; and was for the vigorous prosecution of the war.[42] Democratic newspapers were as loud in their denunciation of this order as Republicans were in denouncing the Knights of the Golden Circle, the American Knights, and the Sons of Liberty.[43]

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Early in the war the South made the greatest effort to secure a supply of military and hospital supplies in anticipation of a blockade. Sending contraband goods from Indiana continued until it was checked by local vigilence committees, federal agents encouraged by Governor Morton, and detectives appointed by him, and by military officers engaged in raising troops. Seeing the inactivity of the government, private citizens also took it upon themselves to suppress the traffic.[44] On May 4, 1861, citizens at Lafayette organized to prevent such trade; at a prearranged signal citizens were to assemble to confiscate goods ready for shipment.[45] On May 1, a Vigilence Committee was organized at

38. Testimony given in conversation with Civil War veteran who took part in the voting.
39. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 17, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, October 18, 26, 31 and November 3, 1864; Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, p. 712.
40. Democrats charged that "At almost every point where voters could be transported, the lines of railroad might be traced by the increase of the Republican vote." Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 371. "Unionism" was an important factor in the election as the war was ending.
41. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, March 24, 1863; Washington Democrat, April 2, and June 4, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 12, 1863; Democratic Banner of Liberty, July 24, 1862. The Indianapolis Daily Sentinel complains continuously of the Union League during 1863 and 1864.
42. Madison Daily Courier, March 24 and 27, 1863.
43. Democratic Pharos, March 11, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 12, 1863; Democratic Banner of Liberty, July 24, 1863.
44. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 124-125.
45. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 7, 1861.

Indianapolis for the same purpose. Two hundred bags of sugar were seized in Indianapolis in June, 1861. Of these one hundred bags were allowed to proceed as far as Jeffersonville on condition that they be sold to Indiana customers.[46] In May five cases of muskets and three sets of military accouterments were seized there,[47] and held subject to the order of the state authorites.[48]

In May Governor Morton sent J. S. Bobbs and Schuyler Colfax to Washington to urge the federal authorities to stop the shipment of provisions to the seceded states.[49] But it was not until August that the order was issued prohibiting all commercial intercourse to the South; and even then only district attorneys, United States marshals and revenue officers, and officers of the naval and military forces of the United States were empowered to act.[50] Other seizures were made from time to time, as in August, 1864, when Morton placed information in the hands of the authorities which resulted in the seizure of large shipments of arms and ammunition.[51] These confiscations made shippers and railroads cautious as the danger of losses increased

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Morton was also active in controlling the press in Indiana. Sections of it had always been opposed to a vigorous prosecution of the war. On June 25, 1862, Governor Morton wrote Secretary Stanton that the Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Dayton Empire, and the Chicago Times were doing great injury to the Union cause through their attacks upon Union men, their continual apologies for the acts of the leaders of the Confederacy, and by their failure to condemn the Southern cause. In regard to the Indianapolis Daily Sentinel he said that in its sympathies "it was as thoroughly opposed to the Union as the Charleston Mercury or the Richmond Enquirer. The rebel perisoners at Camp Morton regard and esteem it as their defender, ally, and friend . . . ." [52]

The Plymouth Democrat was suppressed in the next month. General Milo S. Hascall, while commander of the military district from April 15 to June 5, 1863 [53] acting under General Burnside's General Orders No. 38, [54] suppressed the Pulaski Democrat [55] and engaged in wordy

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46. Ibid., June 19, 1861.
47. Ibid., May 8, 1861.
48. Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, p. 791; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 385.
49. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 7, 1861, pp. 496-498.
50. President Lincoln's proclamation of August 16, 1861, in United States Statutes at Large, 1861, Appendix, p. 1262.
51. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 408-409; Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 16, 1863.
52. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, June 25, 1862, Official Records, Series III, vol. II, p. 176-177.
53. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 463.
54. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 7 and 13, 1863.
55. Democratic Pharos, June 17, 1863.

controversies with others.[56] By so doing he aroused such a storm that he had every Democrat hating him and prudent Republicans fearing the consequences of his actions. GovernorMorton asked that he be relieved from his office,[57] and President Lincoln asked that thereafter all such matters be referred to him before action was taken, unless the case was too urgent.[58] Soldiers in March, 1863, destroyed the Richmond Jeffersonian, as they did the Rockport Democrat two months later, er.[59] Other printing offices at Vincennes, Terre Haute, Franklin, a and other places were wrecked because of their opposition to the war program.[60] Governor Morton never so much as mildly rebuked the offenders for their acts.

The constant active steps being made at least neutralized the force of the Northwest in the war[61] called forth the most extraordinary methods for countering them. Weeden says that "Perhaps no administrator ever threw himself more absolutely and without reserve into his work."[62] Certainly few executives have done so with such slender support as had Governor Morton in those two years from 1863 to 1865. In his survey of Morton's situation, Weeden says further, "Governor Andrew could discuss constitutional procedure with Judge Parker, having enormous majorities at his back; but Morton, holding only the tattered rags of his gubernatorial mantle, must act against men secretly armed for overthrowing the civic organization." [63] Seward, Stanton, and Lincoln always had substantial majorities to support their extra-legal acts. Morton did not have that support and consequently had to resort to all forms of strategy; defensive, offensive, offensive-defensive, to accomplish his purpose.

To accomplish his purpose of furthering the cause of the Union, he converted the state government into that of a little kingdom, compelling everything out of harmony with his views to submit to his wishes. And he was by nature so highly individualistic that there was no working with him. One could only work for him, be he a citizen of a neighboring state, a citizen or public official of Indiana, general in the field, Secretary of War, Secretary of Treasury, or President of the United States. That situation may have made his task doubly hard; but there was no other way for him to work, except when odds were so overwhelmingly against him that he could win more by compromise, and such cases were rare, there being possibly not more than a half dozen during the war. To accomplish his purpose he drove his assistants, federal officials having business relations with him, and himself to

56. Official Records, Series II, vol. V, pp. 723-726.
57. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, ibid., Series I,vol.XXXIX, part II, p. 281.
58. Stanton to Burnside, June 1, 1863, ibid., Series II, vol. V,p.724.
59. Vevay Reveille, March 19, 1863; Washington Democrat, April 2, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 17, 1863; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 227.
60. Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, p. 778.
61. Weeden, War Government, pp. 338-339.
62. Ibid., p. 347.
63. Ibid., pp. 352-353.

work night and day, or secured their dismissal and the appointment of others who would do as he wished. No element of authority that he originally possessed was given up during the war; duties and responsibilities of a state and federal nature were constantly added to his absolute rule.

The fact that there was resistance to the raising of troops has already been discussed in Chapter II. It remains to be seen how that resistance was counteracted or neutralized. Of the two general forms of raising troops, that of volunteering is noticed first. With Morton it was not a matter of being able to fill calls for troops. He must fill the cup to the overflowing. To do that he went beyond the formality of issuing calls for troops, to creating a sentiment in the state that would not only fill the call of the moment but assist in filling others as well. He urged ever-larger federal and local bounties to enable men to depart for the front willingly. He tried to secure adequate support for those dependent upon them while they were away. He tried to create a public opinion that would force the hesitant to a decision to enlist. And as a last resort, he urged the passage of the draft law of July, 1862, that it might be used as a whip to cause others to enlist.

Once a man had enlisted he tried to make conditions for reenlistment as favorable as possible by insuring communications with relatives and friends; by sending visitors to regiments or visiting them himself; by enabling packages to reach them from home; by providing an adequate hospital service in the field or securing the consent of military authorities that soldiers be moved to an adequate service; by providing clothing, blankets, and other supplies when they were not furnished by the regular authorities; by urging exchanges of prisoners, etc. He tried to introduce greater efficiency into recruiting by making plans of his own or modifying those of the federal government to meet special conditions in Indiana. These activities are discussed more fully elsewhere.

But it was not these things that called for a real effort as much as the questions arising in connection with the raising of troops by conscription. There were two large agencies interested in this: The state of Indiana, and the federal government. In the federal government the President, the Treasury, the War Department with its commanders in the field and especially generals commanding military districts, and the Judge-Advocate's office with its provost-marshals were vitally concerned, and had the pre-dominant authortity supported in most cases by actual legislation. On the other hand there was the state of Indiana, in this case represented by Governor Morton who had little legal authority to act, and yet who was an interested and real participant in the enforcement of the draft law.

What was Morton's place in the conscription machinery as it actually worked? Cases of resistance to enrollment for the draft were handled in this manner: The law made the provost-marshal responsible for effecting the enrollment. In case of opposition he was directed by the Provost-Marshal General to cooperate with Governor Morton and the military commander of the state or district in overcoming

it.[64] In the case of the resistance to the draft in Rush County in June, 1863, the Provost -marshal for the state of Indiana had frequent interviews with Governor Morton and General Willcox on the difficulties that had arisen or that might arise, secured unanimity of opinion on the course to be pursued and harmony of action in carrying out the measures adopted. The policy was "to execute the laws, if possible, without a conflict; to act so prudently that if a collision should occur there would be no pretext for saying that it was provoked by the representatives of the government, and in such an event to vindicate the authority of the government at all hazards."[65] Prudent officers who would not arouse unnecessary opposition were appointed to the office of provost-marshal. Morton was active in securing men of this type by insisting that his nominees alone be appointed. His system of recommendations also secured men known to himself, and consequently favorable to his program.

In case the difficulty promised to become serious Morton did what he could to keep the matter out of the hands of the commander of the military district by settling it by other means, and means that he could control more effectively than he could army men. He would write or telegraph the War Department, or confer with the Secretary of War in Washington, try to keep enrolled troops from being ordered from the state until the situation became less serious, or have troops ordered in to settle the difficulty.

Morton also tried to control the situation by securing the appointment of military commanders for the military district of Indiana favorable to his program, if he had to have them at all. The first one of these, Henry B. Carrington, appointed in March, 1863, was a man of his choice, even though Secretary Stanton was not entirely favorable to the appointment, and General Halleck was greatly opposed to it.[66] Carrington's successor, Milo S. Hascall appointed on April 15, 1863, was satisfactory to neither Morton, nor the War Department, nor the President, due largely to his General Order No. 9, which resulted in the suppression of some newspapers, and Hascell's "engaging in newspaper controversies that agitated the public mind," and producing "irritation by assuming military powers not essential to the public peace," and for "unnecessarily interferring with the political condition of the State."[67] Morton's objections were largely responsible for his

[64] E. M. Stanton's orders of February 14, 1862, Official Records, Series II, vol. II, pp. 221-222; ibid., Series III, vol. III, pp. 354 and 339-340.

[65] Conrad Baker to J. B. Fry, June 13, 1863, ibid., p. 354; O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, October 7, 1862, ibid., p. 340; W. H. H. Terrell to O. P. Morton, October 7, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 52; Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 299.

[66] H. W. Halleck to General Wright, March 30, 1863, ibid., Series I, vol. XXIII, part II, pp. 193-194; Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, p. 781.

[67] Official Records, Series III, vol. V, pp. 723-726. General Hascall's General Order No. 9, is printed in ibid., Series II, vol. V, p. 485. The newspapers suppressed were mostly in Northern Indiana. On June 1, 1863, Secretary Stanton notified General

removal.[68]

General Alvin P. Hovey succeeded General Willcox in the Indiana district on August 25, 1864, after Governor Morton had telegraphed Secretary Stanton, "General Hovey will be satisfactory. Order him here at once." [69] His instructions were dated September 14, 1864. While they were very general he was told to "render to the Executive authority of Indiana, whatever aid may be needed in the enforcement of the laws and the preservation of peace. The cordial relations which are understood to exist between you and his Excellency, Governor Morton, will no doubt, lead to that harmony of action between the Federal and State authorities which it is highly desirable should obtain."[70]

The Governor was also successful in keeping men in office whom he found to be especially valuable for his work. He did this at times even after orders for their transfer had been issued.[71] During Morgan's raid he called General Lew Wallace from the field under the command of General Halleck, before he asked for Halleck's consent, promising that he "would stand between you and harm." [72] Secretary Stanton approved his action the next day.[73]

Evidence of Governor Morton's clash with military authority is seen in July, 1863, when General Burnside asked of the Governors of Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana, their acquiescence in his declaring martial law in their states. The General promised that the arrangement would not "interfere with any civil matters, either public or private, except in cases to be enumerated. . . . ." Nor would "official nor private business need by interferred with."[74] The Governors of Ohio, Illinois, and Kentucky gave their consent quite readily. Governor Tod of Ohio said that "the

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Burnside that hereafter in the "arrest of civilians and the suppresion of newspapers not requiring immediate action the President desires to be previously consulted." E. M. Stanton to General Burnside, June 1, 1863, ibid., p. 724.

[68] O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, May 27, 1863, ibid., Series I, vol XXIII, part II, p. 369; Judge David Davis to E. M. Stanton, May 27, 1863, ibid., Series I, vol, XXIII, part II, p. 369; ibid., Series II, vol. V, pp. 724, 725.

[69] O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, ibid., Series I, vol. XXXIX, part II, p. 281.

[70] E. D. Townshend to General Hovey, September 14, 1864, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library.

[71] Official Records, Series III, vol. III, pp. 19, 173; ibid., Series I, vol. XX, part II, p. 297; Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 619-620.

[72] W. R. Holloway to General Wallace, July 10, 1864, ibid., Series I, vol. LII, part I, p. 398. See also Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 134.

[73] Official Records, Series I, vol. LII, part I, p. 399.

[74] Ibid., Series I, vol. XXIII, part I, p. 728.

people of the state would submit without a sigh or murmur to every deprivation to preserve the state from invasion."[75] Morton refused to give his consent, "If I understand the purpose to be accomplished by declaring martial law in your department, I am opposed to it, as I am unable to see any good to grow out of it, but much possible harm. So far as the present invasion of Indiana is concerned, it can certainly do no good, and so far as calling out and organizing the militia, either to repel invasion or maintain order, I am satisfied it can be better done by State than Federal authority. I say to you frankly, that so far as Indiana is concerned, it would be highly inexpedient, in my judgment."[76] As usual Morton tried to secure the support of Secretary Stanton against Burnside's proposal. General Burnside in June had asked the Secretary for authority to declare martial law in Indiana but had not been sustained;[77] Morton had refused to consent to it until all other means of putting down opposition had been exhausted.[78]

On June 1, 1863, Secretary Stanton sent the following suggestions to General Burnside at Cincinnati, which were to regulate his relations with Governors of states: "So far as it can be done with safety to the Government, it is well to leave the administration within those States to their respective Governors and to consult them in regard to any coercive measures in respect to persons not in the military service or not engaged in actual hostility. Their familiarity with the temper of the people will enable you to judge to what extent such measures may or may not be advisible . . . . The natural aversion of our people to the exercise of military powers without necessity will be greatly stimulated by any feeling in the State Executives that the General Government is disposed to interfere in matters of administration which properly belong to them or which they are able to manage. The proper limit of military authority in such cases is at their request to aid and not supercede the State authority."[79]

But even Stanton's definition went too far for General Halleck who agreed with Governor Morton in that the policy of appointing district commanders in states in the North was damaging. He wrote General Burnside on June 16, 1863, "I have recently conversed with several prominent citizens of Ohio and Indiana, including Governor Morton, and they are unanimously of the opinion that the policy of ap-

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75. Ibid,, pp. 729 and 745.
76. Ibid., p. 728. On July 11, 1863, General Willcox wrote General Burnside, "What do you think of Governor Morton, or any other civilian, however respectable his judgment may be, attempting to interfere in such (military) matters? I have counselled the good Governor in every important step (during Morgan's Raid) ." O.B. Willcox to General Burnside, July 11, 1863; ibid., p. 727.
77. General Burnside to E. M. Stanton, June 16, 1863, ibid., Series III, vol. III, p. 371.
78. Ibid., p. 392.
79. Ibid., Series II, vol. V, p. 724.

pointing district commanders in those states is injurious. They say that it conveys to the people an idea that they are being subjected to military restraint; that difficulties are multiplied between civil and military authorities, the former taking offense at the assumption of the latter; that the public feeling is becoming strong that these military commanders, with their numerous staffs, had much better be in the field fighting the enemy than exercising unnecessary military authority in the loyal states.

"I know that representations to the same effect have been made to the War Department, and I think it would be well for you to consider this matter and the propriety of withdrawing these district commanders and leaving the control, as much as possible, in the hands of the Governors and civil authorities. For example, why not leave Governor Morton, with the commanding officer at Indianapolis, to manage affairs in that State and put General Willcox and his staff in the field? I know that General Willcox is an excellent officer, but he is a stranger in Indiana and is not likely to understand their political squabbles. The Governor has made no complaints of him or of anyone else, but he does not see any necessity of his being there at all."[80]

. . . . .

In the arrest of deserters much the same process was followed that was followed in enforcing the enrollment for the draft. The federal law, effective March 3, 1863, stated that the penalty "for procuring or enticing to desert, harboring deserters, carrying a deserter knowingly, refusing to give him up when ordered, is a fine not to exceed $500 and imprisonment of from six months to two years."[81a] The law was a direct stroke at the secret societies in opposition to the war. Scores of arrests followed.[81b] Other arrests were made for discouraging enlistments, and for expressing sentiments favorable to the Confederacy.

In making these arrests the provost-marshals of the several districts had generally the same powers in executing federal law that sheriffs had in executing state law. The execution of the law was left exclusively under the orders of James B. Fry, Provost-Marshal-General.[82]

80. General Halleck to General Burnside, June 16, 1863, ibid., Series III, vol. III, p. 385.
81a. United States Statutes, 1863, Third Session, Chap. 75, Sec. 24.
81b. Plymouth Democrat, October 30, 1861; New Albany Daily Ledger, April 23, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 2, 18, May 6, 18, 22, 25, June 13, 1863; August 11, 1864; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 2, 27, 1863, April 11, 22, August 17, 1864; Vevay, Reveille, April 2, 1863; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, January 9, 1863; Official Records, Series II, vol. VII, p. 943. The Report of the Legislative Committee on Arbitrary Arrests of 1863, gives 160 pages of the results of their examination of arbitrary arrests generally.
82. United States Statutes at Large, 1863, 3d Session, Chap. 75, Sec. 6.

He instructed his assistants however that "while the Governors have no control over you, you will be required to acquaint yourselves with their best views and wishes, and give them due weight in determining as to the best interests of the government. To do this you will use all proper means to gain and retain the confidence and good will of the governor and his state officers."[83] Later he told Conrad Baker, Provost-Marshal of Indiana, "I have no doubt that the military commander and the governor will continue to aid in carrying out such measures as you may find necessary."[84]

There is no doubt that that Morton's influence in making these arrests was predominant. At times he really acted as an equal with, or the superior of the provost-marshals. He recommended making arrests, holding as a prisoner, releasing on parole, or discharge from arrest as seemed best to him, inquired into various centers of disturbance, gathered evidence to be used in trials of political offenders, and received reports from the various provost-marshal expeditions like one in full authority.[85] He called upon Secretary Stanton for "authority to arrest and hold as a prisoner of war, Joseph Glore now at Rising Sun, Indiana who acknowledges and boasts of having been in the Rebel Service and who is believed to be a spy."[86] He notified

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83. J. B. Fry to E. M. Stanton, March 17, 1863, Official Records, Series III, vol. V, p. 252; J. B. Fry instructions to subordinates ibid., Series III, vol. III, p. 168. In a general order relating to arrests for political reasons, dated February 14, 1862, Secretary Stanton announced that "extra-ordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the military authorities alone," ibid., Series II, vol.II, pp. 221-222.
84. J. B. Fry to Conrad Baker, June 28, 1863, ibid., Series III,vol. III, pp. 421-422. See also J. B. Fry to Secretary Stanton, September 27, 1863, ibid., p. 842.
85. General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 242; General Dispatches, vol.III, p. 137; ibid., vol. IV, p. 29; ibid., vol. VII, p. 355; ibid., vol. IX, pp. 45, 46, 65, 66, 81, 82, 137, 242; ibid., vol. XV, p. 356; Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 23, 74. On May 8,1863,Morton asked that the Postmaster General give to Colonel D. C. Rose, United States Marshal for Indiana, authority to open letters to and from a gang of counterfeiters in this city . . . . . Counterfeiting is being carried on extensively in this in this State, and this authority is necessary for the purpose of establishing the guilt of the criminals." Morton, Letters, vol. II, p. 788.
86. O. P.Morton to E. M. Stanton, July 7, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 68. Lieutenant S. P. Coffin, on the next day, was authorized to make the arrest through instructions sent Morton by Secretary Stanton. Morton, Letters, vol. I, p. 44. On July 10, Morton notified Colonel Rose, "you will receive and confine in your camp, Joseph Glore and hold him a prisoner of war, under instructions and by authority of the Secretary of War, until further orders from this Department." Ibid., p. 45.

James Speed of Louisville, "I wish you would send me immediately a good detective. I want him to smoke out a nest of traitors Knights of the Golden Circle."[87] He moved political prisoners from place to place to keep them away from writs of habeas corpus.[88]

Early in 1863, Henry B. Carrington, mustering officer for Indiana, was working with Morton. He seems to have been really the head of Governor Morton's secret service to ferret out and expose the Knights of the Golden Circle. He was engaged in the examination of soldiers, to detect the operations of the secret society. He was also frustrating general attempts to do mischief, be they plots to assassinate Governor Morton, take possession of the Indiana Arsenal, or maintain order generally. Nearly 2,600 deserters and stragglers were arrested within a very few weeks.[89] He continued the same work after he was made commander of the military district of Indiana on March 23, 1863, and while he occupied that office he accomplished his purpose. The results of his investigations were publixhed in June at the request of Governor Morton, as an expose of the society. Soon after he was relieved of the office of district commander, he was ordered to report to Morton for duty.[90]

In March, 1863, acting on reports from Governor Morton and orders from General Wright he stopped the sale of arms in Indiana to prevent the Knights of the Golden Circle arming themselves.[91] From this time on Carrington was almost constantly associated with Morton at Indianapolis. This cooperation was the occasion for such appellations as "Morton, Carrington and Company", and "Letter Thief of Indiana" (Carrington) being hurled at them and their work by those against whom they were working.

It was during 1863 that Governor Morton's spy service was perfected.[92] A number of men were in this service, no one of whom knew of

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87. O. P. Morton to James Speed, July 9, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 72.
88. General Dispatches, vol. IV, pp. 129, 131, 161, and 165.
89. Henry B. Carrington report to Adjutant-General Thomas, January 24, 1863, Official Records, Series III, vol. III, pp. 19-20; Fesler, Secret Political Societies, p. 206; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 383, 384, 425. A total of 7,484 deserters from Indiana organizations were arrested during the war. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 114.
90. Ibid., p. 273-276; Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 9-11. On May 26, 1863, General Haskell wrote Morton: "In carrying out my instructions it will undoubtedly be necessary from time to time for me to cause what are called "arbitrary arrests" to be made . . , in fact I have some cases on hand now requiring in my judgment this kind of action. I have heard it intimated (though not through very reliable sources) that such course does not meet your approbations and my object in addressing you this note is to ascertain what the fact is, as I have no desire to "usurp" any of your functions or to proceed contrary to your wishes," Morton, Correspondence, Box, Indiana State Archives.
91. Official Records, Series III, vol. III, p. 76.

the employment of any of the rest, "and each was expected to report on the doings of the others, as well as on the conduct of the bona fide members of the order." The reports were made at various centers, which Morton visited to get the statements of his agents. "So complete was this system of espionage that Morton and Carrington often knew the most important plans of the order before they were communicated to the members of the order who were expected to take part in their execution. Reports of the proceedings at the night meetings of the conspirators were often in Morton's hand on the morning of the following day."[93] Newly enlisted soldiers were sent back to their homes to become members of the secret societies in order to report their activities. Morton's spies kept him fully informed of the preparations of the Democrats for the Democratic Convention at Indianapolis on May 20, 1863.[94] They were handed the confidential dispatches of General Morgan when he entered Kentucky on his way north for the raid of June, 1864. "The messages were steamed, opened, and transcribed, and copies were delivered to Morton before the originals were delivered at their destination. The correspondence on both sides was thus examined in several other cases before it was delivered to the parties interested." He learned of the impending ivasion of Kentucky by Zollicoffer and Polk in 1861 through secret agents,[95] as did the Kirby Smith campaign in 1862.[96] So successfully did these agents work into the confidences of the societies that one spy would be dispatched to assassinate another. Some of these agents were in Morton's employ; others were paid by the federal government and detailed to work for Morton.

One of these agents was S. P. Coffin, one of Morton's former clients in Wayne County, Indiana. He was very successful. W. H. Holloway once said of him to Colonel I. W. Shackleford, "Coffin has been much in our employ as a detective and is a good hand at the business." [97] Another was Felix Stidger, one of the most successful of federal government detectives, who worked through Indiana and Kentucky in 1864, and was one of the most valuable of the witnesses for the gov-

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92. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 405; Mos. O. P. Mortin, in Indianapolis News, December 11, 1906.
93. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 405-406.
94. Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, p. 782.
95. Official Records, Series I, vol. XXIII, part I, p. 716.
96. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 272.
97. W. R. Holloway to Colonel I. W. Shackleford, October 8, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 61.

ernment at the "Treason Trials" in 1864. Others were Dr. Henry M. Zumro and Edmund Klamroth.[98] Morton and Carrington covered the "Great Conspiracy" of 1864 with their spies.[99]

The money for this service advanced $40,000 for the secret service fund on March 28, 1863, and $10,000 on September 7, 1864. The federal government refunded $25,000 of this on January 29, 1864.[100] On September 11, 1864, the federal government advanced Morton $5,000 from its secret service fund.[101]

98. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 405-407; Fesler, Secret Political Societies, pp. 202, 206, 211, 238, 250, 253, 259-260; Official Records, Series II, vol. VII, pp. 271, 730; Stidger "became a leading knight, secured not only all the secrets of the officers of the Circle, but the rituals, constitutions and proceedings of the order, both in Kentucky and Indiana and then disclosed them to General Carrington and Governor Morton." Esarey, Indiana, vol. II, pp. 784-785. Foulke, says that once Morton had determined to investigate and expose the Knights of the Golden Circle, it made little difference to him whether he was authorized by statute to do so or not. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 385.
99. Official Records, Series I, vol. XXXIX, part II, pp, 237-239, 259-260.
100. Unclassified mss., Indiana State Library, dated January 9, 1866, and signed by W. H. H. Terrell.
101. E. D. Townshend to A. P. Hovey, September 11, 1864, Official Records, Series III, vol. IV, p. 716.

VII. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIANA SANITARY COMMISSION

1. Origins to March, 1862

SUCH WERE GOVERNOR MORTON'S ACTIVITIES in getting new regiments into the field fully equipped for effective service, and for keeping up the war spirit in the state. But it was soon apparent that other organizations would be of value to supplement federal issues of food and clothing, and to supply wants not included at all, in such issues. It was for those purposes that the Indiana Sanitary Commission was organized for Indiana regiments.

The outbreak of the war revealed the inability of the central government to furnish its soldiers adequately with food, clothing, and munitions. The men themselves were not at all used to the rough and ready life of the army, the various climates in which they were located, and the diseases that prevailed in camp. Civilians did but little for the soldiers during the summer of 1861, and there was really little need for such aid as long as the warm weather lasted. By autumn, however, clothing was needed; some food and clothing was sent, but in no organized manner.[1] Local organizations for caring for sick soldiers became common during the summer. A Florence Nightingale Corps at New Albany had made arrangements for preparing lint and bandages as early as April.[2] Other corps were organized in the towns scattered over the state.

Early in August news reached Indiana telling of the condition of the soldiers in western Virginia, and requisitions were sent to the federal government for clothing. Blankets soon arrived at Indianapolis and were forwarded to the men by James A. Ekin, United States Quartermaster there.[3] Everyone supposed that in due time the federal government would furnish all that was needed; hence citizens made no great effort to provide them;[4] but the weeks that followed showed that this confidence was not well founded because neither cloth nor clothing could be obtained in sufficient quantities, and organization was lacking for making speedy distribution.

When in Washington in August, Governor Morton telegraphed A. Montgomery, to get overcoats of any good material and not wait for advertisement of bids because the regiments were suffering from cold and rain. This order was referred to the United States quartermaster, John H. Dickerson, at Cincinnati, who sent four thousand overcoats in the care of General Rousseau, then in command in western Virginia. The troops awaited their arrival for nearly a month; the middle of Septem-

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1. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 315.
2. New Albany Daily Ledger, April 24, 1861.
3. Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 19, 1861.
4. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 315.
5. J. H. Vajen to Quartermaster Meigs, September 11, 1861, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917), Merrill, Soldier of Indiana, vol. I, pp. 89-90.

ber came and none were delivered. The men were nearly naked, and in the hills with cold weather coming on.[5] Either the ones that had been shipped had to be found or others sent. The State authorities sent no less than four men to search for the lost coats, two of whom were W. R. Holloway, Morton's private secretary, and Asahel Stone, State Commissary General.[6] Finally about three-fourths of them were found in a warehouse on the upper Kanawha, so badly damaged by a recent flood that not more than one-third of those found reached the troops.[7] Some others were sent which partly supplied the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Regiments, but overcoats, shoes, socks, caps, and underclothing were still badly needed.[8] The federal government was doing all it couldto supply the garments, but all its efforts were not equal to the task. Morton saw this, and President Lincoln acknowledged it in a proclamation late in September.[9]

Morton now began to lay his plans for supplying the troops. More urgent calls were sent to Washington.[10] Indiana agents were sent to Cincinnati, and there, even though they were bidding against the state of Ohio, they succeeded in buying some clothing and blankets, but other articles were not on the market at all.[11] On October 10, Morton issued an appeal to the women of Indiana for contributions of shirts, socks, woolen mittens or gloves, and blankets to be sent to the state Quartermaster General;[12] and offered to pay for those blankets that not be donated. Every village and town in the state was urged to organize societies for raising supplies, and Ladies' Sewing Societies were formed.[13] United States Quartermaster M. C. Meigs countersigned the call for the contribution.

The people of the state responded heartily. Thousands of dollars' worth of blankets, shirts, drawers, socks, mittens, sheets, pillows, pads, bandages, lint, dressing gowns, etc., were rushed to Indianapolis.[14] Enough to supply the demand soon arrived and Morton issued a statement to the people telling them of this fact.[15] But the women

6. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 316.
7. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, October 16, December 11, 1861. Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 11, 18, 1861.
8. Ibid., October 9, 12, 1861; Plymouth Democrat, October 17, 1861; John H. Dickerson to M. C. Meigs, September 6, 1861, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library.
9. Proclamation, September 30, 1861, United States Statutes at Large.
10. O. P. Morton to M. C. Meigs, October 7, 1861, Private Telegrams, vol. I, pp. 91-92.
11. New Albany Daily Ledger, October 16, 1861; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 318.
12. Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 10, 1861. Another call was made on October 23, 1861, in which needs were listed and directions given for packaging. Terrell, I, Appendix, 348.
13. New Albany Daily Ledger, October 16, November 10, 1861; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 318-19; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 159; Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 12, 15, 1861.
14. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. II, P. 159; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 320; Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 653.
15. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 320.

of the state could not supply overcoats. The troops in western Virginia and eastern Kentucky had not yet been fully supplied with these, so Morton determined that he would get them, whether the federal government would or would not assume the debt so incurred. In this case as in all that arose throughout the war, he considered only one question, "What do the soldiers need?" He was content to stop and ask what the United States would allow, only while the men were enjoying what he had caused to be done. Certainly the chances for having such a bill assumed by the United States were not the best, when experience had shown that Montgomery Meigs was not disposed to favor the interference of the governors in the purchase of supplies, no matter how badly they were needed. But Morton had had a conference with the Secretary of War at Cincinnati and probably had a definite notion of how Cameron regarded the move.[16] The records do not show Cameron's view on the subject, but it is certain that the purchase would have been made even had it been clear that the state would have had to pay the whole bill.

Robert Dale Owen, legally the state purchasing agent for buying arms for the state, was sent East to buy overcoats. Morton himself contracted for 10,000. In all, the state's agents bought 29,000 overcoats, paying for some, the government price of $7.75; for others prices ranged from $7.50 to 9.25.[17] Those amounts over the government purchasing price had to be borne by the state but the federal government reimbursed the state for the rest.[18]

There was much complaint during the time that various state authorities were meddling with the duties of the United States Quartermasters in the purchase of clothing for volunteers, that the competition raised prices, and that in some cases cloth of an inferior quality was disposed of to states,[19] but such charges that were made against Morton at this time were declared false by Captain James A. Ekin. Cloth of a very inferior quality was sold to Indiana but no payment was made for this.[20] In the middle of October, letters coming from western Virginia said nothing of a scarcity of clothing or food stuffs.[21] Soon after this a soldier's letter from western Virginai said that soldiers were abundantly supplied with provisions. A. Stone coming from that place on the twentieth reported that "troops have plenty of clothing and the fear is that they will have too much sent them." [22] Soon the surplus coming to the capitol was sent to supply Ohio men that were in need.[23]

16. New Albany Daily Ledger, October 18, 1861.
17. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 317; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, December 4, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 29, 1861.
18. Ibid., October 29, November 4, 1861; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, December 4, 1861.
19. Ibid., December 4, 1861.
20. Ibid., November 29, 1861.
21. Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 11, 15, 1861.
22. Ibid., October 28, 1861.
23. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, November 1, 1861.

During the winter the necessity for some relief measures continued.[24] Relief organizations were being formed.[25] During October railroads offered transportation free of charge for goods for such public service coming to Indianapolis.[26] It was not until February and March however that a well organized plan was worked out. The losses resulting from the battle of Fort Donelson were the occasion for it. Constant calls for supplies of all kinds were sent out. By the end of February supplies were coming into Indianapolis in such great quantities that some system had to be applied to the relief work.[27] The work of organization went on from February 26 to March 3, when the Indiana Sanitary Commission emerged.[28] William Hannaman was made president and Alfred Harrison was made treasurer of the organization.[29]

There were two kinds of work to be done by the Commission: Collection and distribution of supplies. William Hannaman was supervisor of both. He united under one head the activities of both divisions of the organization.[30] In accordance with this distinction it is convenient to separate the discussion into those two general branches. The organization for collecting the supplies is considered first.

2. Collection and Distribution of Goods

When it was formally begun, the system was simple. The donor made out two lists of the articles being sent, one was enclosed in the box containing goods contributed and sent in to the central warehouse at Indianapolis while the other was mailed to Hannaman.[31] The various railroads and express companies carried the goods free of charge if they were sent to the Commission, but if consigned to a party other than the Commission the regular rate was charged.[32] The central warehouse, just north of the State House, was a substantial building kept clean, dry, and in perfect order. Goods of all kinds came into this center; those that were addressed to individual soldiers were sent ahead to their destination, while the others were opened, sorted, repacked and stored ready for shipment when the call came for them. Its counters, shelves, and regularly employed labor made it greatly resemble an ordinary general store of the present day. When the goods were shipped out upon requisition, each box was numbered, and the same num-

[24] Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 17, 1861.
[25] Ibid., October 12, 1861.
[26] Ibid., October 10, 19, 1861.
[27] Ibid., March 3, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 28, 1862; General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 62.
[28] Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 28, 1862; ibid., March 1, 4, 1862.
[29] Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 28, March 1, 4, 5, 6, 1862. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 28, March 1, 4, 8, 1862.
[30] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 324.
[31] Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February 6, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 6, 1862; General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 160 and 162.
[32] Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February 6, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 6, 1862.

ber was recorded at the office, together with a list of the contents.[33]

Morton was in the midst of the whole movement. He inspired all by his exertions and counselled with his officers in every emergency. His stirring appeals kept popular attention continuously centered on the soldiers' needs.[34] Hannaman's appeals appeared in the newspapers very frequently,[35] and were copied freely until everyone had a chance to know what was needed. His work kept him in closest touch with both the incoming supplies and the needs in the field. He managed the business in a very creditable manner. Every one that had any great influence in his community was urged to encourage his neighbors to supply what they could. Mayor Caven of Indianapolis was active in raising supplies, as were James Blake and the state Commissary General.

In addition to sending out notices for aid there were various other devices used for bringing pressure to bear on the people. During 1863 and 1864, sanitary fairs were found to be very useful in raising money and supplies for the Commission and for soldiers' families.[36] Everyone in sympathy with the war or having friends and relatives in the army would prepare for them for weeks in advance. Business men of the towns donated money, produce, and the use of halls. Suppers, tableaux, music, and amusing entertainments were made ready for the public. Elaborate programs were arranged,[37] and if the fair happened to

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33. Ibid., March 6, 1862, and September 19, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 653; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 333.
34. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February 6, 1863; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 327-8.
35. The Indianapolis Daily Journal for December 8, 1862, gives one of Hannaman's appeals; "The prompt and liberal responses made by the people of Indiana to previous calls of the Sanitary Committee encourage us to make another appeal to the benevolent. We are much in need of shirts, drawers, socks, mittens, and good fruit either or canned. Governor Morton has placed special agents at Washington, Nashville, Louisville, Memphis, and Cairo to reside at each of these places, to attend to the sick soldiers of Indiana, and receive the goods forwarded by this committee and see that they are promptly and honestly distributed. We receive calls almost daily some of our hospitals, and knowing the sufferings and destitution of our soldiers, we are deeply anxious to contribute to their relief. So far, we are happy to say, we have been able through the kindness of our people, to supply the most urgent demands. We entreat our friends, on seeing this notice, to ship all they possibly can of the above articles, directed to William Hannaman, President of the Sanitary Committee, Indianapolis. It will be a pleasing reflection as you sit in your quiet homes, with happy families, around your comfortable fires, that you have done your share to cheer the sick soldiers on their beds of pain."
36. Ibid., November 11, 1863.
37. Ibid., December 3, 5, 16, 1863; The program for the Knightstown fair in December 1863, was Wednesday evening, grand festival; Thursday evening, art union fair; Friday evening, tableau and concert.

come in Christmas week, a grand dinner was commonly served.[38] They were a fruitful source of income, and in no place were they more successful in raising funds than in Indiana. Neighborhood, county, and state fairs were held.[39] The amounts raised in the various communities varied from rather small sums to $40,000.[40] A state convention of all societies was held at Indianapolis on March 3, 1864, to create enthusiasm for the work. From sixty-five to seventy-five societies were represented in the reports sent in on work done in their locality.[41] Leading men in the Sanitary Commission spoke on their particular phases of the business, and delegates returned home with a new insight into the needs of the soldiers.

But experience taught officials of the organization that some more personal appeal would have to be made if the greatest success was to be achieved. Enthusiastic workers and men who had been in the army and could make that appeal were sent out over the state to raise money and supplies in every way possible. Chaplain J. Hogarth Lozier, of the Thirty-Seventh Indiana Volunteers, was detailed for duty as one of these collecting agents. He was one of the most successful. Before November, 1863, he had raised some $31,000 for the Sanitary Commission.[42] Captain Alonzo Atkinson, of the Sixteenth Indiana, collected thousands of dollars in money and goods.[43] In December, 1863, he arrived at Indianapolis from a trip through Cass County with $1,400, and reported that he had raised four car loads of provisions while on the trip.[44] Honorable M. F. Shuey, of Elkhart County, and Reverend.Benjamin Winans, of Lafayette, were very successful in raising money. At various times Morton made addresses for the purpose of raising supplies. Military agents returning from their posts made this a regular part of their business.

As these man went from county to county they encouraged the organization of societies and outlined work for them.[45] A central society was formed at the county seat and their auxillary societies were established in the townships.[46] Townships were divided into units, and in these, committees were appointed to make a house to house canvas for goods and money. In this way everyone in the state was given a chance to give what he could. The goods collected were sent to the central society, and the whole county contribution was sent to Indianapolis as soon as enough had accumulated to justify a shipment.

38. Ibid., December 16, 22, 1863.
39. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 326.
40. Ibid., pp. 326-7; Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 10, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 83.
41. Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 4, 1864.
42. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, November 27, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 78.
43. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
44. Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 7, 1863.
45. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 324-326.
46. Ibid., pp. 325, Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 10.

Everything of use in field or hospital that could be found in the state was contributed: Tons of clothing, food, and hospital supplies were collected and thousands of dollars were raised. An incomplete list of these articles contributed includes poultry, cornmeal, butter, dried apples, eggs, pillows, pillowcases, bed ticks, sheets, comforts, blankets, towels, handkerchiefs, coats, trousers, vests, shirts,socks, apple butter, kraut, crackers, dried beef, tea, rice, cornstarch, homey, mincemeat, lard, potatoes, peaches, onions, turnips, wine,peas, pickles, cranberries, cheese, turkeys, beans, hominy, sugar, molasses, soap, and tobacco.[47] The Sanitary Commission also sent out directions for preparing the donations.[48] Harrison township, in Henry County, in February, 1862, sent five barrels of poultry, five barrels of corn meal, one barrel of butter, two hundred ninety pounds of dried apples, and one barrel of eggs to the hospital at Louisville.

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[47] Ibid., 1865, part II, pp. 111-112, reports 3,495 pounds of butter, 11,919 bandages, 2,416 dozens of eggs, etc., collected in 1863; for 1864, 50,055 pounds dried apples, 35,164 bandages, 3,350 medicinal wafers, 1,141 pounds of butter, etc. Ibid., pp. 110-111. The following is a partial list of what was sent to the Sanitary Commission from March 3, to December 31, 1862, as given by ibid., pp. 109-10:

1,060	bed ticks	481	pillow ticks
8,264	pillow cases	3,029	Pillows
872	comforts	807	blankets
1	cotton mattress	26	bed spreads
6,699	towels	5,365	Handerchiefs
168	coats	19	vests
261	prs. pants	9,937	shirts
50	pounds salt	10	pounds honey
29	boxes mustard	105	pounds bacon hams
4	gallons maple molasses	3½	pounds macaroni
25	pounds rice	2	doz. bottles lemon syrup
69	pounds farina	38	pounds dried herbs
59	pounds tea	692	loaves bread
767	pounds butter	370	pounds crackers
36	pounds cheese	4,287	pairs drawers
2,605	pairs socks	165	pairs mittens
258	dressing gowns	555	pairs slippers
a 393	housewives	414	pounds soap
599	combs	3,234	pounds dried apples
446	pounds dried peaches	64	bushels small fruit dried
3,199	cans fruit	83	bushels onions
9	bushels potatoes	17	bushels corn meal
15	gallons pickles	1,276	dozen eggs
6	gallons apple butter	10	dozen lemons
		5,540	sheets

[48] The Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 8, 1862, gives rules of Sanitary Commission for preparing bandages. "Bandages if made of new cloth should be shrunken by scalding and drying, half worn cloth is quite as good if it is not too tender. They should be torn, never cut, in strips from three-fourths of an inch to three inches wide, and from three to ten yards long, the

The Commission also collected books to be sent to the soldiers and placed in the Soldiers' Home: 1,349 books and papers reached the Commission in 1862, 2,691 in 1863, and 10,181 in 1864.[50] Special efforts were made to put a Bible in the hands of every soldier.[51] Sunday school children made bags in which they placed needles, thread, yarn, cloth, etc. for the soldier's use.[52]

Money was being raised all the time. Private citizens, societies, companies, counties, and cities gave sums up to $700. It was used in buying such articles as the Commission did not have when relief calls came: For drayage, cloth furnished to Sewing Circles, renting storehouses, salary for porters, fuel, stationery, stamps, expenses of agents that were collecting and distributing goods, clerk hire, relief of soldiers' families, steamboat hire, passes for soldiers and soldiers' wives, expenses of nurses, etc.[53] William Hannaman valued the goods contributed in 1862 at $86,088.00; in 1863, at $101,430.74; to

narrow strips, being for the hand and finger may be shorter, say three to five yards. All must be entirely free from seams, hems, selvedges, or ravelings on edges. In joining the strips overlap the raw edges and run them two or three times across without knots as stockings are darned, making a flat joint, soft and firm. The strips thus tacked together for each separate roll should be exactly of a width; they should be rolled on a flat surface, a board or large book and as firmly and evenly as possible; the roll of bandage when finished should resemble the round wooden blocks in which ribbons are rolled..Practice will result in good work. The end of the bandage should be turned in and fastened with a small sharp pin which surgeons always use, the points being carefully turned in. Then with a pen or pencil write the length of the bandage upon the roll and it is ready. Lint should be of linen, not cotton, and should be raveled, not scraped. It is best to pack it lightly in paper boxes, and is prepared by cutting strips of soft linen the length of the box and of convenient width, from one to two inches, then short threads are all drawn out and heaped promiscously in a pile, and the long ones combed free from knots and trimmed exactly to fit the box, in which they lie like skeins of white silk. The drawn threads are put up in boxes also, thus making two kinds of lint, each excellent for its purpose. These are the precise rules allowed at St. Louis."

49. Ibid., February 18, 28, March 4, 21, April 2, August 14, 30, September 9, 1862; and November 24, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 3, 1862; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, pp. 109-164; ibid., 1863, pp. 10, 654; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, December 2, 1862.
50. Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 109-11; Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 19, 1863.
51. Ibid., October 9, 1862.
52. Ibid., March 4, 1862.
53. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 328; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, pp. 108-9.

December 1, 1864, at $226,086.91; and their value from that time to the end of the Commission at $45,394.38. The total was $359,000.03.

In July, 1862, the state Commissary Department was recognized. Its duties were to look after the welfare and necessities of the sick and wounded soldiers in Indiana regiments; to assist in procuring transportation for the sick and disabled in proper cases; to cooperate with the Sanitary Commission and its branches; to assist in directing the movements of and to receive reports from special agents sent out by the Governor; to procure, publish, and keep on file for reference, accurate lists of sick and disabled soldiers showing their regiments and companies, the hospitals where they are confined, and their condition as far as could be ascertained; to keep lists of deaths, and furnish information concerning them to friends and relatives; to supervise soldiers' homes and look after the subsistence and comfort of soldiers traveling through the state; to attend to the fitting out of steamers chartered to bring home the sick and wounded; to see that proper sanitary and hospital stores were supplied and that competent nurses and surgeons were provided; to procure clothing for the soldiers through the regular channels of army requisition; and to furnish information relating to the above and other matters pertaining to soldiers and their friends. In carrying out his instructions he was directed to consult and cooperate with the military authorities of the state and of the United States in all cases where it was proper and necessary.[54] These instructions from Morton show both the relation of the Sanitary Commission to the state military authorities, and the near-military status of the Commission itself.

Once goods were in the Indianapolis warehouse they awaited calls for relief from the field. Goods going out were sent over the railroads, or on reaching the Ohio river, were commonly sent on south by boat to points as near to their final destination as possible. Morton chartered steamboats to carry sanitary stores, nurses, and surgeons down to river, and the sick and wounded home.[55]

The price paid was from $125 to $225 per day for a specified number of days.[56] He tried to get the concurrence of Captain James Ekin, United States quartermaster at Indianapolis, whenever possible to enable the federal assumption of the debt and secure Ekin's cooperation in inducing the federal government to allow the expenses.[57] The Sanitary Commission paid part of these expenses; Morton paid part from his Military Contingent Fund; and tried to get the federal government to assume the whole debt, in which case the money to be refunded was to

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[54] Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 2, 1862.

[55] General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 176, 177, 178, 183, 193, 215, 216, 229, 236; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 322; Documentary Journal, 1863, part II, p. 41; ibid., 1864-1865, part II, p. 82; ibid., 1865, part II, p. 174.

[56] General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 179, 182.

[57] Ibid., pp. 146, 217, 248, 249, 252; ibid., vol. IV, p. 40; Private Dispatches, vol. XVI, pp. 150, 151.

be paid to Morton himself.[58] He obtained permission from the military authorities for expeditions to pass through their lines;[59] at times named the commander and the clerk of the expedition; arranged for special trains to connect with the boats;[60] sometimes picked the nurses and physicians to make the trip;[61] received reports of the progress of expeditions: The number of soldiers picked up, the supplies needed at the various posts, and the number of sick left behind,[62] inquiries as to where to leave the men brought home,[63] enabled Indianans brought by other states to be left at Indiana hospitals along the Ohio,[64] and provided numerous articles for soldiers not furnished by the federal government.[65] Usually the goods were shipped to an Indiana military agency which served as a permanent depot for distributing supplies. The first of these was established at Philadelphia in June, 1862. Others were soon started at Indianapolis, New York City, Washington, Louisville, Memphis, Nashville, and other places.[66] Generally they were established as near the front as the safety of supplies

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58. General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 229, 286, 294, 295; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 1, 10. Some $30,000 was paid for such expenses from April 18, 1863, to April 30, 1864.
59. General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 178-179.
60. Ibid., pp. 196, 197, 216, 217, 220.
61. Ibid., pp. 226, 256, 257, 260.
62. Ibid., pp. 229, 232, 237.
63. Ibid., p. 226.
64. Ibid., p. 164, 232, 233.
65. Ibid., p. 228, Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 352-354 gives a general discussion of these activities.
66. Ibid., Appendix, p. 109 gives the following data concerning Indiana military agencies (the date following location of agency is that of the appointment of the military agents): Indianapolis, July 1, 1862, Gen. A. Stone, Commissary General, succeeded by William Hannaman; Indianapolis, December 10, 1862, Wm. Hannaman, office still open; Philadelphia, June 28, 1862, Robert R. Corson, closed July 1, 1865; New York City, July 10, 1862, Frank E. Howe, closed July 1, 1865; Washington D. C., September 1, 1862, Col. Wm. T. Dennis, relieved from duty February 20, 1863; Washington D. C., February 21, 1863, Rev. Isaac W. Monfort, relieved from duty July 1, 1864; Washington D. C., July 1, 1864, Wm. H. DeMoppe, relieved from duty July 1, 1865; Washington, D. C., July 1, 1863, Henry P. Lantz, relieved from duty November 10, 1865; Washington, D. C., November 10, 1865, Col. Luther B. Wilson, office still open; Louisville, Kentucky, October 27, 1862, Dr. Calvin J. Woods, relieved from duty December 13, 1862; Louisville, Kentucky, December 13, 1862, Jason Ham, office closed November 20, 1865; Memphis, Tennessee, December 6, 1862, Dr. Reuben Bosworth, relieved from duty March 3, 1863; Memphis, Tennessee, March 3, 1863, Dr. George O. Jobes, office closed August 1, 1865; Nashville, Tennessee, December 12, 1862, Dr. David Hutchison, relieved from duty March 3, 1863; Nashville, Tennessee, March 3, 1863, James W. Scott, relieved from duty November 27, 1863; Nashville, Tennessee, October 27, 1863, Col. Edward Shaw, office closed November 1, 1865; Columbus, Kentucky, December 16, 1862, James S. Wilson, office moved

would permit,[67] and still allow them to be as accessible as possible to the soldiers. Each agency was managed by a military agent. Traveling military agents, or sub-military agents gradually evolved from the system, and had for their duty the business of following the armies in which there were Indiana troops, reporting what was needed and distributing the stores that had been shipped to them. They were subject to no rigid rules, but were left free to give as they saw fit.[68] Their temporary military agencies were of value after a battle, or other special emergency; they were discontinued as their usefulness decreased.[69]

Concerning the duties of these men in greater detail, whether they were in charge of a main depot or a sub-depot, it may be said that they looked after the welfare of the soldiers at their agency and cooperated with the generals of the military district in which their agency was located.[70] They made reports to Indianapolis as often as enough infor-

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to St. Louis, Mo. January 10, 1863; St. Louis, Missouri, January 10, 1863, James S. Wilson, relieved from duty August 1, 1863; St. Louis, Missouri, December 16, 1863, Dr. John E. McJaughey, office closed December 1, 1865; Evansville, Indiana, January 10, 1863, Col. Philip Hornbrook, office closed March 1, 1866; Keokuk, Iowa, March 7, 1863, E. K. Hart, office closed January 1, 1864; Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 25, 1863, Chas. F. Kimball, office removed to New Orleans, October 29, 1863; New Orleans, La., October 29, 1863, Chas. F. Kimball relieved from duty October 1, 1864; New Orleans, La., October 1, 1864, Dr. George W. New, office closed February 1, 1866; Chattanooga, Tennessee, November 24,1863, James H. Turner, relieved September 1, 1864 and placed on duty in General Office at Indianapolis; Chattanooga, Tennessee, September 1, 1864, Vincent Carter, office closed July 1, 1865; City Point, Virginia, October 1, 1864, George A. Huron, office closed June 1, 1865; Indianapolis, Indiana, November 19, 1864, Rev. Isaac W. Monfort as military claim agent, office closed December 31, 1865. Ibid., p. 291, those established at Dalton, Kingston, Carters-ville, Big Shanty, and Marietta, Georgia, as Sherman advanced to Atlanta are examples of these temporary agencies. Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, pp. 170, 182.

[68] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 291, 341.

[69] Ibid., p. 291.

[70] Morton's instructions to David Hutchinson, Military Agent at Nashville, dated December 12, 1862, laid down the following program: "You will look after the welfare and necessities of the sick and disabled soldiers belonging to Indiana Regiments, procure and register their names in a book to be provided for that purpose, noting their condition, etc. see that they are furnished with proper accommodations, medical attendance and suitable food. You will procure and furnish, from the proper officers, descriptive lists for all who may be without them, so that they may be paid, or, if proper, discharged from the service. Examine the condition of the various hospitals, or cause it to be done from time to time, and call the attention of the proper authorities to any neglect or abuse which may be discovered. In the distribution of sanitary supplies or hospital goods, you will cooperate

mation accumulated to justify it; in these reports they gave the number and names of persons in the hospitals, together with the kind of injury or seriousness of the sickness.[71] General reports gave a cursory view of affairs in the vicinity of the agency.[72] Indiana men

with the Sanitary Commission in this city and the several Aid Societies of the State. You will also confer "frequently with Mr. Wm. Hannaman, the General Military Agent and make reports, as often as may be required to him.

"It is intended that your office shall at all time be supplied with the fullest information in regard to the location, condition and wants of the sick and wounded which it may be in your power to obtain, so that all inquiries made by their relatives and friends may be satisfactorily answered.

"Persons who may be seeking their friends in the army or in hospitals will call on you frequently for assistance in procuring furloughs, discharges, description lists, pay, etc., and you are directed to aid them as much as possible.

"Ascertain the locations of our various regiments and keep advised of their movements so that proper directions may be given to persons who may be desirous of visiting them to see relatives and friends . . . . It is intended that our authority shall be broad enough to enable you to transact any business necessary and proper to be done in aid of the suffering or distressed volunteers connected with Regiments from this State.

"Consult with the Military Authorities of your Department and cooperate with them in all cases where their inter-position may be necessary.

"In addition to looking after the sick and wounded, you will keep yourself advised as much as possible of the condition, efficiency and wants of our Regiments, and report to the Department." ibid., pp. 341-342.

[71] The Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 20, 1862, gives a typical report on those in the Danville, Kentucky hospitals:

Jacob Umen	Co. I	174th	died Nov. 10	
Harry Bates	Co. A	101st	died Oct. 31	
Corp. Wm. Schaffer	Co. D	87th	typhoid fever,	convalescent
Hanalton Walder	Co. E	81st	" "	"
Ziba Jagger	Co. A	29th	Flux	
Morgan Johnson	Co. I	80th	died Nov. 8	
A. C. McCurdy	Co. E	80th	diphtheria,	"
Martin J. Orcutt	Co. A	87th	remittent fever	"
G. H. Cotton	Co. G	73rd	" "	"
Sergt. G. W. Potter	Co. G	80th	continued "	feeble
J. H. Finney	Co. A	80th	rheumatism,	convalescent

[72] Ibid., August 14, 1862 gives brief report from N. J. Dorsey to A. Stone, Commissary General, Indiana Volunteers, on the condition of men in hospitals in Virginia and Maryland: "At the U. S. General Hospitals at Frederick, Maryland, I found 101 Indiana sick and wounded. At Harper's Ferry, Va. only 3. The removal of the military post at Winchester, Va. necessarily causing the removal of the hospital, prevented my gaining any infor-

were given preference in distribution; if any goods were left they were given to regiments of other states.[73]

Pay for agents was fair for the times. They received from $100 to $150 per month for their services, and had their office rent paid which amounted to about twenty dollars a month. Fuel, stationery, postage, and clerk hire when needed, was provided for at from fifty to seventy-five dollars a month. In some cases even the cost of meals seems to have been included in the expense account.[74]

The work of military agents in distributing stores is discussed next. The agents did the most of the distributing but in the last two years of the war they were aided by the United States Sanitary and Christian Commissions.[75] Goods sent to the Commission were forwarded to points of need as they were revealed in the reports of the various agents.[76] It was not necessary that men be in the hospitals in order to have sanitary stores sent them; indeed it was claimed by the Commission that its great object was to keep men out of the hospitals. Stores were distributed to men in the field because it was as important to keep men out of the hospital as it was to cure them after they were sick, so they said.[77]

When the orders for supplies came in they were filled as readily and as fully as the stores on hand, or the amount of money in possession of the Commission, permitted. When they reached the waterways, boats were frequently chartered to carry them to the final destination. In November, 1863, a steamer was chartered to carry two thousand packages of stores to Memphis and other hospitals on the Missis-

mation of those who were sick in that place.

"At Washington City I found the various hospitals, including the General Hospital, Falls Church and Fairfax Seminary, Va. with the General Hosptial and Union Hotel Hospital at Georgtown, Maryland, 273 all of whom are under the immediate care of the Indiana Relief Association, receiving every care and attention they desire.

"At each hospital I visited I found every possible attention given to the sick and wounded and all that is necessary for their comfort is in abundance save and except underclothing which in some places is almost impossible to obtain." Many reports went farther into detail than this one.

[73] Terrell, Report, vol..I, pp. 331, 336, 337, 344; Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 13, 1862.

[74] Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, p. 291; ibid., p. 323; Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 20, 1863.

[75] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 330.

[76] Ibid., p. 320; Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 7, 1862. Writing to Morton from Corinth, C. McDougal, medical director there said: "Tell your good generous people that the sick in the hospitals here want sent to Columbus, Kentucky every two weeks, about twenty-four dozens of live chickens, five barrels of eggs and some fresh vegetables." Ibid., July 7, 1862. J. J. Rooker writing from Mound City, Illinois, on March 7, 1862, said, "We

sippi River.[78] These packages ordinarily contained from one hundred to four hundred articles. On June 17, 1863, Captain Alonzo Atkinson shipped seventy tons of sanitary stores to Murfreesboro. He accompanied the goods to see that they reached their destination and were properly distributed.[79]

It was customary to keep quantities of stores at some local central agency near the front and to fill orders from there. Colonel Edward Shaw, within one week preceeding the capture of Nashville by federal forces, distributed several hundred barrels of vegetables and fruits.[80] During three months of the summer of 1864, 537 packages, made up of clothing and vegetables were sent from the Chattanooga agency to points in northern Georgia. Fifteen shipments were made to this agency.[81]

The offices of the agents were intended to be the homes of the Indiana soldiers. The agents wrote letters for the sick, received any keepsake from them that they wanted preserved or sent home and in some cases knapsacks of soldiers dying in hospitals were entrusted to them for preservation and to be delivered to relatives.[82] Money was lent for embalming bodies, and their shipment home was commonly attended to by these vigilant agents.[83] The arrival of an agent was always a

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are badly needing at this hospital blankets, coverlets, hospital shirts, hospital drawers, pillow cases, pillow ticks, dressing gowns and delicacies." ibid., March 8, 1862.

[77] Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 73.

[78] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, November 12, 1863.

[79] Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 17, 1863.

[80] Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 74.

[81] Ibid., p. 170. Shipments made by James H. Turner, military agent at Chattanooga, were as follows:

1864	To Whom	Where	No. of Pkgs.
May 16	George Merritt	Dalton, Ga.	36
May 21	George Merritt	Kingston, Ga.	9
June 2			59
June 3			9
June 15	Wm. John Wallace	Cartersville, Ga.	23
June 26		Big Shanty	28
June 27			13
June 30	Vincent Carter		32
July 7		Marietta, Ga.	56
July 15			66
July 18			31
July 27			23
Aug. 5			78
Aug. 11			45
Aug. 13			29
		Total	537

[82] Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 30, 1863.

[83] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 321-322.

time of rejoicing among the soldiers, because they brought with them clothing, food, paper, letters, and general news from the outside. The agents mingled freely with the men. Meetings were held and great enthusiasm was developed; the visiting agent usually made a rousing speech to the crowd.[84]

At the close of the campaign under General Sherman, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta, this Commission through its agents C. M. Jones and A. W. Mendenhall, distributed in a few days nearly one thousand barrels of onions, potatoes, and fruits to the worn out soldiers of Indiana and other states. "This timely aid served greatly to encourage and recuperate our brave men. When the regiments were informed that each would receive ten or twenty barrels of supplies, by sending to our warerooms at Atlanta, there were instances of our brave fellows shedding tears of joy and gratitude, at this proof of the love and thoughtfulness of their friends at home."[85] These instances of thoughtfulness for their welfare may be multiplied by one thousand. Morton fairly won the name of "The Soldiers' Friend" given him by the soldiers.[86]

Morton ordered his agents to accompany Sherman on his march to the sea, but that General did not want to be bothered with them. Major James H. Turner was stationed at Chattanooga. George Merritt, Vincent Carter, and W. J. Wallace helped to provide for the sick and wounded

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84. Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 19, 1862.
85. Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 74.
86. Of Morton, Henry Hitchcock at Burnside Barracks in February, 1863, wrote the following:

THE SOLDIERS' FRIEND

The man that we do most esteem--
Whom we would from all harm defend,
Tho' ran our blood a fearful stream--
Is he who is the "Soldiers' Friend."

Who is the truest patriot?
Upon whose head should praise descend?
Not he whom treason foul doth blot--
But he who is the "Soldiers' Friend."

The Minstrel with his soul elate--
His voice with golden harp should blend
To praise our noble Hoosier State,
And him who is the "Soldiers' Friend."

Sweet be the life, and calm the end,
Long after strife is heard no more
Of Morton true--the "Soldiers' Friend",--
Our patriotic Governor.

Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 11, 1863.

left behind along the route.[87]

In December, 1864, goods were shipped to Savannah from New York City. They were accompanied by Dr. C. J. Woods and several assistants. It was intended that they meet Sherman when he reached Savannah, but he had gone north before they arrived and the goods were distributed among the hospitals there, at Port Royal, Hilton Head, and Charleston. Some were returned to New York. Some $8,000 worth of stores were sent to Washington to be distributed among Indiana men in Sherman's army at the surrender of Johnston. They were a welcome addition when the Union men shared their rations with the Confederate troops.[88]

The agencies did not stop at furnishing large supplies of foods and clothing; but maintained a mail service which dispatched letters with greater rapidity than the ordinary channels. Each hospital at Louisville had a daily mail service; hospitals at New Albany were included. Letters intended for Louisville were sent in care of "Dr. C. J. Woods, Indiana Military Agent, No. 440 Main Street, Louisville, Kentucky", in case the sender did not know the number of the hospital in which the soldier was confined. Dr. Woods kept a mail bag for each hospital into which all letters were dropped. Agents leaving Indianapolis for the various places in the field would carry letters and small packages and see that they were delivered.[89]

The money for keeping the Sanitary Commission and military agencies in operation was paid from the military contingent fund that had been appropriated in the special session of the General Assembly in 1861;[90] and from money contributions to the Sanitary Commission. In May, 1863, an attempt was made by Morton to get funds from the Secretary of War, for carrying on the work of the Commission. That appeal was made when the funds for carrying on the business had run very low.

An enumeration of the contributions in money and in goods for the time of the Sanitary Commission's existence shows the amount of business that was carried on.

3. Financial Statement

Cash Contributions

Cash on hand March 3, 1862	$13;490.92
Contributions in 1862	9;038.20
Contributions in 1863	36;232.11
Contributions to Decemberl, 1864	97;035.22
Contributions from December 1, 1864 to close	91;774.30
Total	$247,570.75

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[89] Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 17, 1863.

[90] Indiana Statutes, 1861, Special Session, Chap. II.

Value of Goods Distributed

In 1862	$ 86,088.00
In 1863	101,430.74
To December 1, 1864	126,086.91
To close of business	45,394.38
Total	$359,000.03

These figures show that an equivalent value of $606,570.78 [91] was furnished by the people of the state in addition to the great aid furnished at Donelson and other places before its organization.[92]

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91. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 320, 327; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, pp. 71-72, 109, 110, 762; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, August 22, 1862, October 9, 1863, January 12, 19, 1864; Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 9 and September 4, 1862, January 31 and August 11, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 10.
92. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 338.

VIII. CARE FOR DISABLED SOLDIERS IN THE FIELD

1. In Kentucky-Tennessee, February to April, 1862

WE HAVE SEEN THE OCCASION for organizing the Indiana Sanitary Commission and some introduction to its work in the field. It was there that Morton's care was most far-reaching and always in evidence, especially after February, 1862. Outstanding evidence of that is presented in his activities in providing relief for the sick and wounded from Fort Donelson and Pittsburg Landing.

In the battle of Fort Donelson the Union forces lost nearly 10,000 in killed and wounded, 1,000 of whom were from Indiana.[1] The rest of the men were so nearly exhausted by their labor and exposure that they were not able to prevent the escape of many Confederates on the night before the surrender.[2] On February 17, Governor Morton received a dispatch asking whether he could provide hospital service for 200 wounded. He immediately replied that he had room in advance for all Indiana men.[3] After making arrangements with various cities along the Ohio[4] he telegraphed[5] General Halleck in greater detail, "We can take care of three hundred wounded at Evansville, five hundred at New Albany, and three hundred at Indianapolis . . . ."[6]

This was the first important battle in which Indiana regiments had participated, and was the occasion for extensive preparations for doing everyting that could be done for their welfare. James M. Ray, acting for Governor Morton, called on the people for aid and supplies.[7] Morton decided to go to Donelson to see for himself what aid was needed, and to administer immediate relief. Hundreds of surgeons and several women volunteered to care for the wounded not able to be moved. Several women volunteered to go. Morton entrusted to Dr. J. M. Kitchen the business of selecting surgeons and preparing relief. The company included some twenty-five doctors and nurses. It started on the seventeenth by special train by way of Cairo and Mound City, and

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1. John Cadman Ropes and William Roscoe Livermore, Civil War (New York, 1894-1913), vol, II, pp. 33-34; Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 18, 1862.
2. Ibid., February 25, 1862.
3. New Albany Daily Ledger, February 18, 18, 1862.
4. General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 34, 35, 47-49. As early as Nov. 20, 1861, Morton was having sick soldiers went to Indiana from St. Louis. But he must await soldiers' pay before moving them. A. Stone to Governor Morton, in Morton, Correspondence Folder, Indiana Archives.
5. New Albany Daily Ledger, February 18, 1862.
6. O. P. Morton to General Halleck, February 17, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 34. Among the other cities offering to help were Columbus, Richmond, Terre Haute, Salem and Madison. Department Dispatches, vol. III, pp. 47, 73.
7. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 21, 28, and March 3, 1862.

arrived at Donelson on the twentieth.[8] They found that the dead had been buried, saw that the seriously wounded were being cared for, and the approximate number of wounded that were to be provided for by the state.[9] Several of the wounded had been sent to Cairo, Paducah, Mound City and St. Louis before Morton's party had arrived. Some of these hospitals were visited on the return trip and surgeons left where the immediate need was greatest.

Morton reached Indianapolis on February 23, and immediately began organizing and dispatching assistance to the hospitals. The hospital service at Indianapolis was reorganized; new hosptials were opened in the towns along the Ohio, and inspectors dispatched to keep them in good working order. Other expeditions with physicians and supplies were sent to Paducah, Mound City and other points where Indiana wounded were located,[10] to report the names of Indiana soldiers there, their needs, and the general condition of the sick and wounded.[11] Women over the state did a great work in preparing handkerchiefs, underwear, sheets, pillows, slippers, and other hospital supplies.[12] By February 20, Indianapolis had raised $4,500 in money alone.[13] The state contracted for steamboats to carry supplies and surgeons to hospitals outside the state and the sick and wounded to Indiana. This work continued as long as there was need for it. Indiana's sick and wounded were so well cared for that the secretary of war notified Governor Morton, "The War Department thanks you for your prompt and energetic action."[14]

Again, in April, 1862, the battle of Pittsburg Landing called forth special efforts at relief. Much the same organization was used that had been set up in February, but special steamboats carrying supplies and surgeons out and Indiana men home, were used even more extensively. Again many physicians and nurses offered to go on relief expeditions in response to the call for volunteers; other were sent to the various hospitals in which Indiana soldiers were located.[15] The hospital service of the river towns was reorganized to receive the

8. New Albany Daily Ledger, February 25, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 19, 21, 1862.
9. Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 25, 1862.
10. Ibid., February 21, 1862; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February 26, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 26, 28, and March 3, 1862.
11. Ibid., February 28, 1862; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February, 26, 1862.
12. Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 3, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 28, 1862; General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 62.
13. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 21, 1862; New Albany Daily Ledger, February 19, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 20, 1862.
14. E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, February 19, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 49.
15. Ibid., p. 125.

many that were brought home,[16] and Morton gave them almost personal supervision respecting: Overcrowding,[17] sending elsewhere numbers in excess of those that could be well cared for,[18] and allocating new arrivals.[19] One of the hospitals at Evansville was soon in bad condition, due partly to the inefficiency of the federal medical director there. Morton recommended that he be superceded by a better officer. The Sanitary Commission busied itself in collecting supplies and sending them ot to places needing them, and its previous experience enabled appropriate kinds of stores and packing of goods sent to Shiloh. Again inspectors were sent to hospitals outside the state. Military agents constantly sent in reports from their districts.

The Governor started one boat to Pittsburg Landing on April 7, 1862, and sent surgeons the next day.[20] Father E. B. Kilroy was sent to Shiloh in the middle of March, 1862,[21] to report conditions prevailing among the troops. Morton arranged for a special boat which left Evansville on April 10, 1862, with thirty or forty volunteer surgeons and supplies for Pittsburg Landing.[22] On April 25, 1862, W. R. Holloway was arranging to remove Indiana sick from New Madrid,[23] which was done.[24] Morton wanted all disabled Indiana men sent to Indiana to be cared for. He requested of Dr. G. Perin, assistant medical director at Louisville, to send Indiana sick and wounded arriving there to Indiana hospitals,[25] which was promised "as far as practicable."[26] The same request was made of J. S. Bobbs, medical director at New Albany on April 13.[27] On April 14, Bobbs was instructed to board the boats "arriving and get Indiana wounded. Place them in hospital if possible at New Albany . . . . . Make arrangements to have Indianans left . . . off boats" at Jefferson City or Madison.[28] A boat arriving on April 14, left at Evansville all Indianans on board except those living near Louisville. Those able to travel further were sent on to their homes.[29] Morton also cared for the sick of other states in Indiana hospitals. 400 sick Ohio troops were sent to New Albany on May 12, 1862; 150 placed in the hospital there, and the rest, being convalescent, were furloughed home.[30]

16. Ibid., pp. 124, 125, 128.
17. Ibid., pp. 132, 133, 135, 136.
18. Ibid., pp. 137, 141.
19. Ibid., pp. 142, 144, 158, 159.
20. Ibid., p. 124.
21. Ibid., pp. 125, 225.
22. Ibid., pp. 125, 128. For other negotiations see ibid., pp. 132, 133.
23. Ibid., p. 184.
24. Ibid., p. 205.
25. Ibid., p. 136.
26. Ibid., p. 137.
27. Ibid., p. 142.
28. Ibid., p. 144.
29. Ibid., pp. 145, 164.
30. Ibid., p. 240.

On April 18, 1862, J. S. Wilson, military agent stationed at Nashville, planned to send home on furlough from the hospitals 500 sick Indiana soldiers, but an order from General Buell, dated April 17, prohibited all furloughs, Wilson appealed to Morton, [31] who appealed to General Halleck but in vain. [32] He then appealed to Secretary Stanton, [33] and was authorized "to bring home the sick from Nashville Hospitals as proposed in your telegram." [34] The men were rushed home. [35] Wilson arranged with Dr. Perrin at Louisville to discharge all not likely to be fit for service soon.[36] Many of those coming to Indiana were sent home on furlough if they were strong enough to travel.[37] Morton reprimanded Wilson for not making more adequate provision for the welfare of the men on the homeward journey.[38]

The attitude of the Generals in the field was by no means entirely in favor of Morton's practices. They seemed to have the greatest difficulty in realizing the exact needs of soldiers in hospitals. Nor would the Medical Bureau take suggestions made from the outside whether they came in an official capacity or as a petition from individuals. They regarded Morton's plan of bringing home men disabled for any considerable length of time, as for thirty to sixty days, as demoralizing to the service. During February there was little active opposition to his assistance, but in April more strict federal supervision began to be imposed.[39] On April 19, he appealed to Stanton for permission "to bring to their homes or to our own hospitals from New Madrid, Mo. and other places South and West all the Indiana sick who are able to be moved." [40] Within ten days they were removed.[41] On April 25, Morton asked Secretary Stanton for permission "to transport hospital stores and bring home Indiana sick and wounded wherever I may find them . . . . ." [42] He was authorized to receive "such . . . as may be designated by the Senior Medical Officer in charge." [43]

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31. Ibid., p. 161.
32. O. P. Morton to General Halleck, April 17, 1862; ibid., p. 164.
33. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, April 17, 1862; ibid., p. 164.
34. E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, April 17, 1862; ibid., p. 165.
35. Ibid., pp. 167, 172, 175, 181, 189. Morton authorized Wilson to contract for a steamboat for their transportation, which he did at the rate of one dollar per man. Ibid., p. 147.
36. Ibid., p. 181.
37. Ibid., pp. 147, 180, 181, 186, 190.
38. Ibid., p. 180.
39. Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 175; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 347; General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 186, 187.
40. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, April 19, 1862; ibid., pp. 170, 184.
41. Ibid., p. 205.
42. O. P. Morton to Joseph A. Wright, April 25, 1862; ibid., pp. 182, 183.
43. Surgeon General W. A. Hammond to Joseph A. Wright, April 28,1862, ibid., p. 195. Such soldiers were carried home at state expense if the United States would not furnish transportation. Ibid., pp. 224, 225; ibid., vol. IV, p. 20.

Morton wanted to be on the ground in case of another battle in the region of Shiloh, consequently he went to Pittsburg Landing, starting May 10, 1862.[44] He anticipated a battle at Corinth, Mississippi, and wanted to be on the ground to supervise relief,[45] as well as to see "about Regimental reorganization".[46] While there he was at General Halleck's headquarters.[47] Steamboats plied hurriedly between Pittsburg Landing and Indiana towns in May 10-15, 1862, carrying home Indiana sick and convalescent soldiers, and carrying back soldiers going to rejoin their regiments, and nurses, surgeons, and hospital supplies for the seemingly impending battle.[48]

Then there were numerous outstanding cases of state organizations sending relief to regiments at times not occasioned by battles, or by conflicts of any great importance. In March 1862, Indiana troops near New Madrid were greatly in need of clothing, and Morton offered to supply it from Indianapolis in case there was not a sufficient supply on hand,[49] but General Halleck complacently answered that there was plenty of clothing at St. Louis and Cairo which would be issued upon requisition.[50] Moreover pay was due, but the men there had not been paid for six months because of lack of ready funds, so Morton urged Robert Dale Owen to have money sent to St. Louis for that purpose.[51] Nor was this done, so on March 31, Holloway again reminded Halleck that Indiana regiments under General Pope were in need of uniforms, and offered to furnish them from Indianapolis.[52] To this Halleck again insisted that the Quartermaster had an abundance of good clothing and filled every requisition as soon as it came in;[53] his Quartermaster said that no requisition had been made for clothing for Indiana regiments.[54]

But such arguments over the requirements of red tape did not protect the men from the March winds, and W. R. Holloway sent word to Col. G. N. Fitch of the 46th Indiana at Point Pleasant, Missouri, that he had done everything possible to induce General Halleck to allow his wants to be supplied from Indianapolis and that all he could get from him was the "requisitions are promptly filled". He suggested that

[44] O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, April 19, 1862, ibid., vol. III, p. 230.

[45] Ibid., pp. 236, 254, 258.

[46] Ibid., p. 238.

[47] Ibid., p. 260.

[48] Ibid., pp.215, 216, 221, 226, 227, 236, 237, 240; ibid., vol. IV, p. 5.

[49] General Dispatches, vol. III, p. 110.

[50] Ibid., p. 111.

[51] Ibid., pp. 113, 118.

[52] Ibid., p. 114. On March 29, 1862, W. R. Holloway notified R. D. Owen at Washington, "Please see if the money cannot be sent without delay. These poor fellows' families are suffering for the necessities of life. Humanity demands that they be paid at the earliest possible moment." Ibid., p. 112.

[53] Ibid., p. 115.

[54] Ibid., p. 115.

Colonel Fitch send his quartermaster to St. Louis to see what could be done, and promised to take the responsibility of supplying his regiment if he could not get relief from St. Louis.[55]

On April 5, the Governor again notified Halleck that he had been reliably informed that the Thirty-Fourth, Forty-Third, Forty-Sixth, and Forty-Seventh Regiments under General Pope at New Madrid were suffering for shoes and clothing; that they had made frequent requisitions to no purpose and asked that he investigate the matter and report the results.[56] The red tape remained as firm as granite when Halleck replied "Plenty of supplies at Cairo. Will inquire into the matter,"[57] but it was not until W. R. Holloway went to St. Louis that some of the needed supplies were sent from there and the rest from Indianapolis.[58]

Another instance of great effort being made to relieve an Indiana regiment was that for the Forty-Nineth at Cumberland Ford. In April, 1862, Governor Morton received word that 370 men in that regiment were sick and needing food and hospital supplies suitable for sick men. Nothing of that kind could be had there.[59] On the same day the state promised to send a good lot of supplies and two additional surgeons, and added, "Never hesitate to call on us for assistance. It will be promptly given."[60] Even with this aid conditions grew rapidly worse, and a military agent was sent in the middle of May to report conditions; he found that but 377 men were fit for duty; that 188 were sick and in camp, and 321 were absent on sick leave; that they needed fruits of all kinds, pickles, kraut, and potatoes, but most of all it seemed best to send them on furlough to Lexington.[61]

55. Ibid., p. 116.
56. Ibid., pp. 122, 123.
57. Ibid., p. 123.
58. Ibid., p. 184; Indianapolis Daily Journal, quoted in French, Indiana, pp. 239-241, says that "Morton's dispatches were suppressed at General Pope's headquarters and never handed to Colonel Fitch. Governor Morton, not hearing from Fitch, sent an agent to New Madrid who learned that Morton's requisition for supplies had been endorsed 'Not granted, Jno. Pope, Major General Commanding'. At about the time General Pope was ordered to Pittsburg Landing Governor Morton sent his private secretary to Ft. Pillow where the regiments were then stationed to see if they had been supplied. It was through the Governor's agents that clothing finally reached the troops many of whom were shoeless and almost naked." On April 1, W. R. Holloway promised Colonel Fitch, "If you cannot get them there (at St. Louis) we will take the responsibility and supply you, no matter about the consequences." General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 116.
59. Ibid., p. 184.
60. Ibid., p. 184.
61. Ibid., pp. 222-223, 245.

Conditions became worse and worse. Early in June but 229 out of 900 officers and men could report for duty. Their camp was in an unhealthy locality and supplies were meager and not fit for sick men. They had neither straw nor hay with which to fill bed ticks, even the sick were compelled to lie on the ground. General Buell was requested to order the regiment to Lexington or to some other point where the men could get supplies and be properly cared for.[62] The state sent a a good lot of supplies and two additional surgeons,[63] and Colonel Ray was promised by Holloway that "you must and shall be removed. Your men will not be allowed to die there without an effort on our part."[64] It was not until after two days that Buell sent word that an investigation of the case was being made and that action would be taken as soon as practicable.[65]

In the meantime Holloway telegraphed Indiana's delegation in Congress to induce the President to interfere in behalf of the regiment. General Buell would not agree that the regiment be sent to Lexington, even though Generals Carter and Morgan favored it and Holloway insisted that this was the only way to save the men.[66] Holloway sent President Lincoln a bundle of Colonel Ray's letters treating of the condition of the regiment and appealed to him by telegraph to order its removal to Lexington. He stated that but two-ninths of the 900 men were fit for duty, with a sick list increasing from eleven to fifteen daily; that the regiment had over 300 men lying on the ground without the necessities of life, and that there was no food within eighty miles. He promised that Governor Morton would call on President Lincoln in a few days.[67]

The Indiana delegation visited Lincoln and Secretary Stanton and asked that they interfere on behalf of the regiment. The President asked Stanton to order it away but Stanton flatly refused. Holloway then put the matter in Morton's hands. The Governor was in New York when his secretary wired him "The lives of 900 men depend on getting back to civilization. For God's sake have them ordered to Lexington."[69] There is no more typical instance of the administration's efforts to aid its soldiers than this, and furnished some justification for General Buell being unpopular with Governor Morton later. Buell contended that the "Governors (of Indiana and Ohio) evidently look upon

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62. Ibid., pp. 185, 296; Official Records, Series I, vol. X, pp. 630, 631.
63. W. R. Holloway to Colonel John W. Ray, April 25, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 184, 245, 308.
64. W. R. Holloway to Colonel John W. Ray, June 4, 1862; General Dispatches, vol. III, p. 298.
65. General Buell to O. P. Morton, June 6, 1862; General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 297.
66. Ibid., p. 300.
67. W. R. Holloway to President Lincoln, June 7, 1862, ibid., p.306.
68. W. R. Holloway to O. P. Morton, June 6, 1862, ibid., p. 304. ibid., vol. IV, p. 5.
69. Ibid., vol. III, p. 304.

the troops they furnish the United States as their own."[70]

Dr. D. A. Webster, surgeon at Nashville, Tennessee, reported 1050 invalid soldiers there and asked that orders be sent for them to go to Indianapolis. After finding whether they were Indianans Morton secured the consent of Secretary Stanton for their removal, directed that they be sent to Indiana, named the hospitals in southern Indiana to which they should be sent, and asked that he be notified when they would arrive so that he could be ready to have them cared for. Morton authorized Webster to contract for transportation on the best terms he could, notifying Morton of the particulars by telegraph.[71]

When the Seventh Indiana suffered severe losses at Port Republic in June, 1862, Colonel James Gavin asked Morton if fifty or sixty of the wounded able to return home could be furnished with transportation by the state.[72] Morton authorized Gavin to contract for their transportation at the best terms he could, and asked that the bills be sent to him. He had also sent an agent to assist in making the arrangements,[73] when word was received that Surgeon General W. R. Hammond had blocked the plan.[74]

On August 30, 1862, in the action at Richmond, Kentucky, 206 men were killed and 844 wounded; six Indiana regiments were engaged. Morton with several surgeons, left Indianapolis on the next day to take care of the wounded. He telegraphed all along the road for surgical help and went to Lexington, Kentucky.[75] He commissioned Dr. Theophilus Parvin and Dr. Talbot Bullard to go to Richmond and assist in caring for the wounded there. They went to Cincinnati[76] on September 8, and had to wait there for three and one-half days while arrangements were being made for passing the wagon train through the lines under a flag of truce.[77] Dr. C. McDermott, United States medical director was there at the same time and perhaps was probably instrumental in helping the Indianans in their plans for relief. Thirty ambulances, six sisters of charity together with two other female nurses, and six men made up the train. They carried a large supply of hospital stores and provisions. They arrived in Lexington on the thirteenth, found thirty-seven patients there, and pushed on to Richmond.

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70. Official Records, Series I, vol. VIII, p. 443.
71. General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 200, 206.
72. Ibid., vol. IV, p. 21.
73. Ibid., pp. 20, 22.
74. Ibid., p. 33.
75. Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 1, 1862. The regiments were the Twelfth, Sixty-Sixth, Seventy-First, Sixty-Ninth, Sixteenth and Fifty-Fifth.
76. Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 8, 10, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 322.
77. Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 10, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 322.

The arrival of the train was the cause of much rejoicing among the wounded soldiers that were crowded into the three hospitals there. The needed sanitary provisions were distributed among the men but not all of them were in the hospitals there, the rest were scattered over the surrounding country in farm houses as much as fifteen miles from Richmond. They reported the men to be in as good condition as the means at hand would allow. Wounds were well cared for and the men were comparatively clean and comfortable. The return trip was begun on the seventeenth and they went by way of Lexington and Maysville bringing some two hundred away with them.[78] The expedition cost the state $828.76 and was paid for out of state funds.[79]

Of the eight regiments of Indiana Volunteers belonging to the Army of the South-West at Helena, Arkansas, in September, 1862, there were about 300 men who were entirely unfit for duty. Their surgeons recommended that they be granted a furlough of thirty days with permission to return home. Governor Morton called the attention of Surgeon General William A. Hammond to the situation[80] but was informed that that office had no power to grant such furloughs.[81] He next tried to get supplies through to them, asking permission of General S. R. Curtis to send them from Indianapolis, [82] which was readily granted.[83] It was understood that the goods would go from Indianapolis in order to more speedily supply the troops, and that they were to go by special agent. Morton caused a list of the articles shipped to be sent to St. Louis so that the order would not be duplicated. [84]

In October, 1862, Morton organized a relief expedition to McCook's Division, which had suffered losses in Tennessee. All expenses were borne by the state.[85]

Another one of the most striking attempts made to aid Indiana men was made in the latter part of 1863. During the autumn reports reached Morton that Indiana soldiers confined in prisons in and around Richmond (Va.) were in destitute condition. The men were half dead of hunger, filth, and vermin. The rations were almost the same as those issued to the rebel army, but were hardly endurable.[86] Officers were treated little better than privates, and Indiana military

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78. Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 23, 1862.
79. Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 43; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 2, 1863.
80. O. P. Morton to Surgeon General Hammond, September 22, 1864, Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 278.
81. O. P. Morton to General Curtis, October 13, 1862; ibid., p.279.
82. Ibid., p. 304.
83. General Curtis to O. P. Morton, October 13, 1862, ibid., p.309.
84. Ibid., pp. 305, 308.
85. General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 69, 71, 73, 74.
86. Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 28, 1863. Captain M. T. Anderson of the Fifty-First Indiana, an escaped prisoner, writing in the Indianapolis Daily Journal, said of conditions at Libby and Belle Isle: "Food is bad, scanty and disgusting. Often there is no meat at all and never enough. This is the

agents urged Morton to do something to relieve conditions there.[87]

2. In Prison Camps

The Governor began negotiating with the Confederates. J. W. Montfort, Indiana Military Agent at Washington, carried on the correspondence with Robert Ould, the Confederate commissioner of prisoners. Consent was given by that official saying, "Any provisions you may send to Ely Point for Indiana prisoners will be faithfully distributed under such regulations as our prison authorities may furnish, such regulations relating solely to the benefit of the prisoners. The provisions can be sent to my care or that of Brigadier General Wilder. We have now begun scattering our prisoners over the country, owing to the refusal of the Federal authorities to make an exchange. This action will alone be good reason for directing your provisions to any one of your officers."[88] The directions agreed upon stated that "boxes must be sent by express prepaid to Fortress Monroe. No expense will be incurred upon them beyond that point. All packages . . . . will have the special care of Major Mulford and Mr. Ould, and receipts for them will be returned to Mr. Montfort, at his office in Washington City." All packages had to be marked "For . . ., Prisoner of War, Richmond, Va." A card had to be attached to each side of the box, marked "For Indiana Prisoners of War, From Gov. O. P. Morton, of Indiana, Care Major J. E. Mulford, Ft. Monroe, Va., and Hon. Robert Ould, Agent of Exchange, Richmond, Va."[89]

Some five or six thousand dollars worth of supplies were purchased by Morton in Baltimore and sent to prisoners.[90] As soon as the arrangements were made for getting supplies through the lines, three hundred suits were sent to Richmond by Quartermaster General Stone.[92] The Indianapolis Daily Sentinel on October 11, stated that "Morton has sent seven hundred complete suits of clothes . . . and seven hundred blankets and is trying to make arrangements for sending

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case with officers in Libby. It is still worse with privates in Belle Isle. There food is not only meagre, rare and bad, but they have no other personal comforts to compensate for the want of it, or make its absence tell with less damaging force on the system. The whole isle is alive with vermin, and the men who could easily, and would gladly keep themselves clean, by bathing in the river which runs within a few yards of the camp are never allowed near the water at any time. . . . The very sand of the shore is thickened with vermin." Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 28, 1863.

87. Ibid., December 2, 1863. There were at least twenty-eight military agencies for Indiana between July 1, 1862, and December 1, 1865, on fringe of operations or in centers through which troops might be passing. Terrell, I, Appendix, 109.
88. Ibid., November 21, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, November 23, 1863; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 322.
89. Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 24, 1863, quoting a letter from A. Stone to the Journal; ibid., December 30, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 349.
90. Ibid., pp. 322, 349.
91. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, December 5, 1863.
92. Ibid., November 12, 1863.

provisions."[93] On December 4, three hundred uniforms and blankets and tents for six hundred men were shipped to Belle Isle, Virginia, in charge of a special messenger, as were other shipments. Caps, underwear, socks, jackets, trousers, shoes and overcoats were thus supplied.[94] By December the men were supplied with all that they were allowed to use. Escaped prisoners from Libby prison said that goods sent them arrived in good condition.[95]

It was also arranged that letters be sent to prisoners confined in prison camps in the region of Richmond on condition that they contain no more than one sheet of letter paper, refer only to personal and domestic affairs, and be signed by the writer's name in full. Five cents in coin had to be enclosed in the envelope which was not to be sealed. All letters were to be sent to the commanding general of the Department of Virginia at Fortress Monroe. To go to other points beyond the lines they were to contain ten cents.[96]

3. Generally

These special attempts to relieve Indiana soldiers in the field were supplemented constantly by general activities. Morton's agents and the officers of Indiana regiments were constantly sending information concerning conditions in the field and suggestions for relief.[97] But when the information was not forthcoming he did not hesitate to ask for it. On August 12, 1862, he inquired of General Banks for the names of those killed or wounded belonging to the Twenty-Seventh Indiana.[98] On October 3, 1862, he inquired of General Morgan the condition of the Thirty-Third and Forty-Nineth Regiments.[99] He urged doctors in the hospitals and agents in the field to call upon state organizations for assistance. He anticipated winter calls for food and clothing. He sent special agents to the field to discover what was needed and to report those needs to him or distribute the goods that had been placed in the permanent depots of the military agents. He established a place in Jeffersonville, Indiana, which gave to soldiers passing through the city a warm meal at no cost to themselves.[100]

Concerning the detailed work of Indiana military agents, R. R. Corson writing from Philadelphia said that they were to "keep the state accurately and frequently appraised of the condition and location of her every soldier in the hospital in this city. The state is enabled to answer questions asked by friends, correct desertions falsely reported, and check off discharges from the true date as no

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[93] Ibid., October 11, 1863.

[94] Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 5, 28, 1863; ibid., February 29, 1864.

[95] Ibid., December 28, 1863; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 349, and Appendix, p. 291.

[96] Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 24, 1863.

[97] General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 73, 77; General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 240; Reports of Special Agents (Indianapolis, 1863), pp. 1-68.

[98] Department Dispatches, vol, XV, p. 80.

[99] General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 19.

[100] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 5, 1864.

longer recipients of further State Bounty money . . . . . Letters of inquiry are given immediate attention and are answered in detail in each case after inquiry has been made." They reported the needs of soldiers in hospitals, and the condition of each, the number in the hospitals, transfers to other hospitals, etc.[101] Memorials of the dead were preserved and sent to friends or relatives. W. T. Dennis wrote from Washington, "it is not improper to remark that the duties of our agent at this point are not entirely restricted to the wants and care of those in the hospitals, but that all matters upon which information is desired by our citizens at home, or by those in the army at other points, very materially falls into this channel, and a very large number of letters from various parts of our state are to be attended to . . . ."[102]

Morton sent out special surgeons, agents, and relief expeditions to places needing them and at state expense. Mr. Merritt, a state agent in April, 1862, took to Savannah, Tennessee, by way of Louisville, a large amount of hospital supplies for the sick and wounded left in the region of Shiloh.[103] A special agent accompanied supplies and munitions to New Madrid in April, 1862.[104] Colonel W. E. Hollingsworth was sent in charge of expeditions to Shiloh in May,1862 1862.[105] Morton hired a special train to carry himself and suite from Indianapolis to Evansville on May 10, 1862.[106] on his way to Pittsburg Landing. He ordered a special train to carry sanitary stores and a relief party to the Ohio river for an expedition south on May,4, 1862.[107]

Indiana's relief extended not only to the sick demanding attention in the hospitals, but to carrying good cheer to the convalescent and able. Agent W. T. Dennis gave a Christmas dinner for Indiana patients in hospitals in Washington in 1862, Governor Morton being drawn upon for funds.[108]

In case it seemed that the men in the hospitals could not be restored to the service in a short time, the whole organization of the military agencies was thrown on the side of their being sent home for for treatment. In May, 1862, Governor Morton sent General K. F. Mansfield to Sherman's army to do what he could to have the sick and wounded sent to Indiana.[109] G. O. Jobes, military agent at Memphis, in September, 1863, assisted seventy furloughed men to reach their homes.[110]

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[101] Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 13, 1862.
[102] Ibid., June 5, 1862.
[103] General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 122.
[104] Ibid., p. 184.
[105] Ibid., pp. 228.
[106] Ibid., pp. 230, 231.
[107] Ibid., p. 216.
[108] General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 240, 254, 284, 285, 292, 294.
[109] Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, April 4, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 347.
[110] Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 173.

In March, 1863, W. R. Holloway obtained 148 furloughs for sick soldiers at St. Louis, had thirty-two discharged from the service and provided passes for them all.[111] In September, 1862, G. K. Steele and Governor Morton were in Louisville trying to secure discharges for sick Indiana soldiers there. At the same time Asahel Stone, Commissary General for Indiana, was travelling all over the war region for the same purpose.[112] In case these men could not be sent to Indiana, Morton tried to at least get them together in a place in which they could receive better care. Agents were instructed to this effect.[113]

The state issued passes to enable disabled men in the field to reach Indiana. They were being issued to military agents by William Hannaman in March, 1862.[114] At that time W. R. Holloway visited Cincinnati hospitals and gave passes home to fifty sick.[115] It was one of the duties of the state Commissary General to assist in procuring transportation for the sick and wounded in proper cases; and it was one of the duties of the general military agents to look after this phase of the work. Hence the passes were issued as Indiana military passes. Generally they were given to convalescent soldiers, to those who had received no pay and were furloughed or discharged without means for getting home, to female relatives or friends seeking a friend or relative but who had no money for travelling expenses,[116] and to those who for some reason were unable to get passes from the federal government. Funds were furnished by the state or by the Sanitary Commission, the various railroads charging the regular military rates for those traveling on pass.[117] They were evidently not necessarily intended to be paid for ultimately by the recipients. George O. Jobes, writing from Memphis on September 5, 1863, said "At first I gave it as a gift and merely took receipt for it, but the demand got to be so great that I had to get a statement from the person receiving the pass . . . that he would refund the money as soon as he should receive payment for his services in the army." And he added, "I shall collect these as long as I can without harshness."[118]

111. Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 7, 1862.
112. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 455; General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 149.
113. Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 12, 1862.
114. Ibid., March 17, 1862; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p.174.
115. Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 17, 1862.
116. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 291. Passes into southern territory, of course, had to be countersigned by the commanding generals there. Morton's statements were frequently not accepted by those generals, i.e., Boyle, Garfield, and Rosecrans, as is seen in Private Dispatches, vol. XVI, pp. 48, 49, 50, 90, 91, 108, 109, 194, 195. Morton wished to have this expense assumed by the federal government and was flatly refused. Ibid., pp. 147, 153.
117. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 346, and Appendix, p. 291.
118. Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 172.

Indiana agents were not only instrumental in securing passes for Indianans, but they also played the good Samaritan for hundreds of citizens of other states. Colonel Jason Ham, military agent at Louisville from 1863 to 1865, said that "had the agency not been able to get passes for citizens of the state, hundreds of men and women would have been detained for days and even then would have had to return without visiting their friends, as many had to do from other states," and continuing said the "thousands of citizens from other states had passes procurred for them by Indiana Agencies."[119] At Louisville it was the practice of the commandant to send all persons having no sufficient endorsement for a pass, to the Indiana agency to have their passes made correct. Citizens of Kentucky, Illinois, and Michigan often came to the Louisville agency for aid.[120]

Some 4,542 passes had been issued to the end of 1864. Of these 3,053 were issued to soldiers, 509 to soldiers' wives, 222 to nurses, 106 to special surgeons, 154 to military agents, and 109 to refugees on their way north. The average cost was about two dollars for each pass.[124] Late in the war when permanent hospitals had greatly improved the number of such passes was reduced.[125]

In the middle of April, 1862, W. R. Holloway made a tour of the hospitals in southern Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and the region of Pittsburg Landing to locate Indiana men, investigate their needs, and get as many of those disabled as possible sent to hospitals in Indiana.[126] The state paid the most of the cost of transportation.[127] He also visited Indiana regiments under General Pope following April 17, 1862,[128] to report health conditions, the condition of military equipment, and the men in the hospitals that should be sent home.[129] In June and August he visited Indiana regiments in the East and reported the conditions prevailing there.[130] Governor Morton sent Judge W. S. Holman as special agent to Missouri and Arkansas in March, 1862, to report conditions existing among the Indiana troops there.[131] He instructed W. R. Holloway at Pittsburg Landing[132] to have Colonel Gerber's remains sent home.[133] The body of Colonel Bass was sent to Ft. Wayne evidently through the same intervention.[134]

Morton also obtained additional hospital service. In March,1862,

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119. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 345.
120. Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 167.
124. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 346.
125. Ibid., p. 347.
126. General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 147, 152, 157.
127. Ibid.,p. 138.
128. Ibid., pp. 166, 167.
129. Ibid., pp. 171, 177.
130. Ibid., vol. IV, p. 37; Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 80.
131. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 94, 95, 97, 104.
132. General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 152, 153.
133. Ibid., p. 225.
134. Ibid., p. 159.

there were 200 sick and wounded soldiers at New Albany, Indiana.[135] There was no government hospital there. Governor Morton was in Washington; Holloway directed Mayor Barnett at Evansville to "Employ a good physician and get the largest and best house possible."[136] A hospital was fitted up.[137] Then came word from General Halleck that the men were at New Albany against his positive orders.[138] This caused some commotion, but finally the Medical Director at Louisville permitted those too sick to be removed to remain.[139] In December, 1862 Morton asked the Secretary of War to establish a United States hospital at Madison or reopen one at Evansville,[140] due to the number of soldiers to be cared for.[141]

From August to October, 1862, many Indianans were in the hospitals in the East. A special agent was sent to cooperate with the regular military agent and visit every hospital on the Patomac.[142] Another was sent in October to visit Indiana sick and wounded in the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry.[143] Morton himself visited hospitals and carried supplies to the territory around Washington in the same month.[144] In the middle of October W. H. H. Terrell visited Harper's Ferry and the battlefield at Antietam to investigate the condition of Indianans there.[145] It was at this time that Morton's private secretary inquired of Terrell, "Complaints are made from good sources about (W. H.) Dennis' financial matters. No reports or vouchers have been submitted by him. I hope you will look into this as you are aware of its importance. Does he really do any work or is (it) theory. (sic.)"[146] In February, 1863, Morton defended to Secretary Stanton the case of a surgeon in the Thirtieth Indiana who had been dismissed by General Sherman.[147]

The Governor's efforts to guarantee to the Sixty-Sixth Indiana advance pay and bounty in August and September, 1862, won from General W. Nelson the exclamation, "Would to God that Governors of other states would take the care of their soldiers that you do of all those of Indiana!"[148] Morton caused a paymaster to be stationed at Indianapolis to pay the large number of discharged and furloughed men there wanting their pay.[149] In June, 1862, General Sherman needed $25,000 to pay

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135. Ibid., pp. 102, 103.
136. Ibid., p. 103.
137. Ibid., p. 106.
138. Ibid., p. 107.
139. Ibid., p. 107.
140. General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 272.
141. Ibid., p. 273.
142. Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 296.
143. General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 16.
144. Ibid., p. 34.
145. Ibid., p. 102.
146. W. R. Holloway to W. H. H. Terrell, October 17, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. IX, p. 119.
147. Morton, Letters, vol. II, p. 202.
148. General Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 194-197.
149. Ibid., vol. III. pp. 210, 211.

troops but there was no money in sight from the federal government. Through an agent, Governor Morton deducted that amount from funds due for ammunition supplied to the United States, turned it over to them,[150] and waited for the money until the federal government was in a position to pay.[151]

The Governor was always anxious to get his men out of southern prison camps as soon as he could to save them from disease and get them back into active service as soon as possible. To accomplish this purpose he continuously corresponded with federal officials in charge of that business[152] and sometimes succeeded in his purpose and at times he met with gruff, curt replies that anything he could do would not hasten things in the least, since they insisted they were doing as much as they could to secure exchanges.[153]

Under General Order No. 72 from the War Department, and according to an order from the Commissary General of Prisoners of War, paroled prisoners from Indiana regiments could not be sent to camp at Indianapolis; General Wright refused to grant Morton's wish to have them sent to the Indianapolis camp because they were supposed to go to the military camp at Columbus, Ohio.[154]

He demanded of Secretary Stanton that a camp for paroled prisoners be established at Indianapolis, and complained that the poor treatment of men there caused much discontent and induced them to take "French leave" to escape the torture of staying there.[155] He assured Stanton that Indianapolis could care for them better than any other place.[156] But Stanton firmly refused because it induced "shameful surrenders",[157] and some warm letters were exchanged which ended in Morton being partly victorious, as orders were issued which gave these men twenty days parole if they wished it.[158] Not satisfied with this concession the Governor wanted to get those at Chicago sent to Indianapolis; six days later he renewed his agitation to remove the men at Camp Chase as well. Stanton evidently grew weary of being stormed by telegrams, and beset by Morton's special agents, for on October 22, he promised to have the men sent to Indianapolis if possible.[159] This

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150. Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 36, 44, 46, 47. Other instances of his efforts to get pay due to the troops are found in ibid., vol. IX, pp. 177, 181, 220, 257.
151. General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 110, 118, 260; ibid., vol. IV, p. 36.
152. Ibid., vol. IX, pp. 58, 87, 114, 302; ibid., vol. XV, pp. 266,308.
153. Official Records, Series II, vol. IV, pp. 522, 623.
154. General Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 274, 275.
155. Ibid., p. 286.
156. Morton to Colonel William Hoffman, May 29, 1863, Private Dispatches, vol. XVI, pp. 122, 204.
157. E. M. Stanton to O. P. Morton, September 22, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 287.
158. Ibid., pp. 107, 287, 290, 291.
159. Ibid,, pp. 111, 320, 321.

was not done even though Morton continued to remind him of the fact every week or so for a month longer.[160] This is another instance of the tenacity of purpose with which the Governor stuck to his plans even when he had appealed to the last resort. Early in 1863 Morton renewed his demands and in May was rewarded by partial success when Burnside ordered a few of this class of prisoners to be sent to Indiana.[161]

The Governor's experience with the regular hospital service of the army after the battles of Fort Donelson and Pittsburg Landing made him extremely fearful of soldiers' relief in such emergencies. He had sent much special relief, but it was of a purely temporary nature. He wanted it to be more permanent.[162] On April 11, 1862, he asked Secretary Stanton for permission to raise a corps of volunteer surgeons. Stanton immediately replied that such "large provision has already been made for medical attendance that I must wait for report from General Halleck and if more be needed will give you notice and instructions." [163] But Morton was not to be put off by so soft an answer. On April 21, 1862, he again sent a telegram to Stanton, saying, "That a great battle is pending at Corinth, is evident. Before additional surgical aid can reach the field from any quarter, five or six days will elapse. Meanwhile the wounded must suffer immensely. So it was at Donelson and Pittsburg. Indiana has at least twenty-four Regiments before the enemy. I propose to send at once to each of them two additional surgeons, and respectfully request authority from you to do so. I regard this as an absolute necessity."[164]

P. H. Watson, assistant secretary of war, replied: "You have Authority to send to each of the Indiana Regiments on the field in Tennessee, Two Additional Surgeons."[165] Competent surgeons were im-

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160. Ibid., vol. XVI, pp. 4, 24, 34. In June 1863, he secured the consent of General Burnside that paroled men at Camp Chase be sent home. Private Dispatches, No. 16, p. 230. For other correspondence in 1862 and 1863, see ibid., pp. 194, 195, and 210; Department Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 274, 275.
161. General Dispatches, vol. XVI, pp. 122, 194, 195, 210.
162. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 351; O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, April 11, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 130. See also Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 351, and Appendix p. 345. New York had been granted this permission. At the beginning of the war, one surgeon and one assistant-surgeon were allowed each regiment. Their services were sometimes required at hospitals, or on detached duty; or if they were sick or resigned, the regiment might be, and at times was, without any medical attendance whatever. The small medical force was especially noticeable after a battle.
163. Ibid., Appendix, pp. 345, 351.
164. Ibid., p. 351, and Appendix, p. 345; Morton to E. M. Stanton, April 21, 1862; Official Records, Series III, vol. II, p. 24; General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 172.
165. P. H. Watson to O. P. Morton, April 21, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, p. 346; Official Records, Series III, vol. II, p. 24; General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 173.

mediately appointed to stay with regiments for any length of time, not only in Tennessee, but also in Kentucky, and permission for doing the same was obtained.[166] Requests for permission to send medical aid became quite common in 1863 and 1864; [167] seventy additional surgeons were dispatched to Indiana regiments.[168] They were gladly received by the men in the field and did good service during the rest of the war.[169]

When some of these surgeons were sent to the field there was no provision for their pay except through the Sanitary Commission. So much money was being paid out of this fund that it was necessary, as well as expedient, to have them paid by the War Department if possible.[170] Morton asked Senator Wright to "Urge this upon the Secretary of War. All important, will save the lives of hundreds of soldiers."[171] When Morton wrote the war department on June 14, 1862, on this subject, he received word that the matter had been referred to the Paymaster General. This official said that "the Pay Department can only pay military officers authorized by some statute, and the law organizing the Volunteer forces expressly limits the number of Assistant Surgeons to each Regiment to one."[172]

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166. Ibid., pp. 176, 177, 253; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp.350,352.
167. Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 30, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, pp. 78-79; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, October 27, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 351; Private Dispatches, vol. XVI, pp. 69, 76, 79, 118, 202, 203, 204, 205. During 1862 and 1863 "there was hardly a single general engagement that did not require the services of special surgeons, nurses and means of relief; and they were furnished by our state . . . ." Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 350.
168. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 166; Indianaplois Daily Journal, January 7, 1863.
169. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 351. "The health of the regiment (36th at Murfreesboro) is about the average . . . . The superior Sanitary condition is due to the efficiency of the recently appointed Assistant-Surgeons". Rev. A. W. Sanford, Chaplain, in Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 19, 1863.
170. Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 11, 1863.
171. O. P. Morton to Jos. A. Wright, April 26, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 182.
172. Money paid special surgeons and not consented to by military auditing board was as follows for 1862:

Apr.	10	J. S. Bobbs	$ 17.00	33d Regiment at Crab Orchard,Ky.
Apr.	23	Dr. J. C. Rooke	23.00	Mound City, Illinois
Apr.	24	R. A. Houghton	30.00	Pittsburg Landing
Aug.	25	L. Dunlap	100.00	Examining disabled soldiers
Sept.	18	Delaney Wiley	150.00	Army on Potomac
Oct.	20	E. W. Leech	115.00	Visiting Seventy-Sixth Regiment
Oct.	22	Delaney Wiley	57.10	Hospitals East
Oct.	29	W. B. Fletcher	20.00	Exp. surgeons in Kentucky
Nov.	3	J. S. Bobbs	44.00	Visiting troops
Nov.	12	F. S. Newcomer	27.00	Perryville, Kentucky

For services and expenses of special surgeons visiting hospitals

Since this way to the Federal Treasury was effectively blocked, Morton again wrote General Buckingham and had the matter referred to the Surgeon General, and had the satisfaction of getting his reply: "The Surgeon General will approve these contracts, and their bills can then be paid by any Quartermaster, Paymaster, or disbursing Officer. The regulations limit the allowance to $100 per month." 173 Other special surgeons were ordinarily allowed from $100 to $150 per month by the state for their services, when any charge was made.174 Much money was paid directly by Morton from the Financial Bureau. Services and expenses of special surgeons visiting hospitals and regiments from April 10, 1861, to November 12, 1862, amounted to $2,103.85. 175 $11,728.91 was paid for this purpose from April 18, 1863, to April 30, 1864, of course some of this money came from the State Treasury.176

This movement agitated by Morton was very instrumental in causing Congress to pass an act on July 2, 1862, which provided that instead of having one assistant surgeon for each regiment, there should be two and that the President appoint forty surgeons and one hundred and twenty assistant-surgeons, of volunteers who should have "the rank, pay and emoluments of officers of corresponding grades in the regular army".177 Word was sent Morton on July 23, 1862, that the contract between him and his special surgeons should terminate immediately as Congress had provided for this, but the Governor's plan of sending additional surgeons continued.178 A letter written by George Merritt on June 1, 1864, from Chattanooga shows such conditions as influenced Morton to do this.179 During the latter part of 1864, there

and regiments from April 10, 1861, to November 12, 1862, was paid $2,103. 85; and from April 18, 1863 to April 30, 1864, $11,728.91. There was paid from State Treasury $13,832.76. Documentary Journal, 1863, part II, pp. 37-43.

173. C. P. Buckingham to O. P. Morton, July 23, 1862.
174. Terrell, Report, Vol. I, Appendix, pp. 291-2.
175. Documentary Journal, 1863, part II, pp. 37-43.
176. Ibid., 1864, part I, p. 10.
177. U. S. Statutes at Large, 1862, Chap. 127; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 352.
178. Ibid., p. 352.
179. ". . . . the first ambulance train was just coming in from the front some twenty-five miles away, and in two hours, 1,200 wounded men from the twentieth army corps (Hooker's) were there to be unloaded, fed, wounds dressed, etc., and only six hospital tents to put them in, and no previous preparation, or, at least, no adequate preparation, for caring for them; and as they had been in ambulances all night and day, and the nurses and drivers who came with them were all worn out and only anxious to get rid of their charge before dark, you may imagine there was some confusion, and an immensity of suffering, from every imaginable kind of wounds, that had been broiled all day in the hot sun, and pounded all day over bad roads, in the ambulances, until every other part not wounded was bruised and sore! The mountain of suffering seemed so big that it seemed useless to attempt to alleviate it by removing one at a time,

was an average of fifty nurses on the field under the supervision of the Sanitary Commission.

In May, 1863, George O. Jobes, Indiana military agent, reported that there were sixteen female nurses in the hospitals in Memphis.[180] In January, 1865, there were fifty in the service of the Commission, and from January, 1863, to April, 1864, there were about ninety-five in the service.[181] Miss C. Annette Buckel was superintendent of female nurses for 1864, and was very successful in her work among them around Louisville.[182] They did hospital work and distributed sanitary stores. Others were at Paducah, Nahsville, Bowling Green,[183] and Murfreesboro. Many more volunteered than were accepted; only one-third of those offering to go to Nashville in January, 1863, were given permission to do so. To get into the service they sent their names, with references, to William Hannaman from whom they, if found qualified, received their appointment and directions as to when and where to report. In case they were not needed at the time of making the application, they were kept on record and notified when they were wanted.[184] They were paid, when such payment was asked for, from the funds of the Commission, or from the Indiana military contingent Fund, They traveled on the regular passes issued by the Commission.[185]

> but as that was the only way, I pulled off my coat, and reported at once to the Surgeon in charge, and was soon engaged among the ambulances, sorting out the amputations, to put among the tents, which only held about half of that class. All the rest had their choice, to stay all night in the ambulances, or lay on the ground without shelter, and most of them preferred the ground. While the ambulances were being unloaded . . . . were busy getting tea and coffee prepared by the barrel . . . by ten o'clock we had them all fed, and I went to work to assist the surgeons at dressing the wounds but soon found that some were without surgeons, either because they were entirely worn out, or because of some misunderstanding, thinking that the surgeons at the post were to take charge of them as soon as they arrived . . . . there was none to care for them; and to this class I turned my attention, dressing such wounds as I could, and begging some surgeon to attend to such as I could not; but still hundreds of cases had to remain undressed, most of whom after a while were worn out with calling for help and fell asleep. Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, pp. 181-182.

[180] Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 9, 1862; ibid., May 14, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 175.

[181] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 354.

[182] Ibid., p. 79.

[183] Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 29, February 6, and October 10, 1863.

[184] Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February 2, 1863.

[185] Documentary Journal, 1865, part II, p. 174; ibid., 1863, part II, p. 41.

IX. CARE FOR SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS WITHIN THE STATE

1. State Institutions

SUCH WERE THE EFFORTS OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATION to aid those enrolled in the military forces in the fied . But the state institutions, soldiers, soldiers' families and other relatives also called for their share of special support, since the General Assembly of 1863 failed to make appropriations for defraying expenses arising from those sources. The state institutions standing in need of financial assistance were those for the blind, the deaf and dumb, the insane, and those for criminals. The means for their support was furnished through the activities of the Financial Bureau as is explained in Chapter X.

The Institute for the Blind housed eighty persons early in 1863; during the year sixteen more were brought in. About forty were employed in making brooms, brushes, carpets, doormats, etc., and so contributed quite materially to the upkeep of the home.[1] Close economy was practiced but a few improvements were necessary.[2] At the end of the fiscal year, May 1, 1864, it was found that Morton had contributed $20,304. for its support.[3]

The Institute for the Deaf and Dumb had exhausted its appropriations for 1861 by May, 1863, and in order to keep the inmates from being turned back upon the counties or upon relatives, as was done in 1857, the administration supplied $25,000 to keep it going until May, 1864.[4] It had to supply funds until the following September, when the State Treasury, seeing that its game of obstruction was not a success, began paying the bills.[5] During this time the average attendance was 152.

The Hospital for the Insane was in much the same conditoin financially. To prevent the closing of its doors and returning its inmates to county jails and poor houses, or to relatives, Morton furnished the means for its support, which for the year ending October1, 1863, amounted to $16,568;[7] to the end of the next year he had supplied an additional $47,709 from the Financial Bureau.[8]

The finances of the Northern Prison were in even worse condition. In addition to being left without funds for the future, it had under-

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1. Ibid., pp. 15-16; Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 10, 1863.
2. Ibid., July 30, 1863.
3. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 13-14, 722, 731.
4. Ibid., 1863, pp. 293-294; ibid., 1864-1865, part I, p. 14; Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 20, 1863.
5. Ibid., August 20, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, p. 581.
6. Ibid., p. 14.
7. Ibid., 1863, pp. 328, 331; ibid., 1864-1865, part I, pp. 21-22.
8. Ibid., pp. 381-385.

taken some necessary improvements. The law demanded that all convicts sent to a penitentiary from counties north of the National road be confined at Michigan City, hence there was no doubt but that it had to be kept open. Morton advised the prison board to use the strictest economy and send him estimates of the amount that would be necessary for its year.[9] This was done; necessary construction work was continued, but only by making contracts dependent on future appropriations for payment for the work.[10]

On the $36,000 required for operating the institution to May, 1864, Morton furnished one-half; convict labor brought $13,600; the United States furnished $2,100 for keeping federal prisoners; and the state furnished $2,300.[11] Such was the quality of the upkeep that even a Democratic newspaper conceded that the buildings were neat and clean and the prisoners well cared for.[12]

The Southern Prison, being already in running order was better able to continue without aid from the Financial Bureau or from the legislature.[13] Receipts from convict labor to December, 1863, amounting to $19,000, added to the $15,700 advanced by the state, was sufficient to cover its expenses until that date,[14] even though prices had risen from 100 to 500 per cent, and the convicts were working on contracts made two years before.[15] In December the warden, D. W. Miller, called on the Governor for $4,000 with which to lay in the annual supply of meat while prices were lowest, and he would also save by paying cash.[16] The prison board thought with that assistance, the institution would be able to sustain itself.[17] However, at the end of 1864, it was in debt $11,700.[18] The State Superintendent of Public Instruction was given assistance for office help and traveling expenses. This amounted to $1,000.[19]

The funds for the institutions were furnished as needed, but the officials in charge had difficulty in getting their salaries. In October, 1864, when they heard that the espenses of the state printer had been paid by the State Treasurer under a law of 1852, they made application for reimbursement under the same law and the bills were allowed.[20] Payments were made on itemized accounts of expenses after

[9] Ibid., p. 14-15.
[10] Ibid., pp. 777-779; ibid., 1863, p. 409.
[11] Ibid., pp. 109, 470, 608, 612.
[12] Plymouth Democrat, quoted in Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, December 16, 1863.
[13] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 10-11, 15.
[14] Ibid., 1863, pp. 355, 479; ibid., 1864-1865, part I, p. 15.
[15] Ibid., 1863, p. 352; ibid., 1864-1865, part I, pp. 571, 776-777.
[16] Ibid., 1863, p. 352; ibid., 1864-1865, part I, pp. 15, 798.
[17] Ibid., p. 15.
[18] Ibid., pp. 80-81.
[19] Ibid., pp. 10-11, 22, 23, 33, 70, 461, 464.
[20] Ibid., pp. 294-295, 572, 581.

they had been certified by the supervising officer of the institution. When receipted by the claimants, these vouchers were paid. The checks when cashed were taken up at the end of the month, attached to their vouchers and laid away to be used for future reference if necessary.[21]

2. Ladies' Home, Soldiers' Home, Camp Bakery, Etc.

Women and children were coming to Indianapolis almost constantly during the early years of the war. During the winter of 1863-1864 almost every train brought wives, mothers, or sisters in search of relatives in the army. Many of them had never been in the city before, and were totally unacquainted with the place and the enticements that were placed in their way. These women did not know where to go and were often ill-used, or at times robbed of the scant funds they had brought with them. Then too, many had not provided themselves with enough money to continue their journey if the object of their search was not found at once, or to remain many days at the hotels.

These people repeatedly called upon Governor Morton for advice and financial aid; the Quartermaster's Department and the Sanitary Commission were also appealed to for such assistance and usually granted it by paying hotel bills and some other expenses. These claims became so frequent and urgent that Morton called William Hannaman, President of the State Sanitary Commission, and Asahel Stone into consultation to find whether means could be devised to furnish a free home for such persons while spending a few days in the city, in which they could be looked after as relatives of soldiers should be cared for, and where they could find their information without having to search for it in the street or elsewhere.[22]

They agreed on a general plan, but details of execution were left to William Hannaman and Asahel Stone. They secured a two story brick tenement on South Illinois Street, about two blocks south of the Union Station. It was well furnished for the purpose and the expense was borne by the Sanitary Commission and the Quartermaster's Department, each paying one-half. The rent of the house was $500 a year up to December 1; after that date, it was $1,000 per year. A Captain Wilcox, who was a member of the Invalid Corps. and his wife were steward and housekeeper.[23] They occupied the basement, leaving fourteen rooms for the visitors. Later, Lieutenant J. G. Greenwald and wife had these duties.

A register was kept showing the name, residence, nativity, and dates of arrival and departure of visitors. A soldier of good reputation was always on duty at the Union Station to meet trains, to discover who were the relatives of soldiers, and to conduct them to the

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21. Ibid., pp. 8-9, gives W. H. Terrell's account of the methods used.
22. Ibid., pp. 214-216; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, September 22, 1864; Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 23, 1876.
23. Ibid., November 16, 1863, April 2, and June 2, 1864; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 214-216. There is a good summary in Terrell, I, pp. 454-458.

Home.[24] In the year following December, 1863, an average of seventy-five women and forty children were cared for each month. In April, 1864, some 1,200 meals were served.[25]

The Soldiers' Home

The large number of soldiers passing through Indianapolis to and from the front, or going there to secure discharges and furloughs, made it necessary to make some provision for their entertainment. It was necessary too, because these men, in some cases, were wounded and in such condition that a hot bath and good meal were prerequisites for saving their lives. During the first months of the war, man were posted at the Union Station to supply passing troops with food, and others had been employed to take care of those sick in the hotels of the city. This plan was both invonvenient and very expensive and had to be given up.[26]

Then a camp was established on vacant ground south of the depot, where hospital tents were fitted up with bunks. Meals were furnished at some of the hotels until June, 1862, when the amount of business and large expense occasioned by inadequate facilities for such work caused plans for improvement to be agitated.[27] Governor Morton urged them to completion. He caused the general government to order Asahel Stone, Quartermaster-General, to erect a building at United States expense.[28] It was placed in a grove near White River on the west side of West Street and the canal, north of the machine shops of the Terre Haute railroad, and south of the Vandalia railroad.

Work on the building continued from June until August, when it was formally opened.[29] It was a frame building 150 feet long by 24 feet wide. About two-thirds of it was fitted up at the expense of the State Sanitary Commission with beds arranged three tiers high with a wide aisle between them. The rest of this main building was used for a dining hall. A kitchen and store room combined, 24 feet square, and attached to the main building, was also erected; the stoves, kitchen utensils, etc., were supplied by the Quartermasters' Department.[30] Three men were constantly kept busy at cooking, and waiting on tables; all other work was done by inmates of the Home. The Commissary De-

[24] Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 21, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 214-216.

[25] Ibid., pp. 214-216; and Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 366-367, summarize the work of the Ladies' Home.

[26] Holloway, Indianapolis and Marion County, p. 316; Documentary Journal, 1863, p. 9.

[27] Ibid., p. 9; ibid., 1864-1865, part II, pp. 210-214. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 362-366 summarized the establishment and work of the Home.

[28] Sulgrove, Indianapolis and Marion County, p. 316; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 210-214.

[29] Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 12, 1862; Holloway, Indianapolis, pp. 119, 316.

[30] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 210-214; Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 11, 1862.

partment furnished foods such as meat, flour, coffee, sugar, rice, beans, molasses, and vinegar, but furnished no vegetables. They were either furnished by the State Sanitary Commission, or supplied from its stores, or came from neighborhood contributions.[31]

Governor Morton was at the head of the Home; under him worked Superintendent George H. Merritt, with his assistants. They saw that the proper food was furnished and that the sick were properly cared for. The building had been open but ten days when it was caring for 150 men.[32]

But the number of soldiers arriving at the Home soon taxed its capacity for comfortable accomodation. To relieve the congestion, the general government, at Morton's suggestion, erected a dining hall early in the winter of 1862. It was 250 feet long by 24 feet wide, and had two side rooms, each 24 feet square, one for an office, and one for a kitchen. The furniture and fixtures of this building, like the former one, were supplied by the Quartermaster's Department. Three tables were arranged running nearly the whole length of the building. It could accomodate about 1,000 soldiers. The federal government erected another building in 1863, 150 feet long by 24 feet wide, which was used as a hospital. A large portion of the interior of this building, together with the furniture, was supplied by the Quartermaster's Department.

Sleeping quarters were still inadequate and a movement was set on foot in July, 1863, to add to these facilities. The sum of $2,000 had been offered for this purpose at that time; in September the general government refused to increase the amount. The buildings were not erected then, but in December, 1863, James A. Ekin, working on the basis of using the $2,000 offer, advertised for bids for a building 175 feet long by 24 feet wide. Large numbers of soldiers were going through Indianapolis during the early months of 1864. They generally remained in the city from two to fifteen days. In anticipation of overcrowding the buildings, Asahel Stone on February 17, 1864, gave a warning of a future need for enlarged sleeping quarters, and offered to pay for the buildings out of the profits of the Bakery. In April and May he erected two buildings near the others, each 175 feet by 28 feet, with two rows of bunks, three tiers high in each. Each building accomodated 500 men and cost about $2,000.[33]

With these facilities, the Home could lodge from 1,500 to 1,800 men, and feed 8,000 a day.[34] In August, 1862, 20,931 meals were

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31. Ibid., July 11, 1862.
32. Ibid., August 12, 1862; Documentary Journal, 1862-1863, part II, p. 808.
33. Ibid., 1864-1864, part II, pp. 210-214.
34. Ibid., p. 210-214; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 27, February 6, 11, 1864; Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 9, 16, April 3, and July 17, 1863; January 28, February 9, and April 2, 1864.

served; in September, 58,140; in October, 58,744; and in November, 41,427.[35] In June, 1863, the Home furnished 55,934 meals.[36] From August 1, 1862, to June, 1865, it furnished 3,777,791 meals, and during 1864, it furnished an average of 4,498 meals per day.[37]

Periodicals magazines, books, and papers were given the men for reading material. The men themselves made the bookcases, and by June, 1864, had collected 100 volumes of standard books which were highly appreciated.[38] In November, 1863, it was announced that a prayer meeting thirty minutes long would be held each day.[39]

Many classes of soldiers found ready welcome at the Home: The sick and wounded, navy recruits, men going through the city from any state to any location, and prisoners of war. Even refugees from the South got rations there.[40] Receptions for public men and homecoming regiments were held there. To March 2, 1864, 167,908 soldiers had been cared for by the Soldiers' Home.[41]

The Camp Bakery

Another instance of Morton's extra-legal care for the men by using the limited means at hand is that of the Post Bakery at Camp Morton. This Bakery had been in operation for several months before September 1, 1862, under the management of a committeeof commissioned officers, but had failed to pay for itself. It was believed by parties who were somewhat conversant with bakeries connected with the army that, with judicious management, large profits could be made.[42] Morton was one of these and, on September 1, 1862, acting through the Quartermaster's Departemnt, he took charge of it. Three ove had already been built from the profits of the prisoner's fund, and had a capacity of from 6,000 to 7,000 loaves per day. He immediately increased this to 12,000 by putting up new buildings and an additional oven at an expense of $573.74, which was paid for out of the profits.

This enlargement was made because the demand for its product frequently reached the 12,000 loaf limit. The net profits for the Bakery for the rest of the year of 1862 averaged $2,000 a month. With this

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35. Ibid., 1864-1865, part II, p. 808.
36. Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 25, 1863.
37. Holloway, Indianapolis, p. 119.
38. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 9, 1863, and June 28, 1864.
39. In 1865 the Home was made a permanent institution, based on Governor Morton's proclamation of May 15, 1865. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 368-372.
40. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, April 1, August 18, 24, 26, September 2, 15, and November 3, 28, 1864; Democratic Pharos, July 19, 1865; Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 22, and August 17, 1863.
41. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 3, 1864. Terrell, I (1960), 460-465, gives account also of care for refugees, soldiers' children and their education.
42. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 207-210. Terrell, Report, I (1960 Report), 448-536, has an account of the bakery.

money were procured stoves and other necessaries for the soldiers' quarters and regimental hospitals, which could not be procured from the government or by any other menas except by the state or private contributions. Vouchers for all money expended from this fund were carefully kept, subject to such disposition as Morton or the General Assembly might see fit to make.[43]

Morton's taking charge of the enterprise was entirely experimental, but how well his anticipations and those of the friends of the project have been verified the following figures show. The gross receipts from all sources in connection with the bakery from September 1 1862, to January 1, 1865, were $71,691. Money expended for payment of laborers, repairs, the new oven, wood, and for various other expenditures connected with the establishment amounted to $29,879; expenditures for stoves, tinware, materials for repairing barracks, for two buildings erected at the Soldiers' Home, etc., all of which were approved by the auditing committee, amounted to $30,893. The amount paid Fletcher and Sharpe, bankers, for discounts on checks for United States certificates of indebtedness was $1,030, leaving on hand on January 1, 1865, $9,898 belonging to the bakery fund.

The profits of the Bakery came from flour furnished, on proper requisition, by Captain Thomas Foster; the Commissary of Subsistency and the Bakery delivered to the soldiers the amount of bread that the army regulations allowed them. At the end of each month, the Bakery found it had a surplus of flour on hand amounting to about one-third of the amount furnished. The commissary of subsistence purchased this surplus from the Bakery at the price fixed by the flour contract existing between that ofifce and the party furnish it. At times the commissary received these payments in certificates of indebtedness, which were discounted at from two and one-half to four and one-half per cent when they were cashed. This fund was of incalculable advantage to the Department, as out of it were supplied stores for barracks in Camps Carrington, Sullivan, Shanks, in Noble Barracks, and portions of Camps Morton and Burnside. It has also furnished carpenters' tools and nails for building and repairing barracks, as well as the entire supply of coffee mills, tin buckets, and frying pans, for all the volunteers and drafted men raised in the state after October, 1862. These articles were almost indispensible to the soldier, but were not furnished under any circumstances by the general government, nor did it, until late in the war, furnish soldiers with plates, knives, and forks, tin cups and spoons; and until that time, Inidana's troops were supplied with those articles also, at the expense of this fund.

From the same source, after March 1, 1864, Laz Noble was enabled to meet the monthly pay roll of all hands employed in and about the state armory; its entire expense of fuel, lights, repairs, and incidentals of various sorts . also after September 1, 1862, his own salary and those of his clerks and assistants, besides urgent claims of still earlier date, amounting to several hundred dollars. It will thus be perceived that the Bakery fund answered the important negative purpose of not adding to the financial embarrassment under which the

[43] Ibid., pp. 808-809.

legislature of 1863 placed Morton by its failure to make the necessary appropriations for the state. But for this fund, Morton would have been subjected to the onerous task of raising large sums of money to meet the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the Commissary Department.

The Bakery also did something in the way of benefaction, having furnished, from August 1, 1864, to January 1, 1865, 18,353 loaves of bread gratuitously to families of soldiers residing in and around the city, who in many cases were almost destitute of the necessaries of life. The money value of the bread thus distributed, if reckoned at six cents per loaf, the contract price of flour, amounted to $1,098. A record of the names of the soldiers whose families were thus supplied, with their companies and regiments, and also names of their wives and children, with the daily allowance to each family, was preserved for inspection in the Commissary General's office.

The administration also furnished 1,350 loaves of bread valued at $74.25 in August, 1864, to an encampment of the Marion County regiment of the Indiana Legion. The bread thus furnished to the families of soldiers and to the Marion County regiment, did not enter into any of the credits in favor of the Bakery, but amounted to a donation, not appearing on the books of the office, but only in the monthly reports of the superintendent.[44]

Care For Soldiers' Families

In August, 1861, Governor Morton began active preparation for aiding the families of soldiers in the field,[45] but not much was done and comparatively little needed to be done during the first winter, as comparatively few men had been called to the army and the country was fairly prosperous. By August, 1862, however, the situation began to take on a different aspect. Captain Herman Sturm, of the Indiana Arsenal,[46] made recommendations that all employees contribute six to ten per cent of their wages to the support of families of volunteers.[47] Soldiers' aid committees were formed over the state to receive contributions and distribute them where needed most, and officials of other cities over the state were performing the same duties.[48] Individual contributions varied from ten to one hundred dollars.

[44] Ibid., pp. 207-210.

[45] Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 23, 1876; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 354-359; see also for soldiers' families and orphans. This was based on a law of May 11, 1861, authorizing boards of commissioners of counties, and city and town authorities, to make appropriations for relief of soldiers' families and for military supplies. Terrell, I, Appendix, 255.

[46] Indianapolis Daily Journal, August 11, 25, 28, 1862.

[47] Ibid., August 28, 1862.

[48] Ibid., November 11, 1862.

The movement got its real impetus when Governor Morton called on the people of Indiana to rally to the support of those in distress when he said that there were "on November 15, 1862, over 100,000 soldiers in the field, and thousands have left families with only temporary provision for their support. Some are too spirited to ask for assistance and others will not know where to apply. The soldiers' pay is often long delayed, and his own necessities require a portion of it, and the remainder is frequently delayed in transmission home. His salary is only $156 a year and this makes a very scanty support for a family. There is not much chance for employment. Everything is on a cash basis. Patriotic citizens of Indiana must apply the proper remedy." He declared that crops had been good and that there was no reasonable excuse for allowing the poor to suffer. To get the movement started and organized, he urged that in every locality in the state, some systematic plans, by means of regularly organized commission or auxiliary aid societies, be adopted at once. He suggested that township trustees, since they were familiar with local affairs, give a portion of their time and efforts to relieving the needy and destitute.[49] This was done and families supplied with food, fuel, clothing, etc.[50]

Ministers of Indianapolis called for aid from the clergy, county commissioners, township trustees, and private citizens.[51] Railroads volunteered to haul wood free of charge from outlying districts to Indianapolis and sell it at cost to those unable to pay more, or pay the prices demanded by the regular dealers. The State Bakery furnished bread free of charge to soldiers' families in need, to the value of $6,354.[52] The soldiers' aid committee at Lafayette furnished 300 cords of wood for the use of soldiers' families.[53] Marion County commissioners passed resolutions which provided for the appointment of a committee of five to find out the number of soldiers' families in need, and to raise and distribute aid to all needing it. They instructed the central committee to cooperate with the county commissioners, and township trustees in supplying such aid. By December, 1862, these county commissioners had appropriated $21,761.87 for this purpose and for bounties.[54] The Indianapolis benevolent society collected and distributed $1,033 before November 29, 1862; thirty-six soldiers' wives receiving clothing, and 106 families receiving other aid.[55]

The same thing was done during the next winter, and much the same organization was used.[56] Late in October, 1863, Governor Morton again

[49] Ibid., November 15, 1862.

[50] Vevay Reveille, December 18, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, October 28, 1862.

[51] Indianaplois Daily Journal, December 1, 1862.

[52] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 359.

[53] Indianaplois Daily Journal, November 11, 1862.

[54] Ibid., December 8, 1862; the appropriation itself was strictly legal. Indiana Statutes, 1861, Special Seesion, Chap. XII, Sec. I.

[55] Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 29, 1862; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 255.

[56] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, December 11, 1863.

called the attention of the public to its duty of making liberal and timely provision for the relief of destitute families. Crops had been a partial failure; labor was scarce; and thousands of families were unprovided with sufficient food, clothing, and fuel. Again the Governor asked that an efficient committee in each war dand township be selected at once with as many assistants and sub-committees as might be necessary to care for the emergencies. They were to find out the number of families in each district requiring aid, and estimate the quantity, kind, and cost of all supplies needed during the winter. He urged township trustees to assist, and ministers to present the matter to their congregations and cooperate with the central committees.[57] The appeal had the desired effect; organizations were formed and plans were successfully carried out. On December 9, about eighty wagons loaded with wood for fuel were brought into Logansport to relieve those short of fuel.[58] Again the railroads cooperated by reducing rates, and carrying the various contributions.[59]

Farmers in other localities organized to haul wood for fuel to the towns; in Indianapolis it was distrubuted by Mayor Caven by order of the city council.[60] This council also appealed to farmers to bring potatoes, apples, flour, meal, beans, meat, etc., and special days were set aside for general programs and contributions. Governor Morton was a frequent speaker on such days.[61] The special festivities of the holidays were made the occasions for raising contributions of various kinds; the women of Indianapolis raised $10,000 at Thanksgiving time in 1863. [62]

Marion County commissioners in December, 1863, appropriated $3,000 to aid the poor, of which $1,000 was for buying fuel.[63] The General Assembly of 1863, in its great anxiety to defend the constitution from all encroachments, and in other political squabbles, had of course neglected to make appropriations for the poor. The legislature of 1865 had some time to assist in alleviating conditions. At the suggestion of the Governor, it appropriated eight dollars a month to the wife or mother dependent upon a soldier, and for each child under the age of twelve years, gave an additional two dollars a month, [64] funds to be supplied by a pecial tax of thirty cents on each $100 of property value in the state. The State Sanitary Commission furnished $4,566,898 for the relief of soldiers' families, and soldiers disabled by disease or wounds.[65]

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57. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, October 28, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, November 4, 1863.
58. Democratic Pharos, December 16, 1863.
59. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, November 12, 1863.
60. Ibid., November 6, December 2, 1863.
61. Ibid., October 28, 1863.
62. Ibid., December 3, 1863.
63. Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 4, 1863.
64. Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chap. VII; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 359.
65. Sulgrove, Indianapolis and Marion County, p. 317..

3. Soldiers' Cemeteries and Monuments

Numbers of Union Soldiers had been dying in the vicinity of Indianapolis since the first part of the war. Early in 1863 some of the leading men of the state began to make definite plans for securing a soldiers' burial ground. Morton, in an open letter published on May 26, 1863, explained that he wished to buy a 100-acre tract of land near Indianapolis for this purpose, and proposed that subscription books be opened in each county in the state to secure the necessary funds.[66]

The proposal aroused much opposition in various parts of the state on the part of those favoring the plan of establishing county cemeteries, if special ones were to be started.[67] But a meeting of a number of the leading citizens of Indianapolis was held in the Senate chamber on June 1 to start to raise the money to purchase the ground. The meeting resulted in the appointment of a committee consisting of Alfred Harrison, James M. Ray, John Love, Theodore P. Haughey, and Albert G. Porter.[68] No success was realized for some time, but finally the board of directors of the Crown Hill Cemetery offered a plot of ground valued at $5,000 to the state and general government for the burial of the Union men, who had died while on duty near the city, and for a final resting place for those who had been buried in the old cemetery on Kentucky Avenue.

The offer was promptly accepted by Governor Morton on the part of the State and by the Assistant Quartermaster on the part of the federal government. Congress appropriated $5,000 to defray the expense of moving those buried in other cemeteries. By the autumn of 1865 the removals had been made, and 708 Union soldiers had been interred there. The federal government promised to provide uniform cast-iron head boards for the graves, suitably inscribed. A register of the name, company, regiment, rank and date of death of each soldier interred there was kept in the office.[69]

After the battle of Gettysburg, arrangements were made by the state of Pennsylvania for establishing a national cemetery upon the battlefield, in which every state having troops engaged there should have a place set apart for the burial of its dead. As Indiana lost many men in that battle, Morton assumed the responsibility of cooperating with Pennsylvania and other states, and appointed Colonel John G. Stevenson as commissioner to select Indiana's burial place and to superintend the burial of Indiana's soldiers.[70] In 1865 he asked the

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66. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 26, 1863.
67. Evansville Journal, quoted in Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 26, 1863; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, May 30, June,10, 1863; Washington Democrat, June 4, 1863.
68. Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 26, 1863; James A. Ekin to O. P. Morton and others, June 1, 1863, in unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917).
69. Proceedings at the dedication of the cemetery, in unclassified mss., Indiana State Library (1917).
70. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 761.

General Assembly to approve his action and it was done.[71]

And in appreciation of the contributions to the war by members of the armed forces, a law was enacted in the special session of 1865, which authorized county commissioners to make appropriations for and receive donations to erect suitable monuments at or near county seats in memory of deceased soldiers.[72]

4. Camp Morton Prison Camp, 1862

During 1862, in the absence of federal facilities, the state assumed responsibility for many prisoners of war. First this concerned prisoners captured at Fort Donelson in February. Morton offered facilities for 3,000. Some 3,800 arrivedlate in February and were housed and cared for at Camp Morton, Indianapolis, using the facilities of the State Fair grounds, and same facilities as would be used for Union forces. Many were sick and the death rate was high until the arrival of summer. (Indiana Legion did guard duty temporarily.) Others were housed in warehouses at Terre Haute, and at Lafayette, but were received at Camp Morton in about a month after facilities had been provided. At the camp public assistance was offered and welcomed from local persons. Infirmaries were provided outside of camp for some of the sick; those who died were buried in public cemeteries, plain wooden coffins being provided. By the end of February 4,800 prisoners had arrived. Visiting relatives were welcomed. Food and clothing was provided; Camp Bakery was set up and profits used for the prisoners welfare. Colonel Richard Owen was in command until June when he was relieved by Colonel David G. Rose who continued until the general prisoner exchange in August, when the camp was closed for the time.

After the fall of Vicksburg in July, 1863, Camp Morton was again refitted for accommodation of prisoners and a total of several thousand cared for. But the federal government at that time took over responsibilities and administered the camp to the end of the war.[73]

[72] Terrell, I (1960), 474-475; Ibid., I, Appendix, dated December 20, 1865.

[73] Terrell, Report (1960 Reprint) I, 545-553; Stampp, Indiana, 111.

X. FINANCIAL CONTROL, 1863-1865

1. Financial and Political Situation, February-March, 1863

THE FINANCIAL STANDING OF INDIANA in March, 1863, was very low. Since the late 1830's it had been so low that her bonds would hardly sell at all; and in 1846 she was forced to compromise with her creditors to keep from going bankrupt. She had promised to pay interest on this debt semi-annually, and by doing so for a while had partly redeemed herself, but in March, 1863, there was no means at hand for paying this debt or the interest on it, the ordinary state expenses, or the extraordinary ones arising from the military situation. Democrats were sure the administration could not meet the problem without calling a special session of the General Assembly, but in this they were destined to be disappointed.

The Legislature of 1863 had adjourned on March 9 without making appropriations for defraying the ordinary or extraordinary expenses of the state government. The former appropriations for the benevolent institutions--the Hospital for the Insane, Institute for the Blind, and Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb--had been nearly or quite exhausted and the Northern Prison at Michigan City had not only exhausted the appropriations hitherto made, but had incurred a heavy debt by the construction of buildings. More than 100,000 of Indiana's citizens had been sent to the field to assist in suppressing the rebellion; yet the only fund that Governor Morton had at his disposal from which the contingent military expenses, including the care and relief of the sick and wounded, could be paid, was a small remnant of the appropriation of 1861. For the civil contingent of the Executive Department, there was no provision whatever. The Auditor and Treasurer, upon being consulted by the Governor immediately after the close of the legislative session of 1863, had decided that not a dollar, in absence of regular appropirations, could be drawn from the treasury for those objects.

2. Alternatives for Government

Morton realized that he had an extremely difficult situation to face. The alternatives for action presented to him were, first, to allow the benev lent institutions to be closed and permit the inmates to be sent back to their respective counties, or to their relatives for support; secondly, to convene the legislature in extra session in hope that the Democratic majority would pass the appropiration bills; or thirdly, to get the money by extra-legal means. To have closed the institutions would have been a disgrace to the state and a crime against society; to have called an extra session of the legislature after a quorum had been present in each House for fifty out of sixty days and had failed to make the appropriations that every one knew ought to have been passed would have been entirely useless. The step would have been dangerous to the safety of the state administration and perhaps the state itself. It would have endangered the Union greatly, so evenly balanced were the opposing forces, and certainly it would only have started the game of petty partisan politics over again

with no chances of either side surrendering to the other.[1] Consequently Morton determined to procure, by extra-legal means if necessary, enough money to carry on all the state institutions, finance Indiana's part of the war, and keep all the other governmental business going.

The possible means for getting this money extra-legally were first, to get it out of the treasury without appropriations;[2] or by loans to Morton personally as governor, or through the regular legal loan channels; or a combination of both. Morton recognized the futility of trying to get the state treasury to assume the debts of the state and go ahead on that basis, first, because the law expressly forbade it,[3] and, secondly, the opposition party was in full conrol of the treasury and auditor's office. He could not borrow money legally since the law of 1861 provided that the governor, auditor and treasurer must make these temporary loans jointly. He, by himself, could not legally borrow it in the name of the state, nor would the other two officials named by law consent to any such borrowing, and should he succeed in getting a loan in the name of the state, the same statute required that the money so borrowed be paid into the state treasury, to be drawn out only on the order of the auditor through the treasurer.[4] Thus the only procedure was to let Morton get the money on his own name and pay state expenses with it.

Early in March it had been rumored that he intended to run the state on his own initiative, and before the General Assembly adjourned, he began active preparations for doing so by getting in touch with wealthy Republicans, banks, county commissioners, etc., and finding out what they would do in the crisis.[5] Democrats at first regarded the

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1. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 1-4, 782-785; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 253; Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 264-268.
2. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 253-4.
3. In 1859 the Legislature made appropriation for paying the interest with no limit put on the number of times the law was used to pay the interest. The legislature of 1861 again made a specific appropriation from the funds not already appropriated. It also provided heavey penalties for paying money from the treasury without an appropriation. Indiana Statutes, 1859, Chap. 88, Sec. 16. Annual Encyclopaedia, 1860, p. 530; Indiana Statutes, 1861, Special Session, Chap. XXXI.
4. Indiana Sttatues, 1861, Special Session, Chap. VI. On July 2, 1863, James O'Brien of Noblesville wrote to Morton: "Permit me on behalf of the loyal citizens of this county to thank you for having made such an arrangement for payment of the interest on our State debt as will save the credit of our State." Morton, Correspondence Box, State Archives.
5. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 10, June 6, 10, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, p. 580. On February 5, 1864, Jus H. White, treasurer of St. Joseph county wrote Terrell: "You will please find herewith Three Thousand Dollars the amount the Governor expected to have advanced by our County Board to as-

scheme as visionary in the extreme and did not consider the proposal worthy of any serious attention; later when they saw the plan definitely under way, they were astonished by the audacity of the proposal.[6]

With the promises of the leading Republicans over the state, and of Cincinnati and New York banks, that they were willing to furnish Morton with money on his own responsibility until the political composition of the General Assembly should change and grant a return of their funds, the Governor started to work.[7] He took his stand on the broad principal that the occasion demended extraordinary measures, when he tried to justify his measures at all, but as a rule Morton did not care enough for that side of the question to bother with it while other work was to be done. The step was certainly revolutionary in the extreme, for an individual with no legal backing was taking upon himself the task of running a commonwealth for two years in time of war without, and imminent danger of war within the state. He had political enemies by thousands and attempts were being made to assassinate him for political reasons.[8]

3. The Financial Bureau and Its Operation, 1863-1865

Money coming to Morton had to be received and paid out independently of regular channels, but how was that to be done when there was no such means? An extra-legal means for handling the funds had to be created as well, so n April 18, 1863,[9] the Governor put a big safe in his office, and made William H. H. Terrell his financial secretary with powers to handle the funds in Morton's name as Governor.[10] Business began at once; only strictly business methods were used or could be used, because every one knew that Democratic enemies who were being foiled by the plan would take greatest delight in placing these leaders in prison could they get the least hold on them with the law. The bookkeeping system adopted was very much like that used in the office of the Auditor and Treasurer except that several registers, ouchers forms, and statement books were added. Vouchers were kept for every cent of expenditure. Monthly settlements were made with the banks

sist him in carrying on the State government. You wil please send me proper vouchers for the same." Morton, Correspondence Box, State Archives.

6. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 10, 1863.
7. Ibid., March 10, June6, 10, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, p. 580.
8. Smith, Indiana, vol. I, p. 371.
9. W. H. H. Terrell in Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 5-10.
10. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 255; Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 10, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, p. 7. From 1861 to March, 1863, Terrell had been clerk of the military auditing board. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 388-390. Morton's checks drew money from the Financial Bureau after bills had been allowed by the military auditing committee. Financial Bureau, p. 463 passim.

and checks paid there were carefully compared with the vouchers at the Bureau. Terrell prepared statements at the end of each month showing receipts and expenditures and the balance on hand. The same was done in yearly reports.[11]

On May 30, 1863, Morton issued a circular to the counties and the public of Indiana in general asking for loans to be used by him in his official capacity to support the benevolent institutions and for the relief of the sick and wounded Indiana soldiers.[12] The circular was followed by correspondence by Morton and Terrell urging hesitant counties to hasten their appropriations so that the state would know what it could depend on. Boards of commissioners acted as they saw fit.[13] Of course Morton and Terrell could only use persuasion on the county commissioners, but they used it most efficiently.[14] Advances to the Financial Bureau were used as parts of the loan, the money bei brought to Indianapolis by special messenger or express.[15] Banks such as those at Richmond, Indiana, loaned money; Wayne County friends sent $20,000; and the Terre Haute and Richmond railroad contributed $15,000.

The loans exceeded all expectations. County commissioners loaned amounts varying from $2,000 to $20,000. Sums from this source totaled $115,000.[16] Funds received were deposited in banks through the Financial Bureau: With A. and J. C. S. Harrison, and S . A. Fletcher and Company of Indianapolis; Winslow, Lanier and Company of New York City; and the United States Depository at Cincinnati.[17]

By the end of June enough had been advanced to assure at least

[11] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 5-9.

[12] Bureau of Finance, p. 119; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, June 8, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 5-9.

[13] Bureau of Finance, pp. 121, 122, 142-143, 148, 163.

[14] Terrell wanted the loans rushed to the Financial Bureau where they would be beyond the reach of "Copperheads" and the Democratic Supreme Court, Bureau of Finance, p. 163. On June 16 he urged them to "act before the Copperheads defeat the war plans of the State." Bureau of Finance, pp. 142-143.

[15] George K. Steele acted as collector, taking money to the Financial Bureau and returning the receipt.

[16] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 19-20 gives Terrell's report on the matter. Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chapter 49, Section 4 says in part "And that the $135,000 be appropriated out of the treasury to repay the principal of loans made by the Governor of Indiana for the support of the Benevolent Institutions, with interest at six per cent per year from date loans were received, until date of payment except $20,000 borrowed from citizens of Wayne County, on which loan has been paid to August 3, 1865, and on which losn interest shall be deducted at the rate of six per cent from date principal is repaid to said 3d of August, 1865." See also Democratic Pharos, May 13, 1863; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 255.

[17] Indianapolis Daily Journal, March 12, June 4, 23, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, June 25, July 3, 1863; Madison Courier,

the temporary success of the plan.[18] But in December the various counties were asked to pay into the Bureau the rest of the money that had been set aside for that purpose.[19] The county commissioners took the governor's official receipt for the amounts loaned.[20] The state reimbursed these loans by appropriation in 1865. [21]

Morton also appealed to the President for financial aid,[22] and Lincoln told him to would gladly furnish the money but knew of no way to do so legally. He then put the matter before the Secretary of War who said he knew of no law just then but that he would "be damned" if he would not find a way to do it. He found a federal statute of July 31, 1861, which appropriated $2,000,000 to be expended by the President" in any State in which the inhabitants are in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or in which rebellion is, or may be threatened."[23] After full consideration of the condition of affairs in Indiana, the President advanced to Morton as disbursing officer $250,000. [24] It was spent through the Financial Bureau[25] for the benefit of the state mostly in paying necessary military expenses.

Money came from other federal sources as well. The Governor had advanced $171,661 from the State Treasury to the state paymaster. When this was refunded, by the federal government, upon Morton's filing

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March 27, 1863; and Bureau of Finance, pp. 89-90, 93, 122, 123.

[18] Ibid., p. 724.

[19] Ibid., p. 557.

[20] Morton's receipt to county commissioners as cited in Bureau of Finance, 558, reads as follows: "Received from the Treasury of the County of Hamilton in the State of Indiana, the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2000) as a loan from said County to be used by me in my official capacity as Governor in defraying the proper and necessary expenses of the Benevolent Institutions of the State and the Northern Prison, and for the relief of sick and wounded Indiana soldiers; said loan, with such reasonable interest as may be allowed to be reimbursed and paid to said county of Hamilton by the State of Indiana as amy be provided for by law hereafter.

(Signed) O. P. Morton."

[21] Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chap. 49, Sec. 4.

[22] Indianapolis State Sentinel, May 27, 1863.

[23] United States Statute of July 31, 1861; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 6, 1863. As Morton received the warrant from Stanton, he said, "If the cause fails, you and I will be covered with prosecutions, and probably imprisoned or driven from the county." Mr. Stanton replied, "If the cause fails, I do not wish to live." Henry Wilson, "Edwin M. Stanton", in Atlantic Monthly, vol. XXV (1870), p. 242. See also John Hay and J. George Nicolay, Abraham Lincoln: A history (New York, 1890), vol. VIII, p. 10.

[24] Morton's account is given in Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 23, 24, 780.

[25] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, March 6, 1865.

with the federal government receipted payrolls of the Indiana Legion,[26] the greater part of it was paid not into the State Treasury but into the Financial Bureau.

The federal government paid Morton between January 1, 1863, and April 26, 1864, the amount of $338,885, [27] for ammunition from the Indiana Arsenal furnished United States troops. All of this was turned into the Financial Bureau and deposited subject to check in banks in Indianapolis and New York City, as were other payments of Arsenal product. The embezzlement laws of 1859 and 1861 did not apply to the case because the Legislature had never recognized the Arsenal as state property.[28] The money was paid out for running state institutions [29] and for military purposes even though the Arsenal was as much the personal property of Governor Morton as it was of any other party even though it was begun with state funds. Democratic state officials tried in vain to get control of this money; in January, 1863, they were in correspondence with Washington to have state advances turned over to them, but Morton blocked their efforts.[30] They used the Indianapolis Daily Sentinel and other anti-administration papers to frighten Republicans from their course but without success.

Other possible sources of income to the Bureau were given great attention. Morton induced the federal government to bear as much expnese as he could: Those incurred by his chartering boats to carry Sanitary Commission supplies,[31] for special surgeons, military agents, additonial clothing, for the losses and damages incurred during Morgan's raid in July, 1863, etc.[32] When it was seen that payment

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[26] Morton's account is given in Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 779-781; W. H. H. Terrell to T. Q. Palmer, June 27, 1863, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library.

[27] An unclassified mss., Indiana State Library, gives the following statements of money paid into the State Treasury or the Financial Bureau and places of deposit with dates of each:

$74,581	For ammunition	in State Treasury	July 14, 1862
64,147	" "	" " "	Nov. 8, 1862
72,446	" "	" " "	Nov. 12, 1862
237,270	For State Arms		Jan. 8, 1863
49,122	Indiana Arsenal	Indianapolis Banking Co.	April 2, 1863
23,208	" "	" " "	April 2, 1863
17,929	" "	" " "	May 4, 1863
47,594	2 "	" " "	July 9, 1863
38,549	" "	" " "	Aug. 8, 1863
53,572	" "	" " "	Sept.23, 1863
41,362	" "	Winslow, Lanier & Company	Nov. 10, 1864
50,217	" "	" " " "	Apr. 19, 1864
16,933	" "	Harrison's Bank	Apr. 26, 1864

[28] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, April 3, 6, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 5, 1863.

[29] Ibid., April 5, 1863.

[30] Documentary Journal, 1863,part I,pp. 122-123, in report to Morton.

[31] Bureau of Finance, pp. 65, 80, 901.

[32] Ibid., pp. 245-246, Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 268, 301, 304.

for essential activities was not forthcoming, money was advanced from the Bureau to cover the expense, and efforts were made at once to secure reimbursement for the same.[33] On January 19, 1864, Morton sent claims for $74,820 for the Indiana Legion repelling rebel raids in 1862.[34] Claims for the expense of the draft of 1862 were sent the War Department in 1863 and every effort made to secure payment.[35] Money so obtained was turned into the Financial Bureau. With the money in the Bureau or coming in, the Governor turned to meet some of the state's obligations.

The law of 1846 which ratified the state's compromise with her clamorous creditors provided for an appropriation for the interest due January first and July first of each year. The amount due at each payment was about $320,000. [36] Indiana needed all of its money for current expenses, and yet debts had to be paid or it would have no credit at all. Three ways existed by which it might be done: First, get it from the State Treasury even though there was no appropriation; second, get a federal government loan; and third, borrow from private corporations. In the beginning, Morton tried the first.

The Democratic and Republican newspapers of May, June and July were full of cumbersome arguments trying to prove or disprove that the Auditor and Treasurer should allow this claim.[37] The favorite argument of the Republicans for payment by the Treasury was based on a former payment of some of the expenses of the benevolent institution expenses even though there had been no appropriation.[38] Governor Willard's legislature of 1857 had nearly paralleled Morton's case[39] but the embezzlement laws of 1859 and 1861 had been passed since then. The compromise act of 1846 had said "And for the payment of the interest . . . the faith of the State is hereby solemnly pledged." But it did not make a specific appropriation. [40] After doing all he could by persuasion to get the Democrats to open the treasury, Morton turned to the courts.

The Attorney-General had already been consulted by J. Ristine,[41]

and 307; Private Telegams, vol..I, pp.145.

[33] Ibid., pp. 88, 94, 95, 96, 218, 219.

[34] Ibid., pp. 584, 620, 739.

[35] Bureau of Finance, pp. 577, 678.

[36] Indianaplis Daily Sentinel, April 8, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1858, p. 20 gives the Auditor's figures for the years from 1847.

[37] Ibid., 1864-1865, part II, p. 540, gives Morton's argument for payment by the Treasurer.

[38] Ibid., 1857-1858, p. 179 gives Governor Willard's account of the affair.

[39] Ibid., p. 179.

[40] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, April 8, May 11, December 16, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1857-1858, pp. 84, 179; Annual Encyclopaedia, 1863, p. 560.

[41] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 20. 1863.

Auditor of State, and the opinion that the Auditor could not use treasury funds for payment of the interst falling due on July 1 had been rendered.[42] Certainly the Treasurer could not pay the interest without an order from the Auditor even had he been so inclined.[43] Newspapers all over the country were advising the petty political squabbles of the time and so reducing Indiana's credit to the minimum.[44]

Morton acting through the president of the sinking fund started legal proceedings against the Auditor to compel him to issue a warrant on the Treasurer to force him to pay the interest.[45] It seems that these proceedings were more of a formality than anything else; the Democrats feeling confident of the result and well they might, stood their ground. The Attorney-General for the state, a Democrat, appeared in the Marion Circuit Court as defense for the Auditor and the case was begun. Judge Finch decided that the Auditor must issue the warrant.[46]

But the Democrats were on the alert and by a shrewd move immediately rushed in an appeal to the Supreme Court which was granted.[47] Morton foresaw disaster in such a move and called Judge Finch to him for a conference.[48] The Judge then saw that he had been tricked by the opposition and tried to recall his grant of an appeal but to no use, for appeals were made from both the changed decision and the decision ordering the warrant issued.[49] This unexpected move was a severe blow to Morton, as he preferred to have the question left open to having a Supreme Court decision issued against him.[50] Nothing could be done to prevent it and the case went on to the Court.

The question was fully argued by the most eminent counsel in the state. Joseph E. McDonald presented the side of the administration, while Thomas A. Hendricks and the Attorney-General were the leading attorneys for the Democrats. McDonald argued that the law by which the state compromised with their creditors was in effect a continuous

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42. New Albany Daily Ledger, May 11, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 11, 1863; Bureau of Finance, pp. 109-110.
43. Indiana Statutes, 1859, Section VII.
44. New York Times, July 2, 1863; New York Herald, quoted in Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, July 6, 1863; Annual Encyclopaedia, 1863, p. 530.
45. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 14, 1863; Indianapllis Daily Journal, May 13, 1863; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, May 20, 1863.
46. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 13, 20, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 13, 1863.
47. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 16, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 19, 1863.
48. Ibid., May 16, 19, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 18, 19, 20, 23, 1863.
49. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, June 6, 16, 1863.
50. Ibid., May 19, June 8, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 4, 1864; and February 23, 1876. Judges Hanna and Perkins, of the Supreme Court, were aginst Morton from the first.

appropriation and intended to guarantee the credit of the state.[51] Political feeling ran high. Republicans threatened the judges if a decision was not in their favor, and promised the treasurer suit for damages if he did not pay the interest.[52] The decision rendered on June 5, said that there was no authority for payment of the interest without a specific appropriation.[53] This effectively closed that channel for gaining funds and the administration turned its attention to other sources.

Morton went to New York City early in June and laid the whole proposition before Winslow, Lanier, and Company, with the request that they advance the amount necessary to pay the interest until money co could be got from the treasury by appropriation.[54] That firm was interested at once, and after a delay of only a few days agreed to make the loan provided a correct list of the stock holders could be obtained. They relied on Morton's personal promise to pay, and future elections bringing to the Legislature enough men of Republican faith to make an appropriation for both principal and interest.[55]

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51. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, p. 782-785.
52. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, May 14, 26, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 15, 1863.
53. Ibid., May 26, June 6, 1863.
54. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 782-785 gives Morton's account of the transaction. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, June 3, 22, July 6, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 27, July 2, 1863. J. F. D. Lanier had been connected with Indiana banking and financial interests for years and was an old friend of Morton's. In 1857 he was chairman of the board of trustees of the Wabash and Erie Canal; from the first of the war had been a heavy investor in Indiana War bonds. Thus he was financially as well as patriotically interested in seeing the credit of the state maintained. For further reference see Lanier, Life of Lanier (New York, 1870). See also Documentary Journal, 1863, pp. 47, 48, 64-70; New York Times, July 2, 1863; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, April 26, 1861; Documentary Journal, 1857-1858, p. 295. At the outbreak of the war the firm had offered the state a loan of $25,000 without stipulation as to interest or term. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 3.
55. In October, 1862, the State needed funds and it proposed that it be borrowed from Winslow, Lanier and Company on the Governor's signature. Jesse J. Brown and Robert Dale Owen negotiated the loan and during the transaction some question was raised as to the power of the Governor to borrow money to pay for arms, etc. J. P. Siddall, and John F. Kebbey, Attorney-General, characterized the power of the Governor to make such a loan as undoubted, saying that by an act approved A½ril 1, 1861, he was authorized to borrow $500,000 to buy arms and ammunition; but by an act of June 3, 1861, the Governor, Auditor and Treasurer were authorized to make temporary loans for meeting the expenditures incurred in purchasing supplies for troops in the service of the state; that the Constitution of Indiana, Article X, Section V, authorized the creation to meet casual deficits in the revenue, repel invas-

They at once notified John C. Walker, Democratic agent of State, of their readiness to pay the interest, asked him to furnish from the books in his possession the names of the stockholders, and offered to pay for the work done. Walker refused to do this or allow any one else access to his books. The bankers proposed that he pay the interest in the usual way upon his own books, and agreed to honor his checks issued therefor, and at the same time freed him from all personal liabilities for possible errors in the money so paid out. This offer was refused[56] on the ground that he could not render assistance to the Governor in his attempt to carry on the state government in defiance of law and without that legislation which the Supreme Court had decided was essential for such payments. The real reason for his refusal was that he wanted to throw as many difficulties in Morton's way as possible, and so help force him to call an extra session of the legislature which might enable the Democrats to get the military power out of his hands. The bankers would not take the responsibility of paying so much interest while there was such a large amount of spurious Indiana bonds on the market,[58] but they did put $160,000 at Walker's disposal should he decide to accept the offer.[59]

ion, suppress insurrection, or provide for the public defense; that that power had been frequently exercised under the Constitution, and had never before been questioned. Their argument was faulty in the extreme but there is every evidence, except the note itself, to show that Morton was the only State official to sign it. This loan was successfully concluded October 10, 1862. Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 24, 782-785; J. J. Brown to R. D. Owen, October 10, 1862, General Dispatches, vol, IX, p. 73; J. J. Brown to D. R. Marin, October 7, 1862; ib ibid., p. 49; J. J. Brown to W. H. H. Terrell, October 4, 1862, ibid., p. 24; J. P. Siddall and J. E. Kibbey to J. J. Brown, October 2, 1862; ibid., p. 19; J. J. Brown to R. D. Owen, October 10, 1863, ibid., p. 73.

56. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, June 30, 1863.

58. Joseph E. McDonald received about $2,500 as fees in 1865 for obtaining the cancellation of the fraudulent bonds. Indiana Statutes, 1865, p. 73 passim.

59. In May, 1862, it became known that D. C. Stover of Montgomery County, agent of state, had defrauded Indiana out of thousands of dollars. This could hardly be a surprise when it is understood that hundreds of bonds had been signed, sealed, and finished except the mere filling in of the purchaser's name, the date, and the amount. They were left lying around in the Treasurer's office in Indianapolis; when a sale of them was to be made a bunch would be handed to an agent who took them and went to New York, etc., to dispose of them to the highest bidder. When the fraud was first found out state officials nearest Walker tried to cover it up by forcing the retirement of the bonds, but such an attempt only gave more time to invest the money. The funds were used in purchasing a bank in Beverly, New Jersey. The brokers helping to do the business denied all knowledge of the transaction being made through fraud. Governor Morton got Stover under arrest in New York City and with difficulty brought him

He was given permission to check upon it for the interest due each stockholder for payments due on July 1, 1863, and on January 1, 1864, if there was no otherway to get into the treasury by that time.[60]

But such a move was effectively blocked for nearly six months because Walker controlled the list of stockholders and had powers of attorney from numerous foreign and domestic stockholders who could not be reached.[61] By the middle of December, Morton had prepared what he believed to be a correct list of bond holders,[62] And had appointed J. K. Gapen clerk to assist Winslow, Lanier and Company in making payments.[63] As soon as these preparations were made the bankers renewed their offers to Walker; on December 15 they gave notice to the public that they would pay the July interest at once, and soon announced the same concerning the January dues.[64] Some $200,000 were paid at this time. They paid the interest due on July 1, 1864, and January 1, 1865. To November 1, 1865, they had paid $416,778. In all, these payments amounted to nearly $575,000 to help the state out of its difficulties.[65] In January, 1865, the treasurer of state was authorized by the General Assembly to refund the money loaned with interest at seven per cent.[66]

In this controversy Morton had no legal right, and claimed none except for pretext, to acquire money in this way for paying off state liabilities, nor had he any legal right to pay the money so borrowed to the holders of Indiana's bonds. Indiana laws of 1859 expressly stated the (1) money borrowed on the credit of the state by any authorozed agent of state, (2) all money belonging to the state or not otherwise provided for by law, (3) money coming in from any state fund, (4) all money belonging to or loaned to the state , (5) all money borrowed

to Indianapolis. Friends in Montgomery County, Indiana, went his bond for $150,000.

[60] Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 29, 1863; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, June 30, 1863.

[61] New York Times, July 2, 1863.

[62] Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, December 11, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 11, 1863.

[63] Ibid., December 11, 14, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 782-785.

[64] Winslow, Lanier and Company, public letter of December 15, 1863; and Winslow, Lanier and Company to O. P. Morton, December 10, 1863, Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 569; Indianapolis Daily Journal, and Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, December 11, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 14, 1864. After Morton had made a list of bond holders and started payment, Ristine, permitted Morton's secretary to take from his book copies of transfers of public records and any other information he wanted.

[65] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 24-25, gives Terrell's account, and pages 782-785 give Morton's account of the transaction. The money advanced ni the ten months following July 1, 1863, amounted to $280,680.56.

[66] Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chap. XXVII.

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59. Indianapolis. Friends in Montgomery County, Indiana, went his bond for $150,000.
60. Indianapolis Daily Journal, June 19, 1863; Madison Indiana Weekly Courier, June 20, 1863.
61. New York Times, July 2, 1863.
62. Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 11, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 12, 1863.
63. Ibid., December 11, 15, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1863-1865, part I, pp. 792-795.
64. Winslow, Lanier and Company, public letter of December 15, 1863; and Winslow, Lanier and Company to O. P. Morton, December 10, 1863, Documentary Journal, 1863-1865, part II, p. 409; Indianapolis Daily Journal, and Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, December 15, 1863; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 15, 1864. After Winslow had sent a list of bond holders and started payment, Winslow permitted Morton's secretary to take from his book copies of signatures of public records and any other information he wanted.
65. Documentary Journal, 1863-1865, part I, pp. 3-25 (gives Terrell's accounts), and pages 788-797 give Morton's account of the transaction. The money advanced in the ten months following July 1, 1863, amounted to $[illegible].
66. Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chap. XXVII.

on the credit of the state by authority of law had to be paid into the state treasury. In case money was borrowed legally for the State it was necessary for the Governor, Auditor, and Treasurer to make it; and in such case the money had to be paid into the state treasury.[67] In the case of the Winslow, Lanier loan, the money was not borrowed by these three state officers as was required for a legal loan to the state. Since it was not a loan to the state by definition of law, it was not necessary to have it paid into the treasury or handled by the regular state officials. The New York firm made no contracts with the state for reimbursement of principal or interest. The whole matter was by them referred to the good faith of the future state government, trusting in the ability of the people to make good that confidence. Hence the law could not touch Morton for his activities.

The payment of Indiana's quota of the National Direct Tax, while not a part of the Financial Bureau's work, was largely of the same extra-legal nature. A federal law of August 6, 1861, levied an annual direct tax of $20,000,000 on the states. Indiana was assessed $904,875.33 as its share of the amount. The act provided that a state acting through its governor or treasurer could pay through its own initiative; that if its portion was paid before June 31 of the year in which the levy was due, a discount of fifteen per cent was allowed; and that state claims against the federal government would be accepted in payment.[68]

From the beginning of the war, Indiana had been compelled to advance large sums of money to equip and supply its soldiers, and it was believed that such advances nearly amounted to enough to meet the first payment. Accordingly Morton took the matter up with the United States treasury, and in December, 1861, filed claims which were supposed to cover the levy without the intervention of federal officers. The papers were accepted by the Secretary of Treasury, and a statement was obtained by Morton saying that federal treasury agents would not be appointed to collect the tax in Indiana.[69] Morton says that Democratic state officials concurred in the arrangement, which seems to be entirely true.[70]

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67. Ibid., 1859, Chap. 138. The law was uniformly consistent on this point; ibid., 1848, Chaps. 72, 74; ibid., 1849-50, Chap. 116; ibid., 1851, Chap. 124; ibid., 1861; Special Session, Chap. 31, Section 3.
68. United States Statutes at Large, 37 Congress, Session I, (1861), Chap. 45.
69. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. II, p. 177; Madison Daily Courier, December 13, 18, 1861, January 3, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, quoted in New Albany Daily Ledger, December 3, 1861; Democratic Banner of Liberty, December 19, 1861; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 775-776.
70. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, December 13, 19, 1861, and January 3, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, January 2, 1862; Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, quoted in New Albany Daily Ledger, December 3, 1861.

Auditor of State, Lange, went to Washington in January to make the final settlement but found that the mode of settlement had not been determined upon, nor had the treasury taken up Indiana's accounts, due to the rush of business there. Hence the adjustment was delayed. Finally it became evident that the claims were in great danger of being delayed until too late for the discount. As usual with Morton, he was not discouraged by not getting what he wanted in the first attempt, so he tried another route. He brought the matter to the attention of Indiana's Congressional delegation at Washington, and asked for legislation providing for an extension of time for getting claims through the Treasury Department. After much trouble and and delay Senator Henry S. Lane secured the passage of an act approved May 13, 1862, granting an extension of time to July 30. [71] But even then the work on the accounts progressed so slowly that the matter was not arranged finally until the last day allowed by the law.[72] By this transaction the state was saved $135,731.30, or fifteen per cent of the $904,875.33 levy.[73]

The General Assembly of 1863 took no action toward legalizing such use of advances due the state. The transaction could hardly be called a loan. Had it been a loan to the state, the cooperation of the Governor, Auditor, and Treasurer would have make it legal. As it was these state officials paid the state obligations due the United States with state funds not set aside for that purpose by the General Assembly. The necessary legislative action was taken in 1865 in the act legalizing Morton's action in paying the direct tax and authorizing him to settle all other cliams of the state against the United States.[74]

Morton's financial activities also included plans for getting soldiers' money to persons dependent upon them for support. The three months' regiments had been mustered out at Indianapolis, and hence there was no need of a means for getting this money home. But by October, 1861, there were many men at the front, away from the regular

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[71] General Dispatches, vol. III, pp. 234, 247; United States Statutes at Large, 37 Congress, Session II, (1862), Chap. 66. O. P. Morton to Henry S. Lane, and J. A. Bright, May 10, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 234; Schuyler Colfax to O. P. Morton, May 14, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 247.

[72] Assistant U. S. Treasurer, E. E. Spinner, to W. H. H. Terrell, July 30, 1862, in unclassified mss., in Indiana State Library.

[73] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 775-776.

[74] Indiana Statutes, 1865, Chap. 4, Sec. 1. For a fuller account of the National Direct Tax, see Morton's message to the General Assembly of 1863 and 1865 in Documentary Journal, 1862-1863, part II, pp. 11-13; and ibid., 1864-1865, part I, pp. 775-776. The tax was suspended during the rest of the war. S. P. Chase to O. P. Morton, November 18, 1862, Department Dispatches, vol. XV. p. 369.

channels of communication, and money was needed by their families to enable them to prepare for the coming winter. Amounts being sent home were small and few,[75] and there was no safe or adequate means for sending them.[76] Accordingly, on November 20, the Governor issued his first allotment circular.[77]

It stated that Morton had effected an arrangement with the Branch Bank in Indianapolis, by which such funds could be conveyed to any part of Indiana through a "safe, and responsible channel, and without cost to the soldier." The State was to appoint a collector who was to visit the regiments and receive from each soldier such funds as he wished to transmit. Commanding officers of regiments were to be furnished with the proper blanks. Soldiers wereto draw a draft in favor ot the party to whom they wanted to send money, and at the same time deposit with the collector the amount they wanted to send. The collector was to make triplicate statements of the transaction, one copy to be retained by the collector, one by the colonel of the regiment, and the third for the use of the Bank. The money was then to be deposited in the bank to be paid out at any of the branch banks in the state upon proper endorsement of the original draft by the person to whom the money was sent.

Acting on this plan, Asahel Stone, in Decemeber went to Missouri and brought back some $16,000 from the regiments stationed there. Other parties brought almost an equal amount.[78] In the same month the federal government enacted its plan for realizing the same object. ject.[79] President Lincoln appointed David C. Branham and Thomas A.

75. Fountain County Ledger, quoted in Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 3, 1861; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 348.
76. On November 3, 1861, Morton wrote the following letter to Colonel W. P. Benton, of the Eighth Regiment of Indiana Volunteers: "Sir: This letter will be handed you by a Col. A. Stone, Commissary General of Indiana, who visits you for the purpose of looking after the interests and comfort of the Volunteers from Indiana and will bring home for friends and families such sums of money as the boys may choose to send and I would suggest that you urge the necessity of the men under your command, remitting what funds they can spare to their families, many of whom stand greatly in need of assistance at this time. Should you need any supplies you will please make the fact known to Col. Stone who will use every exertion with the aid of this Department to see that they are promptly furnished."
77. Unclassified mss., Indiana State Library; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, November 22, 1861; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 373.
78. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, December 23, 1861.
79. The act provided that "The President shall appoint for each State having volunteers in the Unites States service, not exceeding three persons, who shall be commissioned by the President to visit the several departments of the army in which the volunteers from the various states may be and then procure from the volunteers from time to time the . . . . . . allotments . . . . . to their

Goodwin as allotment commissioners for Indiana, and Morton withdrew his agents from the field giving the federal commissioners full control.[80] The system thus had a very good chance to operate with success, but even though there were men willing to collect the money and bring it home no one would attempt such a task which would necessitate constant exposure and the paying of traveling expenses without reimbursement.[81] In the army, sutlers discouraged the system.[82] Not being familiar with theplan, the soldiers themselves hesitated to entrust their money with federal agents, preferring to trust Morton's representatives.

For these reasons the governor caused his allotment plan to be completed early in 1862. He appointed eight men as agents and included in his appointments the federal commissioners.[83] These men visited the different departments of the army wherever Indiana regiments were stationed, and received such amounts as soldiers wanted to send to their families and friends. The money was then carried to nearest places from which it could be forwarded to Indianapolis by express or other reliable means at hand.[84]

Mr. Goodwin was kept busy all the time collecting money, and was really the only one doing a considerable amount of business in 1862. He returned from the army on the Tennessee river in June, 1862, and brought with him $125,000. In the same month he collected $31,000 from the Ninth and Thirty-Sixth Indiana Regiments.[85] Regiments would occasionally send home a few thousands by some member returning to the state.[86] B. J. Tuttle, military agent, collected $59,000 in October, 1862.[87] During the months from April to December, 1862, these commissioners collected $810,450. It was brought home in more than 15,000 packages and deliverd to its final destination without any charge except that for express.[88]

families and friends." Soldiers were required to certify their wishes in writing and have it sworn to. When this had been done the paymasters were to give drafts, payable in New York, to the order of the person to whom the money was ordered sent. The commissioners were to get no pay from the United States Treasury. United States Statutes at Large, December 24, 1861, Chap. 4; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 374.

[80] Ibid., p. 375.

[81] Ibid., pp. 348-9.

[82] Ibid., p. 374 summarized the attitudes of army officers towards the plan.

[83] Ibid., p. 375. The agents appointed were Thomas A. Goodwin, Col. John McCrea, David C. Branham, Lawrence M. Vance, Rev. E. B. Kilroy, James Hook, Asahel Stone, B. I. Tuttle. See also Reports of Special Agents, pp. 97-104, 166-169.

[84] Ibid., p. 375.

[85] Ibid., p. 348.

[86] Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 20, 1862; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February 3, 1862; New Albany Daily Ledger, February 17, 1862.

[87] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 348.

[88] Ibid., p. 376;Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, January 19, 1863.

Other duties of these agents were: First, to look after and relieve the sick and disabled soldiers of Indiana regiments; second, to assist in procuring furloughs and passes in all proper cases; third, to cooperate with the Sanitary Commission; fourth, to aid the various soldier's aid societies in procuring aid and forwarding hospital supplies and sanitary stores; sixth, to report to Morton the abuses and wrongs of both State and federal systems. These duties brought the men in close touch with the soldiers, won their confidence and encouraged them to send their money home to their needy families. One soldier's action influenced other to do the same, with the result that the plan was very successful.

Even with its success there were many defects in the scheme. The system required a great amount of traveling and then often left the most remote regiments unvisited. The risks of losing the money were great, as agents traveled through regions that were often overrun unexpectedly by the enemy and infested with lawless men. Express companies did not extend their business into territory that was unsafe.[89] Mails were unreliable on the border and near the armies. All these things made it evident that the plan would have to be changed.

The old system had been in operation for more than a year when a new one was adopted early in 1863.[90] Mr. T. A. Goodwin, with the advice and approval of Governor Morton, worked out the new system.[91] The Congressional allotment act furnished the central idea, but instead of sending commissioners to the field to get the allotments, each command was furnished with rolls on which each soldier could specify the amount he desired to send. The soldier did this at each payment and also gave the name of the person to whom it was to be se sent, together with the address of the party. The amount was retained by the paymaster. Since the paymaster and pay agent were each provided with a copy of the rolls, the pay agent could give a check on the United States Tresaury at New York City for the total amount allotted by each company. This check was drawn in favor of Goodwin, who converted it into greenbacks and sent it to its destination by express according to directions.[92] This eliminated all chances of loss, except that incurred in expressing the money from Indianapolis to its final destination.[93]

As soon as the rolls were sent to the regiments, soldiers began to take advantage of the system. Yet it took several months to get

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89. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 376-7 gives an illustration of the risks involved.
90. Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 8, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 609; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 377.
91. Ibid., p. 377.
92. The Congressional plan had required paymasters to draw separate checks on New York for each man's allotment.
93. Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 8, December 24, 1863; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 377.

the soldiers, and especially the paymasters, in close sympathy with the scheme. Some who were strangers to Indiana efforts were a little cautious. It imposed new duties on the paymasters and resulted in some evasion, but before long there was no complaint coming from the field. Paymasters generally became accustomed to it and some even expressed their appreciation of it in letters to the Commissioner. [94]

From April to December, 1862, $810,450 were collected, brought to Indianapolis and distributed. In July and August, 1863, $324,446.30 was sent to Indianapolis, and before December 7, $225,865.50 had been received on the November pay. In April, 1864, $28,953.25 was received and distributed; in May none arrived; in June, $2,010 came in; in July, $608; and in August, $71,935.78 [95] The decrease during June and July was caused by an investigation of the allotment commissioners' office, at which time the allotments were ordered stopped. Chaplains of regiments, returning to the state, commonly brought amounts varying from $3,000 to $20,000. [96]

Such was the system used up to November, 1863,[97] when a slight change was made in the mode of distribution due to the expense involved. Goodwin learned that he could deposit the allotment checks with the Treasury Department in New York and check on it for each allotment. He tried that, but the increased amount of help required, the risks which it incurred, together with the fact fhat the former express charges were abolished, caused him to make a charge of twenty-five cents for distributing all amounts over ten dollars. Amounts of less than that were distributed free. Mr. Goodwin continued at the head of the allotment system until the Indiana troops were mustered out at the end of the war. Some $2,000,000 was collected and distributed. Some 40,000 packages were sent out of the Indianapolis office to their final distribution without a cent loss to troops.[98] Certainly no institution called into being by the necessities of the war was more beneficial and less expensive than that of the Indiana allotment systme. The expenses and trouble of collecting the numerous small claims on the federal government caused Morton in the latter part of May, 1863, to go to Washington and make arrangements for enlarging the work of the military agency at that place, to include the collection of claims due Indianans. Rev. J. W. Montfort was retained in the office. His new duties were to file all claims with the government, collect and remit all money due to wives, children or relatives of Indiana soldiers, collect bounties, procure

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[94] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 609-610, 611; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 377.

[95] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 610, 612, 628.

[96] Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 20, 27, May 2, 9, 22, 1863; ibid., January 2, 5, 1864.

[97] Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, pp. 13, 612. This charge was discontinued in March, 1863.

[98] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 377, 609; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part II, p. 609; Private Telegrams, vol. I. p. 147.

pensions, collect claims for discharged volunteers and look after any other business of like nature. Form that time there was no need of employing an attorney for this work. Moreover Monfort was even to answer any questions asked him in letters, written on the legal points that were not understood.[99]

Another agency was given much the same power in Indianapolis. Blank forms for claims of every description were furnished from the office there as well as in Washington, and when filed they were collected by the agent. These agencies did not file applications for attorneys or anyone getting a fee, or for citizens of any state other than Indiana. All business was done free of charge.[100]

These offices collected some $300,000 from the time of their establishment to November, 1866; [101] and much money was saved for the soldiers and their families which would surely have been lost or reduced by delays and charges.

99. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 28, 29, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1864-1865, part I, pp. 34, 76; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 322.
100. Ibid., p. 322; Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 28, 29, 1863; Documentary Journal, 1865, part I, p. 703.
101. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 47, 322-323; Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 27, 1863.

XI. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR

1. Situation about 1860

GREAT ECONOMIC CHANGE took place in the period of the Civil War. It had already started in the 1850's, was hastened by the needs of the conflict, then was delayed in the post-war years. Traditionally agriculture had been of a subsistence nature with only surplus to sell; life on the farm was hard for everyone concerned. Forested parts of counties still ranged from fifty to ninety percent of the area. Change was encouraged by the appearance of fairs and the state board of agriculture which disseminated rural education by making available booklets, lectures, etc. Better transportation assisted in this program too, as did better methods and machinery. Better agricultural practices favored artificial drainage of land, the use of fertilizer, as well as green crops plowed under and rotation of crops. Livestock characteristics were as varied as those of their owners; then specialized breeds of horses appeared; even hogs began to yield to improvement, as did sheep and wool, and cattle.[1] Dogs with their possibilities for damaging livestock began to be taxed and licensed in 1861.[2]

The same was true of crops raised. Chinese sorghum cane was introduced in 1857. Rush county led in agricultural production; federal patent office was helpful with suggestions; agricultural societies and farm journals helped. Prizes were offered for best yield. Corn ranked first in value of farm crops; then came wheat, with central and northern counties leading, as they did for oats. Other crops were hay, rye, hemp, tobacco and Irish potatoes, rather than sweet potatoes just yet. Orchards, dairy and gardens were important.[3]

The general result was good. Property evaluation increased from $202 millions in 1850 to $528 millions in 1860. Three million acres were under cultivation. Over $10 million value of farm implements were in use in 1860. Crop yield ranged up to 700 percent increase in the decade especially with respect to fruit and tobacco, but ordinarily gain was about 250 per cent. Cotton, flax and hemp yielded to sheep and wool for textiles; clothing changed from linsey-woolsey to woolens. As prices were good, household industry declined. Butter came to predominate over wild meat on farmers' tables.[4]

Progress was dependent on prices and transportation to market. Canals there were and of some value but there were regrets that the state had used its credit so recklessly. Roads received attention. Plank roads were the latest thing, but being only ten feet wide, there was great inconvenience when wheeled vehicles met. There were hund-

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1. Esarey, Indiana, II, 822-832.
2. Indiana Statutes, 1861, Ch. 50.
3. Esarey, Indiana, II, 833-839.
4. Esarey, Indiana, II, 582-586.

AREAS OF MOST AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1870

217. WHEAT



218. TOBACCO



219. CORN



220. AREAS OF GREATEST VALUE FOR PRODUCTION



reds of miles of these roads in 1860; plank tracks for wheels only were being advocated. There were problems of dirt roads, too. Turnpikes, graded and graveled, were common.[5]

As for railroads, not much construction had taken place before 1850 except between Madison and Indianapolis. Branch roads came to radiate out of the latter city. Finance was by private enterprise in a kind of mutual improvement society, but was still to be "public road." By 1848 there were eighteen railroads chartered by the state, along with others of varied and earlier ancestry. The Indianapolis and Bellefontaine was completed in 1853. Vandalia railroad was the principal early connection between St. Louis and New York; its net earning in 1868 was about one million dollars. The Ohio and Indianapolis reached Indianapolis in 1868. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago railway was completed in 1859. The Baltimore and Ohio was built across Indiana by 1857, with six-foot gauge rails. Much of construction was poor as was railway equipment; wrecks were frequent. The 228 miles of railway in 1850 was increased to 2,125 in 1860. The war slowed construction by possibly two-thirds but made fullest use of existing facilities.[6] During the war there were various mergers[7] and appearance of longer roads. Facilities were greatly improved: Tracks, cars, bridges, schedule, depots, light and heat, sleeping cars, grain elevators.

Such were foundations in economic life. Necessities of war hastened the economic revolution. Flour, whiskey and pork were now being shipped eastward to market rather than as primary goods as wheat, corn and hogs. This brought ready cash for purchase of goods formerly made at home. It induced more clearing of land and raising larger amounts of produce; but farmers were still hesitant about investing heavily in farm implements. Grist mill production tended to centralize, drive the old local burr mills out of business, and release labor for other employment. Labor was still cheaper than machines and farmers were slow to change anyway.[8] Other changes were taking place. Women and children had always done farm work but the practice was definitely increased during the War. Of the total number of school teachers in Indiana in 1861, 1,611 were women and 5,327 were men; in 1866 almost half of the 9,493 teachers were women.[9] Men had gone elsewhere.

The war increased sharply this tendency to change. Esarey says: "The Civil War suddenly withdrew every able-bodied laborer that could be spared. Not only were about 200,000 men withdrawn from active labor in the state but their employers (armed forces) became wholesale buyers of supplies for the subsistence of those (same) men, at prices

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[5] Ibid., 839-841.

[6] Ibid., 714-737; House, Journal, 1855, 31; O. H. Smith, Indiana, 4 424; Indiana Statutes for the various years. Indiana Magazine of History, XII, XV.

[7] Stampp, The Impact of the Civil War upon Hoosier Society, Indiana Magazine of History, vol XXXVIII., pp. 1 ff.

[8] Esarey, II, 849-850.

[9] State Superintendent, Reports, 6.

never heard of before. The tempting prices caused the farmers to buy farm implements freely and employ every available agency to increase their crops and take advantage of rising prices. Thousands of women became active laborers in the fields.

"The close of the war reversed all those tendencies. Thousands of young men returned from the army to find their places taken by machines. Wholesalers and jobbers bought all the surplus produce and shipped it to the large cities where it was manufactured into its final form. Released from all the difficulties of marketing and manufacture the farmers increased their output rapidly. On top of this came a break in produce prices, a rise in the price of machinery and an increase in freight rates."[10] In 1860 value of farm implements produced was a little more than $700,000, increased from $150,000 in 1850. Wheat was valued at eighty cents a bushel in 1857, $2.00 in 1866; then began the slump. Young men home from the wars and with or without means of making a living went west to build railroads, hunt buffalo, to Indian fighting or to just plain banditry. Others took up farming there and produced wheat, corn and livestock in competition with that in the East.[11])

2. During the War: Railroads, Steamboats, Telegraph

Transportation made an important contribution both in helping to bring on the war and to winning it. They had business aims in mind and well advanced, but there were emergencies during which profit was forgotten. The following quotation from Terrell, Report (1869) Volume I,[12] somewhat adapted, outlines very well the story for railroads, steamboats and telegraph in the war period.

a. Railroads

Railroads assisted materially to enable the state "to place her quotas in the field; to furnish supplies and material of war for her troops; to look after and relieve her sick and wounded soldiers; to protect her southern border against rebel raids and to repel rebel invasions; and to meet and overcome the many critical emergencies that arose during those eventful years. While it may be truly said that our railroad corporations flourished to an unparalleled degree by the patronage of the State and General Government resulting from the war, many of them, indeed, having been enabled from their military business alone to extinguish very heavy indebtedness and to bring up their stock from merely nominal figures to handsome quotable rates--it is but just to add that they did not receive greater profits nor amass more wealth than they were reasonably entitled to by their energy and enterprise, their hazards and the immense capital employed.

"Their regular business and the private interests of communities and individuals were necessarily subjected to many interruptions and annoyances by the peculiar and imperative demands of the public service, and such interruptions doubtless often resulted in heavy pecuniary losses and sacrifices to the business public. Military transpor-

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10. Esarey, II, 849-850; Eighth Census, 169.
11. Census Reports, 1870; Esarey, II, 851-852.
12. Terrell, Report (1960), 489-495.

RAILWAYS, 1860



tation always took precedence; and at times, for weeks in succession, the ordinary business of the country was almost entirely neglected and deferred.

"The capacity of the several roads, the ability and tact of the managing officials, and the faithfulness and endurance of operating employees, were thoroughly tested in a manner that reflected the highest credit upon all concerned.

"hile it is impracticable to make special mention of the many occasions when the salvation of the country, and especially the asfety of our own homes, seemed to depend upon the prompt action of the railroads, it is proper to state that their good management was strikingly displayed in forwarding new regiments to Kentucky in August, 1862, when the rebel forces , ., aiming to reach and destroy Cincinnati, were met and checked at Richmond; and in July, 1863, when undertook his famous marauding expedition north of the Ohio. Cincinnati was saved; and the Morgan raiders were compelled to fly from the state, almost without sleep or rest. Most of the railroad companies observed the very liberal rule of carrying soldiers discharged in the field or on furlough, when unprovided with State or Government transportation, at one half the usual rates, whenever it appeared from their papers that they had been honorable discharged, or were traveling on proper leaves of absence. To those who were sick this generous reduction was a particularly welcome and valuable favor, enabling thousands to reach their homes where they could recruit their impaired health, as well as to return to their regiments in the field at the proper time. In a great many cases where soldiers were destitute of means to pay their fare, or even represented themselves to be destitute, they were passed free. Impositions were of frequent occurrence, but the peculiar circumstances of the times and the disposition almost universally felt to mitigate the sufferings and relieve the destitution of every meritorious soldier, induced most of the companies to relax and liberally construe their otherwise inflexibly stringent rules.

"Requisitions were frequently made by the State authorities for special and irregular trains for the movement of troops, and to convey surgeons, nurses and hospital stores to the battlefield. These requsitions were always promptly met, and the services thus rendered were the means of accomplishing incalculable good. In the severe winter of 1862-1863, the wood for the use of the camps at Indianapolis, including the rebel prison, was nearly exhausted; the weather was such that a supply could not be brought in by teams, and the men consequently being put upon short allowance, became disaffected to such an extent that there was serious danger of a general stampede. In this conditi tion of affairs, the officers of the Terre Haute road were applied to for relief, and they very promptly furnished an abundant supply of fuel from their woodyards in the country.

"But while as a general rule the admirable management of the railroads in the state during the war reflected the highest credit upon their officers, there were exceptional instances where the interests of the Government and the comfort of troops were greatly neglected. Delays occurred, whereby the men suffered much from hunger; and insuffi-

cient supply of fuel occasionally afforded ground of complaint, and cars were furnished in some instances which were unfit for the transportation of human beings. Pressure of business and unavoidable accidents doubtless contributed largely to these evils, but inefficiency and culpable neglect on the part of railroad officials were sometimes clearly apparent. The bad conduct of a few soldiers in maliciously damaging coaches, frequently caused the substitution of freight and stock cars, where better conveyances might have been supplied. The soldiers were displeased at this offensive discrimination between themselves and the general traveling public. . . . . . Thus feelings of mutual hostility were engendered between the railroad officials and the soldiers, which led to harsh treatment from the former and aggressive acts by the latter.

"In the summer of 1862, complaints against some of the roads were so frequent it became necessary to appoint for this State a military railroad superintendent, and Colonel . . ., Superintendent of the Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad, was appointed to that office, which action was attended with advantageous results.

"The following table will be interesting:
. . of companies, recruits and persons on military business carried by the various railroads in the State, during the year 1861, and the amounts audited and allowed to the same by the Military Auditing Committee, exclusive of Regiments en route to the field of active service:

RAILROADS	MEN	AMOUNT
Evansville and Crawfordsville	6,916	$9,927.45
Terre Haute and Richmond	12,640	14,668.04
Ohio and Mississippi	5,060	4,816.55
Lafayette and Indianapolis	9,545	11,642.14
Indiana Central	5,342	6,694.21
Peru and Indianapolis	6,456	8,246.82
Toledo and Western	3,548	2,988.82
Indianapolis and Cincinnati	5,864	7,701.27
Indianapolis, Pittsburgh and Cleveland	2,079	1,981.58
Jeffersonville	6,199	9,413.66
Madison and Indianapolis	5,521	6,241.37
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago	853	500.18
Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana	3,309	2,858.10
Cincinnati, Peru and Chicago	940	574.94
Louisville, New Albany and Chicago	9,105	9,149.42
Bellefontaine	2,088	1,662.97
Cincinnati and Chicago Air Line	1,628	1,313.48
	87,093	$100,178.00
Carried by steamboats	1,893	2,293.05
Carried by wagons	1,232	1,970.10
Total for 1861	90,218	$104,441.15

b. Ohio River Packets

"The various lines of packets, operating on the Ohio river during the war, rendered important service to the state and national govern-

CANALS AND CANALIZED RIVERS



ments, of a similar character to those performed by our railroads. Their promptness in seconding the efforts of the authorities and the liberality and general efficiency of their management contributed largely to the success of military operations.

"Guerrilla bands which infested the Kentucky shore and larger bodies of rebel troops occasionally operating in that state, rendered river navigation exceedingly hazardous, and steamers were often exposed to imminent danger of capture. The risks of person and property were met with such courage and business energy as entitled the owners and officers of the packet lines to honorable mention among the agencies employed in the prosecution of the war.

"Steamers were frequently chartered for sending relief--sanitary supplies, surgeons and nurses--to battlefields and to hospitals at various points on the Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi rivers, and for bringing home the sick and wounded, of which more particular mention is made in another part of this report.[13] These steamers rendered invaluable service."

c. The Telegraph

"One of the most important, indeed one of the indispensable, instruments in carrying on the war was the telegraph. On many occasions it was relied on almost entirely as the means of communication, and at all times during the war it was used perhaps to an equal extent with the mails. To the superintendents, managers and operators in Indiana, and especially those on duty at Indianapolis, the thanks of the Governor and his military staff are especially due for their uniform courtesy and efficiency. . . . ., Manager, and . . . , Chief Operator at Indianapolis, deserve particular mention for their faithful and able services in the line of their profession, . . .

"The following statistics convey but an imperfect idea of the business transacted over the wires by the Executive and Military Departments of the state during the war:

OFFICERS		TELEGRAPH CHARGES		CHIEF OF
FOR THE YEAR 1861	GOVERNOR	AD'T GEN.	Q.M.G.	ORDNANCE
Governor	$5,939.07			
Adjutant General		$ 756.58		
Quartermaster General			$562.54	
FOR THE YEAR 1862				
Governor	8,907.03			
Adjutant General		1,093.43		
Quartermaster General			228.71	
Chief of Ordnance				$459.06
FOR THE YEAR 1863				
Governor	5,137.67			
Adjutant General		627.7.		
Quartermaster General			14.16	
Chief of Ordnance				162.12

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13. Lake traffic was not so important for Indiana.

FOR THE YEAR 1864				
Governor	$3,902.87			
Adjutant General		$1,168.91		
Quartermaster General			$29.21	
Chief of Ordnance				70.19
FOR THE YEAR 1865				
Governor	2,783.92			
Adjutant General		1,456.87		
Quartermaster General			8.45	
TOTAL	$26,670.56	$5,103.50	$843.07	$691.37
Grand Total				$33,308.50

3. Other Economic and Social Change

So economic practices were revolutionized during the war period. By 1860 the states of the Old Northwest were producing one-half of the cereals in the United States, and Indiana was doing her share. Demands of wartime absorbed the great harvests of those years. Production of hogs and sheep had been standard activity for several years; cattle packing barely broke over from beginnings. Tobacco raising increased in southern Indiana. Production of sugar and syrup were never adequate for demands, even with the addition of Chinese sorghum to possibilities. Part of the problem of agriculture was that of adequate labor. Labor was drained off by calls for army service and by migrations of farmers to the Far West by the almost endless wagon trains. Their places were rather adequately filled by work of women in the fields, by new arrivals of immigrants from abroad and others from the Border, and by use of the new labor saving machinery, which might reduce labor demands by eighty per cent as well as enable a harvest. Reapers were the great demand; manufacturers were flooded with orders. Federal government was lavish in making lands available to prospective farmers, to railroad companies engaged in construction. Railroads and lake shipping carried farm products eastward and freight rates declined; facilities were inadequate to meet the demands. Product was consumed in industrial communities, by the armed forces, by sale abroad where harvests were not good from 1861 to 1863, in England especially. Size of farms increased; debts were paid; Bankruptcies were few; farmers were prosperous as prices rose and markets were abundant. Agrarian economy was giving way to industry.

And other productions were somewhat in proportion. Salt was in great demand. The same was true of lumber; Southern product ceased to come north; Canadian was excluded. That made for great activity in local lumber camps.[14]

While Indiana was not yet an industrial area, there were abundant raw materials to be processed locally or carried by railroads to distant points. Slaughter house and meat packing went on in all cities, but especially at those along the Ohio river. The War induced greatest

[14] Emerson Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions during the Civil War (New York, 1910), pp. 1-24.

POPULATION ANALYSIS, 1870

229. Areas of Most Negroes



230. Areas of Most Persons with Foreign-Born Parentage



231. Areas with Most Germans



232. Areas with Most Population from British Isles



activity along these lines. Grist and flour mills poured forth their product. Enen in 1860, ninety millions of gallons of whiskey were produced in the United States and Indiana produced its share; the War increased production greatly and even though taxation increased on it, liquor interest made huge profits. Production of thread and cloth and clothing had always been a problem. Then came war demands and improvement in machinery and more application of steam power. Labor costs per unit dropped decidedly; tariff increased in 1861, favored home industry over the protests of Democrats and by 1863 local product was sufficient to supply the tremendous demand; the armed forces absorbed persons thrown out of employment b, economic change. Shoemaking was mechanized and profited in much the same fashion as had other trades. Number of industrial establishments increased by two or three times during the War. A government contract was a sure road to prosperity. And production per mill changed to product more in demand, as carpet mill to woolens, machine shop to gun factory, saws to sabers and jewelry to brass buttons. And government itself was in production: Armories, clothing factory, gunboats trough private contracts. And interest in production for civilian was great also. While business with the South was ruined, war orders enabled old factories to shift to related products or to the construction of new ones. City population increased; there was much construction fo new buildings. Boat building increased after 1862, product going into government service.[15]

Secession and outbreak of war brought a year of panic to business houses, which was soon followed by unexampled prosperity. Strain was great at presidential election time in 1860 and at the time of secession of South Carolina, in that the very existence of the United States and its guarrantees of currency was at stake. Trade with the South was interrupted; Merhants complained about hard times in 1861 and at times engaged in contraband trade until government mostly closed that outlet and took the goods for war use. Bank suspensions of specie payments was common, in part because their reserves were too low to enable them to meet their daily needs. And wild cat banks with their uncertain currency added to the turmoil with their failures, from which business was rescued by the establishment of national banking system in 1863, but federal greenbacks and postal currency was much like wildcat at times when there were military reverses or international controversy, as at the time of the "Trent" affair in 1861. Gold was subject to the same factors. State Bank was forced to suspend specie payments in the spring of 1862. The new national banks increased at the expense of the local ones; by 1864 there were thirty-one national banks in the state.[16] But wages were high and government payments rampant, hence banks and banking profited. Savings banks and express companies shared the good times, as did insurance companies. Government loans lagged into 1862 and then were as dependent on military successes as were elections. Taxes were levied on many things, but prices kept ahead of government dues. Government could print greenbacks and inject currency into the economic life of the country. Heavy taxes and inflation brought distress, but men grew rich from war profits and lived extravagantly.

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15. Ibid., pp. 78-105.
16. Stampp, The Impact of the Civil War upon Hoosier Socity, in

Production by many small units had to be changed otpproduction by larger units with greater efficiency if war materials were to be adequate. There must be pools of capital available to enable the shift; The banking and stock sales agencies helped to provide it at first; then persons of wealth began to appear more nearly able to supply their own capital. Indianans always ran to Cincinnati, Chicago and New York banks in time of need. Wealthy persons went with the trend.[17]

American labor in 1861 was in good circumstances. But there was danger from paper money and inflated prices. Employers hesitated to pass a fair share of profits on to labor. Soon wages rose by one-half while prices of some foods more than doubled; many, of course, must accept the low soldier's pay of thirteen dollars a month regardless of economic conditions, and their families must subsist on it. Clothing prices rose 120 per cent; food prices rose sixty percent; this made hard time for labor. Women and children did industrial labor. Labor saving machinery was ill-regarded by labor as a factor in holding wages down. Negro labor in industry was unimportant. The new immigrant was welcomed by industry but not by labor, and he arrived increasingly in the later years of the war. From eleven to sixteen ho hours made a day's service in the 1850's; ten for the war period. Labor organized to secure its demands as to wages, hours and closing time. The military were severe in clash with organized labor. Early unions were only shop-wide, then spread to larger area, or more nearly became industrial locally. Strike was the favorite weapon, and usually its application was not a success. Labor emerged form the war no better off than it had been when the conflict started.[18]

As would be expected when money was flush, public improvements were made. City streets were neglected but "in every city, in spite of war, new buildings of every kind were being erected, dwellings, business houses, schools, and churches. Streets were blocked as in normal times by those operations, by the digging of water, gas, and sewerage systems, the construction of fire-alarm telegraphs, by paving and sidewalk construction and by the laying of street car tracks. Fire departments were progressing, and new parks were being opened." This was true of cities in general; it was especially true of Indianapolis among Indiana cities.[19]

Education was affected by the war, but the result was not especially damaging; indeed in some ways it was stimulating in the travel engaged in, and the more substantial publications etc. Of course students and professors were drawn away to war service possibly to extent of twenty percent, but over-all attendance increased in [illegible]. Then decreased attendance was due to withdrawal of Southern registrants. Expenses remained low as did salaries. Freedom of speech and thought suffered somewhat. Female seminaries suffered from rise of woman's colleges and high schools. Secondary education for boys was affected by enlistments; public schools were full to overflowing, even [illegible]f at-

Indiana Magazine of History, vol. XXXVIII, pp.1 ff.

17. Fite, chaps. III, V.
18. Ibid., pp. 183-213.
19. Ibid., Chap. VIII.

tendance averaged only about 50 percent. Much of instruction consisted of absorption of text book. Besides formal education other agencies were active for adults especially: Lectures, magazines and journals, libraries, historical societies, various American Associations of specialized fields, Many and better books were beingpublished; pamphlets were on the increase.[20]

The new-found wealth was expressed in more luxurious living and amusements, rather regardless of price. There was interest in music, theatre, museum and exhibitions. Prize fights were very popular, and baseball. Of mass or special appeal, were billiards, card playing, receptions, picnics, skating parties, photographs, etc. and the fast life continued in spite of conservatives to put a damper on it while the existence of the Union was in danger.[21]

Prior to the War charity or benefactions had not been too evident. Then everyone became interested in the welfare of "Boys in Blue," in those recruits from Indiana especially. War work made demands for time and money, individually and organized. Great quantities of supplies were collected and distributed in response to or in anticipation of battle needs. Soldier's and Ladies Homes were set upto satisfy needs for soldiers on the move and of relatives. The great drive was for hospitals and supplies, for supplying to the train loads of wounded on the way to river ports, Indianapolis, etc. as shown elsewhere. Great drives were made for funds to finance these enterprises.[22] Church workers were sent to army camps; thousands of Bibles were distributed. There was much of crime and financial irregulartity; perhaps law enforcement was lax at times. Many real or potential criminals were drawn into the army.. It was not until after the war that veterans fell to direct action to dealing with problems, or went West where they mingled with others of their kind from North and South and continued to settle arguments with a gun. After 1863 church work got much attention; memberships increased and work was done on a broad front.[23]

20. Ibid., pp. 232-259.
21. Ibid., chap. X.
22. Ibid., chap. XI.
23. Ibid., pp. 306-309.

INDUSTRIAL CITIES AND PRODUCT, 1860-1880



XII. OTHER SERVICES TO THE UNION

1. Aid to Federal Program in Kentucky-Tennessee

OF INDIANA'S OTHER SERVICES to the North, the following contributions of Governor Morton are the most important: His assistance in saving Kentucky for the Union; his aid to Ohio in her time of stress; his care for Confederate prisoners of war; and his interest in general plans for carrying on the war, as, plans for opening of the Mississippi to the commerce of the North. Morton was especially interested in saving Kentucky for the Union, and by so doing he was making the most effective defense for his won state,[1] which was therefore a policy directly in line with his duties as commmander-in-chief of Indiana's forces and its chief executive. His actions in that respect can not therefore be regarded as extra-legal. But there was an extra-legal phase to these activities as is shown in his interest in furthering the federal cause there, even though in times of special danger his interest in Indiana's welfare became predominant. His interest or alarm in federal successes or failures varied largely in proportion to the danger of Confederate forces carrying the war into Indiana. Evidences of a desire to further the federal cause are seen in his efforts to energize the war in Kentucky, his conferences with other leaders on conditions there, his encouraging of expeditions from Indiana to pursue into Kentucky rebel bands that had invaded his state, and his calls for gunboats and batteries on the Ohio.

Indiana and Kentucky had always been close to each other, having had common problems and a population closely related by blood, attitudes, and customs. In 1861 arose the question of the proper attitude to be taken on supporting the Union. Both states were somewhat divided on the answer, but of Kentucky it was especially true. Kentucky was a border state in its attitude and in its geographical position; Indiana was one only in respect to attitude. In 1861 the former had a governor who leaned toward the Confederacy, but whose views were largely for a compromise on the qusetion; should that fail, he thought the state should take a position of armed neutrality, or as a last resort join the Confederacy. In 1861 the latter had a governor, constitutionally built along the same lines, but leaning far more decidedly in the opposite direction.

Governor Magoffin was the first to engage in active plans for accomplishing his purpose. He proposed to Governors Morton and Dennison a conference to cooperate with him "in a proposition to the government at Washington for peace, by the border states, as mediators between the contending parties."[2] Morton replied that he would "unite in any effort for the restoration of the Union and for peace which will be constitutional and honorable to Indiana and the Federal government . .

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1. O. P. Morton to General Wright, December 13, 1862, Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 499-500.
2. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 135. See also Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 213-218.

. ."[3] Governor Dennison agreed to the proposal after consultation with Morton. Neither favored Magoffin's plan, but they wanted to control the situatuion as afr as they could. They knew that Magoffin was negotiating for arms from the south, and was in correspondence with the Confederate Secretary of War in respect to furnishing troops to the Confederacy.[4] He proposed Cincinnati as the place for the conference, but failed to come in person, sending Colonel Thomas P. Crittenden instead, and authorizing him fully to represent him. Morton and Dennison refused to open the conference except with Magoffin himself. Finally Governor Morton, on May 1, 1861, wrote Crittenden his views on the situation, "I hold that Indianaand Kentucky are but integral parts of the nation, and, as such, are subject to the government of the United States, and bound to obey the requisitions of the President, issued in pursuance of his constitutional authority; that it is the duty of every state to prohibit, by all means in its power, the transportation within its own limits, of arms, military stores and provisions, to any state in open rebellion and hostility to the government of the United States, and to restrain its citizens from all acts giving aid and comfort to the enemy; that there is no ground in the Constitution midway between the federal government and a rebellious state, upon which another state can stand, holding both in check, and that a state must take its stand upon one side or the other, and I invoke the state of Kentucky, by all the sacred ties that bind us together, to take her stand with Indiana, promptly and efficiently, on the side of the Union, the action of the federal government in the present contest being strictly in accordance with the constitution and the laws of the land . . . ."[5] The attempt at conference resulted in loss to Magoffin, since he did not appear while the other governors were in Cincinnati.[6] The governors at least might have prevented Magoffin using the argument that the whole North was determined to coerce the southern states. Indiana was assuming a defensive position.

During the summer of 1861 Kentucky necessarily abandoned all idea of neutrality. Opinion crystalized into opposing factions. Confed-

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3. Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 135.
4. Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, April 25, May 1, 3, 15, 18, 25, 1861; New Albany Daily Ledger, April 25, 1861; Louisville Journal, May 24, 1861, quotes a letter from L. P. Walker to Governor Magoffin, dated April 22, 1861, in which this is discussed.
5. O. P. Morton to Thomas P. Crittenden, May 1, 1861, Foulke, Life of Morton, vol, I, pp. 137-138. When the question of sending delegates to the conference to discuss the Crittenden Compromise, Morton picked Indiana's delegates with care, sending to each a questionaire which was to be answered in writing to guarantee against all chance of the movement receiving Indiana's consent.
6. He arrived unannounced the next day however, after Morton and Dennison had departed. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 138-139. The correspondence is printed in ibid., pp. 13 -138. See also Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, May 3, 1861; New Albany Daily Ledger, April 26, 1861.

erates seized Columbus on the Mississippi; federal forces occupied Paducah.[7] Camp Joe Holt was established near Louisville. Morton took an active interest in the enterprise. "He made Rousseau heartily welcome, gave permission to Indiana citizens to enlist in his regiments, and allowed companies to be organized in Know and Dearborn counties. Morton was in frequent consultation with Kentucky Unionists, and busied himself in securing and distributing arms and in urging the government to prompt and energetic action."[8] "To his efforts, in no small degree, must be attributed the final determination of the President, to establish military camps and recruiting posts, within the state, as was done at several points about this time."[9] The new state legislature, meeting on September 3, registered the return of control to the Unionists, and took decided steps to prepare the state for an active support of the Union cause. In October fully organized Union forces opposed Confederate troops entering Kentucky from the south.[10] Morton was very active in supplying Indiana regiments to Union forces there.[11]

The subsequent events of the war show the extent and quality of Morton's efforts. The first rebel invasion into Indiana occurred on July 18, 1862, when thirty-two officers and men took Newburgh, plundered its houses and stores, and paroled about ninety sick and wounded Union soldiers in the hospital there. They returned to Kentucky on the same day.. Their success at Newburg was an indication of the general unreadiness of state forces to meet emergencies, as the best organizations had been sent to Kentucky.[12] Federal forces had failed to cope with the situation which had threatened the invasion.[13] To prevent a repetition of the affair, Morton determined to act on the offensive, and after consultation with General Boyle, commanding the military district of Kentucky, obtained that general's consent to organize an expedition to follow the rebels to their source.[14] Major General Love, of the Indiana militia, and Brigadier General Blythe cooperated with Morton in laying plans for the expedition. On July 19, Morton issued a call for volunteers for it. The state being

[7] Ropes, Civil War, vol. I, p. 188.

[8] Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 141-142. See also Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 224.

[9] Ibid., p. 224.

[10] Ropes, Civil War, vol. I, pp. 194-197. Early in September, 1861, Morton secured the consent of President Lincoln to withhold four regiments from Missouri to guard against developments in Kentucky, Cameron to Fremont, September 5, 1861, Official Reocrds, Series I, vol. III, p. 470.

[11] Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 225-226.

[12] General Telegrams, vol. IV, pp. 49, 50, 53, 59.

[13] Ibid., pp. 56, 75, 79, 86.

[14] That General Boyle was willing to undertake the expedition is evident, "You must attend to Henderson and that region the Devils are doing their utmost and may give us great trouble in Kentucky . . . . ." General Boyle to Governor Morton. July 22, 1862, ibid., p. 163.

greatly aroused, responded readily. The Indiana Legion in the southern part of the state was ordered on duty. Troops to cross to Kentucky were mustered into the federal service for thirty days. Troops, the Governor, and commanders collected at Evansville.[15] The forces were organized as the Sixty-Seventh Indiana Regiment of Volunteers.

Gunboats were needed to patrol the Ohio, and afford assistance needed by the expedition. Morton directed the detention of a steam ram belonging to the federal government, and sent it on scout duty up the Green river;[16] he called on Captain Pennock, a United States naval officer at Cairo, for a gunboat, and added, ". . . lose no time it is a matter of the first importance."[17] Two boats were furnished, with Captain Pennock in command,[18] as were others from time to time.[19] With all preparations complete, Morton was able to telegraph Indianapolis on July 22, "About one (1) o'clock this morning near one thousand (1000) troops infantry, cavalry and artillery crossed the river to Henderson and took possession without opposition at daylight. Col. Gaving advanced into the interior with five hundred (500) men . . . . Another company went to Henderson this afternoon."[20] Colonel Gavin carried orders from General Boyle to, "Drive out the rebel bands in Henderson, Davis, Webster and Union counties, shooting down all guerrillas in arms and making armed resistance . . . ."[21] These troops were kept in the service until the expiration of their term of enlistment , when they were relieved by the Sixty-Fifth Indiana.[22]

A telegram to the Secretary of War, dated July 19, gave no indication that the Governor intended to organize such an expedition, even though he recounted the raid on Newburgh.[23] Another sent two days later, after it had been organized, told him that "We have sent a sufficient force to Henderson under General Love of our State Militia to clean out Henderson, Webster, Davis, and Union Counties at the request of General Boyle . . . ."[24] In addition to the skirmishes engaged in, General Boyle authorized Morton to "direct the officer commanding any force you may send to Henderson or that region to seize the horses of secessionists and give receipt for the same . . . ."[25] This was done.[26] "The course pursued for the

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15. Ibid., pp. 164, 200; Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 148. Morton had no legal right to order the Legion from the state, hence he called on it for volunteers for the federal service.
16. General Telegrams, vol. IV, pp. 121, 130.
17. O. P. Morton to Captain Pennock, July 18, 1862, ibid., p. 120.
18. General Telegrams, vol. IV, pp. 129, 132, 170.
19. Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 69, 121, 130, 132, 170; ibid., vol. XV, p. 272; Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 69-71, 264.
20. General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 159.
21. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 149.
22. Ibid., pp. 149-150.
23. O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, July 19 , 1862, General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 138.
24. W. R. Holloway to E. M. Stanton, July 21, 1862,Ibid., p. 154.
25. General Boyle to O. P. Morton, July 22, 1862, ibid., p. 161.
26. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 149.

security of our southern border, was warmly approved by the President and the Secretary of War, and was gratefully acknowledged by General Boyle."[27] Morton sent troops organized on the same basis as the above into Trimble and adjoining counties later in the same month;[28] and another expedition was successfully executed in August, 1864, by General Hovey.[29] In December, 1863, the Indiana Legion bombarded Hawesville, Kentucky, from the Indiana shore.[30]

Morton's influence was also felt in the arbitrary arrests made at the same time. It would seem that he ordered arrests of disloyal Kentuckians engaged in treasonable practices; he did this on his own responsibility when he thought the occasion too urgent to permit of delay. On July 19, 1862, he was notified by Captain D. W. Cheek, "I Have strong affidavits against Abram Piatt, Boone County, Kentucky. Send the Marshall immediately. Answer."[31] Morton replied, "Send him under guard."[32] Morton turned him over to Colonel Rose at Camp Morton, but on discovering that the United States district attorney for Indiana had no jurisdiction in the case, sent him to General Boyle at Louisville.[33] On July 16, 1862, Morton told Colonel Leonidas Metcalfe, of the Seventh Cavalry Kentucky Volunteers at Cynthiana, Kentucky, that, "any prisoners of war, traitors or persons whose conduct is dangerous to our Government, whom you may cause to be arrested, will be received and kept in the prison-camp in this city (Indianapolis), or otherwise confined as the necessity of the case may require."[34] Since the middle of 1861, Morton had been in close connection with Kentucky through his own secret service and agents in the employ of the federal government, and had been instrumental in getting the arrests of other offenders.[35] Nor did he hesitate to make objection to the decisions of the War Department when they differed from his own.[36] He notified the Department of persons that he thought should be arrested; was given permission to release prisoners at his own discretion;[37]

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27. Ibid., p. 150. Terrell gives the account favorable to Morton on pages 143-150.
28. General Telegrams, vol. IV, pp. 178, 184, 185.
29. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp, 207-211.
30. Ibid., p. 123.
31. Captain D. W. Cheek to O. P. Morton, July 19, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 137.
32. O. P. Morton to Captain D. W. Cheek, July 19, 1862, ibid., p.138.
33. W. R. Holloway to Colonel D. G. Rose, July 21, 1862, Morton, Letters, vol. I, p. 67; W. R. Holloway to General Boyle, July 21, 1862, ibid., p. 66.
34. Ibid., p. 53.
35. O. P. Morton to Thomas W. Scott, August (?), 1861, Official Records, Series I, vol. III, p. 255; General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 55, 61, 62; General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 72; ibid., vol.III, pp. 137, 194; Fesler, Secret Political Societies, pp. 238,259-260.
36. W. R. Holloway to E. M. Stanton, May 13, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 242.
37. W. H. H. Terrell to W. Farleigh, December 16, 1862, Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 507-508.

offered to appear before a grand jury in Louisville to give testimony;[38] and at times asked the consent of the federal authorities to make arrests. This connection with Kentucky continued throughout the war.[40]

He urged that federal authorities complete the construction of a telegraph line between Louisville and Indianaplois to enable military authorities in Indiana to keep in touch with the military situation in Kentucky, without having to wait for messages to reach Indianapolis by way of Cincinnati.[41] He wanted a line built from Jeffersonville to the mouth of the Wabash river for the same purpose; and suggested to Governor Yates that he extend it to Cairo.[42]

Governor Morton also took an active part in the arrests in Kentucky in 1861. On September 19, of that year, Charles S. Morehead, ex-governor of Kentucky, Reuben F. Durrett, and M. W. Barr were arrested in Louisville, charged with treason, or disloylaty. Danger of Morehead being released on a writ of habeas corpus becoming immediately evident, the United States marshal there arranged with Governor Morton and the provost-marshal for the Indiana district that the prisoners should be transferred to Indiana. They reached Indianapolis on September 20, where they were turned over to federal military authorities and taken to Fort Lafayette.[43]

His interest in Kentucky affairs was also expressed in conferences held from time to time. Early in July, 1862, he was in conference with Secretary Stanton at Cleveland on the affairs of Kentucky and the Northwest.[44] On July 27, 1862, he and J. C. Harvey, treasurer of Indiana, telegraphed General Boyle, G. D. Prentis, and others at Louisville, "It is of great importance that the leading men of Kentucky should have a free conference at once."[45] It was held at Cincinnati.[46] The situation in Kentucky had caused General Wright to be sent to the Northwest. After a full consultation with Governors Morton and Robi-

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38. General Dispatches, vol. IX, p.135
40. Official Records, Series II, vol. VII, p. 271; Fesler, Secret Political Societies, pp. 259-260.
41. W. H. H. Terrell to O. P. Morton, October 17, 1862, General Dispatches, vol. IX, p. 116; O. P. Morton to General Boyle, August 13, 1862, ibid., vol. XV, p. 100; W. R. Holloway to George McLeod, President of the Jeffersonville Railway, January 9,1863, Morton, Letters, vol. I, p. 651; Indianapolis Daily Journal, December 20, 1862.
42. O. P. Morton to Governor Yates, December 13, 1862, Private Dispatches, No. 16, p. 30.
43. Official Records, Series II, vol. II, pp. 805-829; Indianapolis Daily Journal, September 20, 21, 22, 23, 1861. O. F. Miner to O. P. Morton, September 21, 1861, unclassified mss., Indiana State Library; New Albany Daily Ledger, September 23, 28, 1861.
44. General Telegrams, vol. IV, pp. 49, 52, 55, 88, 90.
45. Ibid., p. 213.
46. Ibid., p. 222.

inson he proclaimed martial law in Jefferson County, Kentucky, on September 2, 1862.[47] On the previous day, as General Bragg advanced towards Louisville, Governors Morton and Robinson held a conference in Louisville and called on General Halleck for "at least six well trained batteries . . . . We ask you to order them without an hour's delay."[48] Again on September 16 they were in consultation over rumors that General Wright was planning to order the troops defending Louisville to the defense of Cincinnati. They raised a great storm about it before General Wright's real intentions were revealed.[49] On September 2, those governors and General Wright united in urging Governor Yates to send all forces under his control to Louisville at once.[50]

Governor Morton was by no means as closely in touch with Ohio and Illinois affairs as he was with those of Kentucky, due to there being comparatively no danger from those sources. He had few relations with Governor Yates except on purely federal questions. The most outstanding ing assistance given to Ohio was given during Kirby Smith's threatened invasion in 1862, and during John Morgan's raid in July, 1863, in supplying munitions and men to assist in its defense.[51]

It was during this time that occasion arose for much adverse criticism of General Buell as commander of the army in eastern Tennessee. His studied movements and failure to inflict severe reverses on the Confederates greatly stirred the governors of the Northwest, especially Governor Morton who imagined that every army starting north was centering on Indianapolis.[52] Secretary Stanton felt much the same way about Buell; President Lincoln was very desirous that the Unionists of eastern Tennessee be freed from the rule of the Confederacy.[53] Andrew Johnson earnestly asked for Buell's removal. On August 18,1862, Halleck was notified to remove Buell, but got the matter delayed.[54]

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[47] General Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 146, 147, 152; Official Reocrds, Series I, vol. LII, part I, p. 277.

[48] Ibid., Series I, vol. XVI, part I, p. 469; General Telegrams, vol. VII, pp. 342, 346.

[49] Official Records, Series I, vol. XVI, part I, pp. 507, 508, 509, 513.

[50] Ibid., p. 775.

[51] Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, p. 190; Cincinnati Gazette, quoted in Indianapolis Daily Journal, July 27, 1862.

[52] In June, 1862, Buell had delayed moving the Forty-Nineth Indiana from Cumberland Ford, much to the displeasure of Governor Morton. On October 7, 1862, Morton told President Lincoln, "In my opinion, if our armies do not make great progress within the next sixty days, our cause will be lost. Our financial system must speedily end . . . . The danger of foreign intervention is daily increasing . . . . Another three months like the last six and we are lost--lost." Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 19-20.

[53] Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. III, pp. 181-183; Official Records, Series I, vol. XVI, part II, pp. 421, 556.

[54] General Halleck to General Buell, August 16, 1862, ibid.,p. 360.

Halleck realized well that Buell could not cut free from his communications, break up his army, and live off the country without courting disaster; and to a certain extent played the part of mediator by urging Buell on and restraining his opponents.[55] Buell defended himself as well as he could, but as early as August 18, asked to be relieved of his command if his course was not approved.[56] It was not until October 24, however, that his command was finally ordered turned over to General Rosecrans,[57] who continued Buell's tactics.

The change of commanders came not a moment too soon in the judgment of the governors in the North. Governor Morton in final desperation had arranged with Governors Yates and Tod to go to Washington to make a positive demand that he be removed.[58] Even after he had received word that Buell had been relieved of his command, he could not forego telegraphing the President, "We were to start tonight for Washington to confer with you in regard to Kentucky affairs. The removal of General Buell and the appointment of Rosecrans came not a moment too soon. The removal of General Buell could not have been delayed an hour with safety to the army or the cause. The history of the battle of Perryville and the recent campaign in Kentucky has never been told.[59] The action you have taken renders our visit unnecessary, although we are very desirous to confer with you in regard to the general condition of the Northwest and hope to do so at no distant period."[60] Morton did not necessarily secure the removal of General Buell, but his constant criticism of him helped to secure it.[61] Buell made the mistake of not giving up his command earlier, but he could

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[55] Ibid., pp. 324, 360, 421, 530, 549, 564; Ropes, Civil War, vol. II, p. 414.

[56] Official Records, Series I, vol. XVI, part II, pp. 360-361.

[57] Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. III, p. 183 note.

[58] Department Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 125-128, 133, 140, 163, 183; Ibid., vol. XV, p. 320.

[59] "Nearly 5000 Indiana soldiers were surrendered as Prisoners at Munfordsville, Kentucky, and paroled. Two thousand more were taken and paroled at Richmond, Kentucky. Indiana feels very sore over the mismanagement and imbecility which led to these results." O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, September 26, 1862, ibid., p. 286.

[60] Governors Morton and Yates to President Lincoln, October 25,1862, ibid., p. 328. Morton thought "our State was lost in the election of 1862 by the inactivity of the army", and the failure to relieve the economic depression of the time. W. H. Holloway to J. G. Nicholay, October 24, 1862, Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 233-239.

[61] On October 21, 1862, Morton and other leaders in Indiana telegraphed President Lincoln, "The butchery of our troops at Perryville was terrible and resulted from a large portion of the enemy being precipitated upon a small part of ours . . . . . Nothing but success speedy and decided will save our cause from utter destruction in the northwest. Distrust and despair are seizing upon the hearts of the people." Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 322. See also Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. III, p. 182.

do little other than he did--do his duty, until his opponents in the North accomplished their purpose.

2. Gunboats for Opening River Traffic

Governor Morton urged upon the federal government the building of gunboats for use on western waterways. The federal blockade of April, 1861, not only seriously impaired the commerce of the Northwest, but necessitated the closing of shipyards, which deprived thousands of skilled workmen of employment. The parties affected set up a great clamor, which was readily taken up by the newspapers of the river ports concerned. The matter only served to increase the total of dissatisfaction with the war itself. Governor Morton realized the seriousness of the situation, and the potential value of these artisans for winning the war.[62] In May he offered President Lincoln 2,000 shipwrights and large quantities of lumber for use in building gunboats.[63] Washington officials, too, were quick to realize the value of the offer; in June they were advertizing for bids and drawing up plans for the boats. Offices were opened in Cincinnati, Pittsburg, and Washington for collecting this data.[64] In July Congress appropriated $100,000, in August $1,000,000, and in December, 1861, $1,000,000 for gunboats.[65] Contracts were let during the winter and spring of 1861-1862. In March, 1862, Morton urged the federal government to build gunboats at Madison, New Albany, and Evansville.[66]

3. Prisoners of War and Other Federal Matters

The 12,000 to 15,000 Confederate soldiers captured at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862, [67] made necessary extensive preparations for caring for them. There were no means readily at hand for doing it. General Halleck, on February 18, after some preliminary negotiations,[68] inquired of Morton, "How many prisoners of war can you accommodate?" [69] He replied, "Three thousand" even though he had at the time no place suitable for keeping them, guarding them, etc. On February 18, Morton ordered General Love and General Noble to prepare quarters for three thousand prisoners, and provided that Colonel Richard Owen be ordered from Evansville to guard them.[70] On February 21, Halleck was notified, "We are fully prepared. Guard and barracks ready."[71] Camp Morton, formerly a fair ground, and recently used as a rendezvous for

[62] New Albany Daily Ledger, May 14, 24, 1861.

[63] Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, May 13, 1861.

[64] M. C. Meigs, quoted in New Albany Daily Ledger, June 24, 1861.

[65] United States Statutes at Large, 1861, First Session, Chaps. VI, and LI, Sec. 3; ibid., Second Session, Chap. 5.

[66] New Albany Daily Ledger, July 19, 1861; April 3, 8, 1862.

[67] James Ford Rhodes, History of the Civil War (New York, 1921), p. 91. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 455-462 gives a general review of this Camp and care of prisoners.

[68] Official Records, Series II, vol. III, p. 278; O. P. Morton to General Halleck, February 17, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 34; W. R. Holloway, to General Halleck, February 18, 1862; ibid., p. 42.

[69] H. W. Halleck to O. P. Morton, February 18, 1862; ibid., p. 43.

[70] Ibid., pp. 42, 43, 51.

[71] W. R. Holloway to General Halleck, February 21, 1862, ibid., p. 52.

Indiana troops, was the place fitted out for the accommodation of the prisoners. Later the United States Quartermaster, James A. Ekin, erected other buildings as they were needed, and from time to time made improvements in those provided by Governor Morton.[72]

On February 22, 3,000 prisoners had arrived.[73] There were 4,800 in camp on February 25;[74] on July 7, there were 4,300 at Camp Morton.[75] In general it might be said that Morton cared for them until the United States was in a position to do so. Federal officers exercised a loose, general supervision over the prison camp, but Morton assumed responsibility for the details of guards and guarding, and the transfer of prisoners from place to place.[76] He assisted in providing the hospital service, saw that they had the proper clothing, enabled some to be released on parole, assisted in drawing up regulations for the camp, and used part of the income from savings on rations for the benefit of the prisoners.[77]

As a result of the general exchange of prisoners of August, 1862, the prison camp was closed. But prisoners were stationed there occasionally during the latter part of 1862. Many prisoners of war captured in the campaign against Vicksburg were sent to Camp Morton, and others were sent in from other sections. State authorities were relieved from the general care and custody of the prisoners after 1862, when the camp was reorganized, and regular troops were used for guard duty. But never did Governor Morton trust them entirely to other responsibility.[78] It is equally evident that he had no legal right to many of his actions.[79]

72. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 456. Other prisoners were located at various places over the state, but that method was so unsatisfactory that they were soon concentrated at Camp Morton. Ibid.,p.457.
73. Ibid., p. 457. Governor Morton chose the route for sending them to Indianapolis, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 51.
74. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 458.
75. General Telegrams, vol. IV, p. 111.
76. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 64, 103, 111; Official Records, Series II, vol. III, pp. 435, 437; General Dispatches, vol. III, pp.103,111.
77. Terrell, Report, vol. I, pp. 457-462. Official Records, Series II, vol. III, pp. 276, 278, 281, 336-337, 347, 515-518 give other details. Soon it was necessary to provide a burial gouund; Morton purchased one near the city. Indianapolis Daily Sentinel, February 26, 1862; Madison Dollar Weekly Courier, February 28, 1862.
78. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 462.
79. On February 22, 1862, Montgomery C. Meigs, United States quartermaster general, notified Captain J. A. Potter, assistant quartermaster at Chicago, "The prisoners are the prisoners of the United States. You are an officer of the United States. The State of Illinois has no more right to give you orders than the State of Massachusetts. State authorities are entitled to respectful attention and consideration but they have no right to give orders to an officer of the United States." Official Records, Series II, vol. III, p. 301. The same was true of Morton's activities.

Morton secured the sending of paroled prisoners belonging to Indiana regiments to Indianapolis to be cared for until they were exchanged,[80] and was very active in securing exchanges of Indiana soldiers whether in southern camps or on parole.[81]

He was able to accomplish these things because many of the men holding federal appointments were nominees of his, or would tolerate his dictation. In June, 1862, he tried to secure the appointment of D. C. Rose, then United States marshal, as commander of the Camp Morton prison camp, but there was risk of the two offices endangering his marshalship.[82] In October, 1862, he secured the appointment of Rose as special provost marshal for Indiana.[83] Rose stood very high in Morton's estimation, as did James E. Ekin, United States quartermaster at Indianapolis.[84] Then, too, the members of the Indiana delegation at Washington were very active in securing appointments for Morton's nominees, and Washington officials were glad to use the patronage to induce favorable results. Morton was equally insistent on officers being removed from positions if he could not approve their acts.[85] Colonel Conrad Baker was appointed special provost marshal for the Indiana district in 1863 on Morton's recommendation.[86] Colonel John C. Walker of the Thirty-Fifth Indiana was relieved from his command in July, 1862, on Morton's protest to General Halleck that Walker had "defied my authority be refusing to allow officers whom I had duly appointed to fill vacancies to exercise their offices . . . ."[87]

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[80] Ibid., Series II, vol. IV, pp. 638, 641, 707, 717; ibid., Series II, vol. V, pp. 266, 289, 571, 719; Department Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 286, 290, 291, 293, 320; General Dispatches, vol. IX, pp. 58, 71, 72, 87, 107, 111, 114, 288, 289, 302, 321; Private Dispatches, No. XVI, pp. 4, 24, 34.

[81] Official Records, Series II, vol. IV, p. 623; ibid., vol. V, pp. 408, 409, 414; Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 111, 278.

[82] General Telegrams, vol. III, pp. 298, 299, 312, 313; ibid., vol. IV, pp. 14, 26.

[83] Department Dispatches, vol. XV, pp. 298-299; ibid., vol. IX, p. 19.

[84] O. P. Morton to E. M. Stanton, May 5, 1862, General Telegrams, vol. III, p. 222; ibid., vol. IV, p. 98.

[85] Department Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 301; ibid., vol. IV, p. 98, 125. Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 26, 1863; Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 149-154; Morton, Letters, vol. II, p. 123.

[86] Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 55.

[87] Morton, Letters, vol. II, pp. 28-41, gives Morton's account of the affair. Other requests for dismissal from command are cited in ibid., pp. 416-417, 146.

Morton was also one of the most insistent of a group of public men who recognized the importance of opening the Mississippi river to its mouth for commerce. The blockade of the South had caused great economic distress in the Northwest. Agricultural products were accumulating in the hands of the producers, and the situation was having an important effect upon the political opposition to the war as well as reducing the chances for financing the war. Morton and General McClernand urged the necessity of opening the river.[88] General Grant said, "This expedition must not fail."[89] President Lincoln said of it, "I feel deep interest in the success of the expedition and desire it to be pushed with all possible dispatch consistently with other parts of the military service."[90] In the early days of October, 1862, the administration was working out its plans.[91] On October 21, Secretary Cameron ordered General McClernand to interview the governors of Indiana, Illinois and Iowa.[92] They responded favorably of course, and the raising of troops for the purpose was begun at once. On December 12, 40,000 men had been raised.[93] The movement finally merged in the operations of Grant and Sherman on the Mississippi in 1863.[94]

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[88] Morton's letter of October 27, 1862, to President Lincoln urging the clearing of the river is printed in Foulke, Life of Morton, vol. I, pp. 208-212. See also ibid., 181, and Morton, Letters, vol. I, pp. 281, 408, 506.

[89] Official Records, Series I, vol. XVII, p. 551.

[90] Ibid., 502.

[91] General Dispatches, vol. XV, p. 301.

[92] Official Records, Series I, vol. XVII, part II, p. 334.

[93] Ibid., 401.

[94] On May 7, 1863, Morton telegraphed Secretary Stanton and Secretary Chase urging that all available force, both military and naval, be at once concentrated to open the Mississippi. By reports to Washington he urged the plan. Terrell, Report, vol. I, p. 26.

XIII. EPILOGUE: PEACE AND ITS PROBLEMS

1. As Occasioned by Ending of the War

WAR HAD COME GRADUALLY TO A CLOSE but there was anticipation of it for some months, expressed in the weakening lines of Confederate armies in the last part of 1864 especially. Partial expression was made, too, in the occasional sifting of veterans from newer military units and sending to Indiana for muster out. On the other hand there were draft calls through to the surrender at Appomattox. And even some radicals were lessening their charges against those who engaged in peace talk. Principal discharge period from the armed forces came during the summer of 1865 but armies of occupation continued to dominate the South as far west as the Texas coast on into the 1870's. Units returning to Indianapolis for muster out were uniformly feasted, complimented for their services, paid off in full and sent to their homes with greatest cheer. The joyous delirium of the public at receiving the news of the surrender in Virginia of April 9, 1865, was equaled only by the rage aroused by the firing on Fort Sumter in the same month almost exactly four years earlier.

Such spirit prevailed until the telegraph brought the news that President Lincoln had been assassinated. Suitable tribute was paid by the state to his memory on April 30 at Indianapolis as the body passed through the city on its way to burial at Springfield, Illinois. It was a rainy Sunday but some 100,000 persons paid their respects at the Capitol building. Previously, about April 15, military and governmental officials and many others had joined in commemoration.[1]

Again partison hatreds raged. Radicals blamed the Democrats; Democrats pleaded innocence. When Democratic senator Thomas A. Hendricks rose to speak at a commemoration mass-meeting at Indianapolis, there was a din of threats to kill him.[2] Along with local radicals generally, Morton and his supporters hastened by telegraph and by personal visitation to express their support to acting-President Andrew Johnson. Morton was even favorable to a moderate plan for reconstruction, but not so with his political arch-enemy George W. Julian

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1. Terrell, Report, vol. I (1960), 476-477; Stampp, Indiana, Chap.XI.
2. On April 24, 1861, Hendricks, had expressed himself with respect to prosecution of the war. He said he ". . . regarded it as the duty of citizens of the state to respect and maintain" federal authority, and "give the government an honest and earnest support in the prosecution of the war, until in the providence of God, it may be brought to an honorable conclusion, and the blessings of peace restored to our country. . . . No man will feel a deeper solicitude in the welfare and proud bearing of Indiana's soldiery in the conflict in arms to which they are called than myself." Foulke, Morton, vol. I, p. 116.

who regarded Lincoln's assassination as a "Godsend." Morton's position may be taken as a measure of radicalism in Indiana with respect to state and national politics. Morton in a moderate program would have the United States annex Mexico as a solution of the country's political difficulties there. He opposed negro control of state governments in the South. He would postpone negro participation in government there until they had become qualified to do so. He would reapportion ex-seceded states representation in the Congress according to the number of voters in the state, rather than by total population. He favored acceptance of the thirteenth amendment freeing the slaves. Such program Morton was soon to repudiate in favor ofmore radical program.

In Indiana negroes were still excluded from the public schools. It was still unlawful for them to enter the state, even for those returning from military service.[3]

2. Political Readjustment

In a message to the General Assembly on January 6, 1865, Morton, asked that his program during the war be legalized on the basis that had been necesaary to save the Union. Response was moderate even with the Republican majority. The State Board of Colonization for negroes was discontinued; testimomy of negroes was still not to be accepted in cases in which a white person was a party; a bill to pay claims of persons suffering damages during Morgan's Raid failed to become law.[4]

Again to the legislature meetingin special session in November, 1865, he strove to secure acceptance of his war program and new reform proposals. Still he would have damages incurred in the Morgan raid to be paid. Now he favored separate schools for negroes provided from public funds. Negroes were given right to testify in the courts. Morton still opposed negro suffrage. He cooperate with President Johnson in his Mexican policy requiring the withdrawal of French troops from that country. But soon he along with other radicals had broken with Johnson over reconstruction and was supporting extreme measures. He regarded Radical Republicanism as the real Republican party and successor to Unionism, and repudiated the presidential policy of reconstruction. Democrats generally supported Johnson as did moderate Republicans in Indiana. Morton weakened politically inthe state and turned to 'bloody shirt' tactics; soon Democrats were "traitors" once more. In 1867 he favored "universal suffrage!" On January 22, 1867, he was chosen United States senator, which he regarded as vindication of his war program. He resigned from the governorship on the same day and thus eased himself out of the cauldron of state politics for the larger and more peaceful sphere of action.[5] In time he outdid Julian in radicalism and entirely lacked the latter's idealism, with his cold economic and politcal realism. Many veterans, too, never forgave peace-Democracy for its attitudes during the war and insisted on "voting as they had shot" in favor of war heroes. The Grand army of the

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[3] Ibid., 444-449.

[4] Foulke vol. I, pp. 438-439.

[5] Ibid., pp. 455, 457, 469, 488.



Early
Later to 1860
1861-1865

ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, 1777-1865

Republic emerged from that spirit and any Republican was better than any Democrat as long as they lived, and there are still traces of that attitude a century after the contest.

The "treason trials" of 1864 have already been alluded to. In that case, Harrison H. Dodd, William L. Bowles, Lambdin P. Milligan, and Stephen Horsey had been sentenced to be hanged. Andrew Humphreys was to do hard labor for the period of the war, but soon had the sentence commuted to township-arrest in Greene county. At any rate the case against the peace Democrats got a thorough publicizing. Sentences of the other three, with recommendation of Governor Morton and other radicals, was finally commuted to life imprisonment by President Johnson. Lincoln had set no date for their execution. Harrison W. Dodd, grand commander of the Sons of Liberty in Indiana was found guilty of conspiracy against the government in September, 1864, as part of the same set-up. He was tried, then was allowed to escape from the government building at Indianapolis and flee to Canada. Evidently the major purpose of publicity and warning to the secret order had been attained, both for its own sake and for its effect on the pending elections.

In 1866, as their case was being taken to the federal Supreme Court, Johnson pardoned the prisoners. Nevertheless the court ruled in the same year that since Milligan was not in military or naval service, and the civil courts in Indiana were open to hear cases, his trial before a military court had been a denial of his rights and therefore illegal. Subsequently Milliagn sued for damages, won his case and an award of $5.00. Until 1942, the decision was regarded as the defense of civil rights in the United States.

As for other matters, never did either peace-Democrat nor radical-Republican acknowledge error for their ways during the war. Most Democrats and moderate Republicans soon were asking publicly that war issues be dropped and attention be given to new problems. Slavery was seen to be at an end by all, but without agreement about what to do about or with the negro from there. Indianans had not too much sympathy even with end of slavery since it at least functioned as a social control over negroes; many could not recognize racial equality and civil rights. Radicals were for national banks, payment of the public debt of the Union but not those of the ex-Confederacy, for a sound currency, a continuance of high protective tariff, and continuation of the homestead policy. Democrats regarded much of that program with moderation; they feared rule of the eastern manufacturing aristocracy much as had the South in 1860-1861. Now that railroads had arrived, and not as a state internal improvement, farmers wanted them at least to be closely regulated by government. They were for rather free issue of green backs and price support for farm products by the inflation route.

3. Legalizations of War Acts and Financial Transactions

As for state governmental measures of the period of 1863-1865, especially, some had little legal foundation to say the least. The election of 1864 had returned Republicans to power at Indianapolis.

They organized the General Assembly in the following January. Morton wanted his irregualr actions to be legalized. Investigating committees approved the various financial accounts, including that of the State Arsenal. Winslow-Lanier loans amounting to $629,433 and seven percent interest were approved by the legislature. Even more questionable loans and bond issues from counties, cities and private citizens were legalized. The Financial Bureau, which was the equivalent of a safe in the governor's office, was long a bone of contention, as were political arrests. And so the contest went on into the future without too much of hard and fast lessons of the war to assist in cooperative planning for the future.[6]

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6. Terrell, Report, vol. I, Appendix, 262, etc.; Stampp, Indiana, chap. II; Foulke, Morton, vol. I, chaps, XXXI, XXXII; Documentary Journal, 1865; Esarey, II, chap. 27.

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